The Emerging Fellows Programme

This week we completed the third of the Emerging Fellows programmes. We are now set to start on the fourth. The change over between programmes gives us an opportunity to reflect upon what we are doing and to consider what it is that we seek to achieve with the programme. 

Starting from the beginning, the current version of the programme - there was a previous version of the programme before we became involved - aims to provide an element of practice based work experience for early stage futurists. We do this through a sequence of curated writing that grows into a catalogue of work over the course of the year. The European Futures Observatory operates the programme in conjunction with the Association of Professional Futurists. The APF has the digital publication rights for the work produced - which is published on the APF web site - and EUFO has the print publication rights, which it exercises in an annual publication of the work in book form.

This arrangement has worked well over the past three years. However, as we enter the fourth year of operation, it is time to place the programme in a wider context. This wider context will help us with one of the problems arising from the programme. Each year, the Emerging Fellows who successfully complete the programme are left with the question of what to do next. Over the years, some of the cohorts have stayed in touch with each other and the issue of what comes next remains in abeyance. If we step back to take a wider view, perhaps that might help us answer this question?

In thinking about this, we have found the APF Foresight Competency Model to be quite useful. The development of competency in foresight speaks to what we are looking to achieve in the programme. The model establishes three foundational areas of competency - personal effectiveness, academic knowledge, and workplace experience - before considering the foresight technical competencies. In a roundabout way, we have also found that place.

Admission to the programme is now through a competitive entrance. This is simply because we don't have enough places available for all applicants. The entrance asks for a written submission to accompany a CV. In the written submission, we are looking for evidence of the three foundational competencies and make our decisions accordingly. We are not an academic institution, so we tend to downplay the academic competencies and highlight the workplace competencies. The scheme of curated writing within the programme aims at delivering a practical application of the foresight technical competencies. We aim to keep the technical workings concealed because our intended readership aren't interested in these nuts and bolts. They just want to receive the end product.

So far, so good. But what next? In the competency model there is a fifth stage - foresight sector competencies. This has three branches - the academic world, the organisational world, and the world of practice. It is this latter category that interests us. There is scope to develop the programme further in the world of consulting through a joint branding and a joint operations exercise. We have stumbled along this route already, but we need to give it a more defined shape and purpose.

The Emerging Fellows in the 2020 programme, along with some of the Emerging Fellows from the 2018 and 2019 programmes, have taken to gaming as a means to unlock the future. We have reported fully on two previous games - one examining the future of the Arctic and one examining the future of Central Asia - and this seems a rich vein to mine a bit further. We can do this in a number of ways - different subject areas, different gaming formats, and introducing different players. We plan to formalise a programme around this in the near future.

There is also a desire amongst some former Emerging Fellows to continue writing. Some want to continue their topics from their programme of study. Some want to examine the roads not taken during their programme of study. And some want to examine topics completely unrelated to their programme of study. All of them see further writing as a means to enhance their professional reputations. It is our intention to harness this desire by launching a new foresight magazine in 2021. The magazine will accept submissions from other than Emerging Fellows, but this ought to be seen as an expansion of the programme.

Now that we can see the direction of travel - deeper into the fifth competency - we can also see the destination ahead. In the fullness of time, there would be scope for the group to bid for and deliver joint projects together. We haven't reached that point just yet, but we can see the time when we will.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

Is There A Gold Standard For Foresight?

One of the problems with foresight is time. Most foresight work takes years, sometimes decades, to be fully work through. Despite this, there is a need to know in the present if a particular project was a worthwhile venture. The desire to appreciate a particular piece of foresight leads us to ask if there is some form of Gold Standard for foresight? An ideal piece of work against which any given piece could be judged. And if there is, what would that ideal piece of foresight look like? More importantly, based on the Gold Standard, could we reverse engineer a piece of foresight to ensure that we can consistently produce good work?

We can appraise foresight from one of two perspectives. First, there is the internal value of a piece of foresight. In this case, the exercise provides value because it was a project that was worth doing in itself. Alternatively, we could view the piece of foresight from an external perspective. In this case, the foresight would be worth doing because we can appraise it as a thing of beauty. There are a number of points to touch upon here.

To begin with, foresight produces a work of art rather than a scientific calculation. The calculation of the future belongs more with forecasting, which has a place in foresight, but not as an end result. A key axiom of foresight is that there is more than one possible future and a good foresight project will capture this plurality of futures. Like most works of art, foresight can be appreciated as the result of a series of techniques, which leans more towards the internal appraisal of foresight. Equally, a piece of foresight could be appreciated as a resultant totality, in which case we would be taking more of an external appraisal of the piece of foresight. Sometimes, these approaches can generate a sharp contrast.

For example, there are those who maintain that - in order to be a good piece of foresight - reference has to be made to certain issues. One that commonly is encountered is climate change. Climate change is important, but should it be present in all pieces of foresight? Perhaps not. Alternatively, there are those who insist that the issue of civilisational collapse is included in all works of foresight. Once again, this is an important issue, but perhaps not an all-consuming issue? 

In my view, these positions are a little too prescriptive for my liking. To put this another way, I am reluctant to with-hold the validation of a foresight project simply because it does not adhere to a subjective frame of reference. Like most subjective frames of reference, these are often held quite violently by their adherents. In my view, this is an extremist position. I know that it's hard to think of futurists as Jihadists, but some can be over their respective beliefs.

My own view is that the validation of foresight should stem from the internal logic of a piece of foresight. To begin with, it needs to be well crafted technically - using the right tool - to the right level of maturity, and answering the question set rather than the question that ought to have been set. We may have to wait some time to be able to appraise the utility of the particular work, but we can discern early clues as to it's validity. Is it internally consistent? Does it answer the question asked? Was the right tool used? For an appropriate time horizon? Does it fit in with broadly similar - but independent - works of foresight? Has it provided a set of milestones into the future by which we can determine which outcome events are tending towards? If all of these elements are there, then the chances are that valid results have been produced.

I'm not sure that there is a Gold Standard for foresight. To me that suggests too prescriptive a framework that merely reinforces a conventional wisdom. There are a number of conviction futurists who would disagree with me on this point, but I would suggest that their convictions are blinding them to the possibility that they might be wrong. I am of the view that there are any number of possible futures that we might experience and that there is no single way to unlock those futures. For this reason, there can be no Gold Standard.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Terrible Twins (Again)

The pandemic has caused some degree of disruption to most economies in the world, much as every crisis does. Equally, not every economy has been affected in an even and consistent way. Some countries have been affected worse than others. Some economies have bounced back better than others. The intensity and duration of the disruption is influenced heavily by differing social and political conditions, which reflect the underlying cultural norms of the different societies. As the pandemic progresses, we can already start to see the contours of an emerging future. It allows us to speculate about how that may develop as time goes on.

COVID originated in the Far East and these societies were the first to react. The initial reaction was one of literally shutting down society and economic activity as far as possible. By and large, this strategy proved to be successful, mainly because the societies involved normally contained a relatively high degree of central control. As the virus spread across Europe and North America, various governments reacted with varying degrees of competence. This meant that the virus was not quite as well contained as it had been in the Far East. The effect of this was to keep economic activity at lower levels than had been experienced previously.

The governments in Europe and North America responded to the economic deep freeze in the private sector with a very large fiscal stimulus. The method varied from nation to nation, but the intention was similar - to keep afloat households during a period of acute reductions in earnings. In Europe, the main intention was to fund employers so that they could continue to pay salaries. In the US, the main strategy was to pay the economic actors directly - funds paid to companies to support profits and to households to cover their expenses.

This is where things start to get interesting. A good percentage of the stimulus funds were saved, both by households and corporates. Both sectors have increased their holdings of precautionary balances - their 'rainy day money'. However, not all of the stimulus has been saved and consumption - especially the consumption of on-line sales - has held up. This has had an interesting impact on the foreign balance. On the one hand, reduced levels of economic activity in the US has held back exports, whilst, on the other hand, the fiscal stimulus has helped to pull in greater levels of imports. Especially imports from China. As a corollary, Chinese sales into the US has helped to increase economic activity in China to such a degree that China can actually expect economic growth this year.

We have now reached a point where the US has seen the return of the twin deficits - the external deficit and the fiscal deficit - and is now reliant upon a net inflow of finance to sustain these. This is of very great significance because it is marking a point at which the US moves from being a creditor nation to becoming a debtor nation. Potentially, this is not a happy place for America.

It could be possible that the US attempts to address these deficits, However, the consequences would be somewhat untoward. The fiscal deficit could be addressed through a large increase in taxation, but that would risk capital flight. Alternatively, spending could be pared back. But where? Defence? Social programmes? These choices presume a political system in broad agreement, whereas we see one that is largely gridlocked. The future prospects are even worse. As America ages, then, if the political promises for pensions and healthcare are to be maintained, then the fiscal deficit will grow even further than it is today.

All of this is dependent upon the willingness of overseas actors to finance the debt. That would suggest the continued support of the rules based economic infrastructure that supports such financing. In which case, the scope for addressing the external deficit becomes much more limited. The two are linked. For example, President Trump's trade war with China and the resultant imposition of tariffs on Chinese goods had two effects. First, China retaliated by imposing tit-for-tat tariffs on American goods entering China. Second, with more subtlety, Chinese surpluses with the US are no longer recycled into US Treasuries. They are channelled into emerging market sovereign debt. This is a potential problem for the US that could have a significant impact upon the future.

It would seem that the twin deficits are likely to be a feature for some time to come. At this point we might ask what that means? We take the view that this is a situation broadly analogous to that of Great Britain a century ago. From the British perspective, it marked the start of a half century of decline. Relative decline at first, and then absolute decline. If we are right, then we ought to start thinking about what might be the American equivalent of the Suez Crisis and look out for the formative elements in mid-century. A more interesting question revolves around how Washington would react in the face of a national humiliation? The pandemic has accelerated this process, which was under way at the start of the year, but it is an interesting consequence of COVID-19.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

Does Foresight Provide Value?

The fact that people are employed as futurists - either within an organisation or as consulting futurists - suggests that there is some value within foresight. Surely the market for foresight would be absolutely flat if no value were to accrue? However, not all foresight does provide value. If it did, then the use of foresight would be far more widespread than it is today. We might ask from where that value originates. We need to start with examining why people want to have an insight into the future. This will help us to determine what foresight can offer and what it can't offer. It also gives us clues about what the utility of foresight might be, which shapes how it is best used.

Foresight is a close cousin to uncertainty. Indeed, the market for foresight is closely correlated to the degree of uncertainty experienced within the working environment. During settled periods where the future is much the same as the present, the need for insights into the future are far less than periods where the operating environment appears to be chaotic. If the future were to be much the same as the present, then that would be a reasonable working assumption for the decision making framework. If on the other hand, we have no idea how the future will roll out, then having an edge to cut through that uncertainty is likely to lead to better decisions in the present. That is the core value proposition of foresight. Good foresight will assist in making better decisions about an uncertain future.

The value proposition is evident, but the delivery of foresight can vary a great deal. We previously explored the possibility that foresight might not work because a project might be poorly constructed. We reviewed the Foresight Maturity Model and the Foresight Competency Model as the bases from which we could take a view. In many respects, these represent the supply dimension of foresight. A given project may provide poor value because it was poorly constructed. There may also be shortcomings on the demand side, leading to a sense that poor value was delivered.

It is important to bear in mind what foresight can do and what it cannot do. Good foresight can highlight a range of possible future situations in which we might find ourselves. It does not predict the future, it explores a range of possible futures. This is, perhaps, the biggest mismatch between the expectations of foresight and what is actually delivered. If this occurs, usually it is a sign of a poor foresight practitioner, who hasn't taken the time to ensure that a client understands what foresight can do and what it cannot do. However, even if client expectations for a project have been well managed, it could still go off the rails because the wrong tool is selected for the job.

There are two dimensions to tool selection - selecting the appropriate level of maturity required for the project and selecting the right techniques to deliver the project. There is a temptation to over-promise on a foresight project. The temptation to promise, say, a world class project, but to then allocate an ad hoc budget to deliver it. This is a recipe for disappointment. Generally speaking, the higher the level of project required, the more human input and time it will take. Consequently, good world class projects are far more expensive - in cash terms - than ad hoc projects. It is tough for the practitioner to tell the client - either internal or external - that when they pare back the budget, they are reducing the degree of maturity the resultant project can hope for.

Equally important as setting the right degree of maturity for a project is selecting the right tools to deliver it. For example, a project that sets out to provide a set of scenarios that delivers a set of trends is bound to disappoint. Equally, a project based  around the exploration of a 2x2 scenario matrix ought to raise eyebrows if it only delivers three scenarios. I have seen these in the past.

The right tools for the job can be found in the terms of reference for the project, which is why it is important to set these out clearly at the start of the project. Even more than that, the terms of reference ought to be bounded by the original project deliverables. This is a case of having a clear view of what a project is setting out to achieve before work commences.

That, in turn, is a question of professionalism. It's a fairly basic procedure to sit down with a client, discuss what they want to examine, work out what they want to get from a project, determine a set of deliverables, select the right tools to undertake the task, pull together a team to roll out the project, and then to actually deliver it. It is surprising how many clients and practitioners fail to do this. At that point, either poor foresight is delivered (wrong techniques used or inappropriate maturity delivered), or good foresight is delivered that fails to provide value because it has answered the wrong question.

At that point, foresight doesn't work. However, it fails to work because it has not been delivered well. The problem is not with the technique but the way in which it has been delivered. If foresight is to work, it has to deliver good foresight (the right techniques at the appropriate level of maturity) that provides value to those involved in that foresight.

Does foresight provide value? If done properly, yes.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

How Can We Distinguish Between Good Foresight And Poor Foresight?

Part of the intrinsic value proposition of foresight is that good foresight works. If that is the case, it then begs the question of how we can distinguish between good foresight and poor foresight. If we can draw this distinction, then we are on the way to determine that intrinsic value proposition. The assessment of foresight means that we have to have some ideal reference framework against which we can compare an actual piece of work to consider what elements are present and what are absent. If a large degree of those elements are present, then we can place a degree of reliance upon any given piece of work. If they are absent, then we are given a clue that the piece of work might be lacking something.

Perhaps an analogy from the medical profession might help us here? Given that most practising doctors have broadly equivalent amounts of training, how do we distinguish a good doctor from a poor one? A good doctor will inspire a greater degree of confidence compared to a poor one, but why is that the case? Usually it is because the good doctor will instil a greater feeling of competence. There is a high correlation between confidence and competence. This is also the case with futurists. Those futurists with a greater reputation for competence will instil a higher degree confidence amongst their actual and potential clients.

Professional competence is an attribute that is key to the work of professional futurists. This shows not only in their work, but also in what their reputation speaks of them. The question then arises of how we can identify and measure that competence? There are a number of ways of doing this, but just as accountants have GAAP (Generally Agreed Accounting Practices), so do futurists have the Foresight Competency Model. Before we get to the competency model, we first have to go through the Foresight Maturity Model.

The maturity model sets out a number of practices that, taken together, constitute foresight. These six practices involve framing, scanning, futuring, visioning, designing, and adapting a foresight project. Together, they form the core of technical competencies that fit into the competency model. In the maturity model, these six technical competencies can be appraised for their maturity level on a scale of one to five (ad hoc, aware, capable, mature, and world class). Each maturity level has its own attributes. The six practices and five maturity levels can be used to generate a framework to appraise a given piece of foresight.

The technical competencies fit into a more general competency model. This was developed by the Association of Professional Futurists - of which I am a member - in order to grapple with the issue of professional competence. In addition to technical competence, the model incorporates four other competencies (personal effectiveness, academic, workplace, and sectoral) to provide an overall framework. The competency model as a whole is designed for use in a global setting, but relies heavily upon professional assumptions from the US in its design. For example, it stresses academic knowledge acquisition over workplace knowledge acquisition, a more European approach to professional development. However, this question of emphasis in no way invalidates the model. It is a shortcoming that the user has to bear in mind when using the model.

The Foresight Maturity Model and the Foresight Competency Model provide a framework by which we can take a view on whether a given piece of foresight work is a good piece or a poor piece. It helps to show us what to expect in a piece of work. In many respects, this is also situational. If we are engaged in a piece of ad hoc work, then it would compromise the personal effectiveness competency if we were to strive to deliver a world class piece of work. That would be over-egging the pudding. Generally speaking, the more mature a piece of work, the more resources are needed to generate it. So if a client wants a quick and inexpensive study, then we can question the wisdom of delivering a long and costly study. That is a question of value, which is a different matter.

For now, to wrap things up, we have established - in a previous post - that whether or not foresight works depends largely upon whether we are talking about good foresight or poor foresight. Poor foresight rarely works in the absence of a huge amount of luck. Good foresight can work. To distinguish between the two, we need to refer to the Foresight Maturity Model and the Foresight Competency Model to ensure that we have a piece of foresight that is technically competent and at the right level of maturity. Of course, that does not mean that foresight has provided value per se. That is a different matter to which we shall turn next.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

Does Foresight Work?

This might be an odd question to ask a futurist. Obviously I believe that foresight works. I wouldn't be doing this if I didn't. It's not particularly well paid, it's not particularly well revered, and it's not particularly appreciated. So there must be something about it that keeps me doing it. However, when I am asked that question - as I frequently am - there is a bit more going on than meets the eye. A more honest way of asking the question would be to say, "I have doubts about whether foresight works, could you convince me please?" That is the question we shall be addressing.

In addressing the question, it might be useful to start elsewhere. It is uncommon for someone to ask an accountant, "Does accountancy work?" Simply saying it sounds absurd. Of course accountancy works. People find it useful to tally their costs and revenues, to use that information in questions of affordability, and to use the language of numbers to link the past, present and future. Accountancy rests upon a set of agreed principles and a core of techniques that are used to generate financial information. These are useful in helping to manage all sorts of entities in all sorts of situations. Accountancy works because it is extremely useful.

Does the same apply to futurists? Intuitively, you would think not. Accountants have a demonstrated utility but futurists don't. Why might that be? I think that there are two dimensions to this question. First, is there a means to distinguish between good and bad foresight? If we can distinguish between the two, we will have a standard by which we can examine the second dimension - does foresight provide value? Putting the two together, if there is a framework by which good foresight can be delivered, and if that foresight provides value, then it surely has to possess some use.

Coming back to the case of accountancy, the agreed principles and core techniques can be used to discern good accounting from poor accounting. They help to unlock some of the base assumptions that go into a set of financial statements. This allows us to take a view on whether we find the financial statements convincing or unconvincing. Unusual assumptions or irregular techniques undermine our confidence in a set of financial statements, possibly to the point where we doubt their veracity. In this case, the financial statements provide very little value and, in this case, accountancy doesn't work. For it to work, good accounting needs to inspire confidence in the set of accounts.

A similar process applies to foresight. If a study adopts a set of generally agreed techniques, and uses a range of assumptions that the end user considers reasonable, then the end user can have a degree of  confidence in the output of the study. In this sense, the output will be both convincing and useful. However, there is a danger of groupthink entering into the calculation. If the core assumptions are monocultural, then the future envisaged may become implausible to people outside of the group. In turn, this begs a question of professional ethics. To what extent should the futurist - who is acting as a technician at this stage - tell the client that they are wrong in their world view? We can park that question for now and return to it in a later piece.

For now, we want to establish something different. If foresight is to work, it must be useful. For it to be useful, it has to provide some form of value to the users of foresight. In order to have provided this value, we must be able to distinguish between good foresight and poor foresight. We need to be able to appraise a study, find the good points and find the weak points, determine if the right techniques were used or if things could have been done differently, and expose assumptions we find convincing and assumptions we feel are a bit weak. 

This feels as if we are ducking the question. Does foresight work? It could do if we use the right approach. If we get things right, it can be quite valuable. If we get things wrong, it can be a waste of time and money. We need to reduce the chance of wasting money by ensuring that a foresight study is properly structured in the first place. This is the subject of our next piece - looking at the question of good and poor foresight.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

Do Money Flows Uncover The Future?

There are times when an emergent future can be seen from within the patterns of monetary flows that occur in the present. The movement of funds signifies the direction in which patterns of value and influence occur. They can be used to chart the rise to prominence of individuals, companies, or nations; as they can equally be used to chart their decline. Identifying the points at which the money flows switch can be used to map the turning points in history.

For example, the UK, prior to 1914, had been very much a creditor nation. The flows of gold - in a monetary system backed by the Gold Standard - tended to move into the country during the 19th Century. This was the consequence of Britain industrialising ahead of the rest of Europe and North America to generate trade surpluses that were further underpinned by the British Empire. The trade surpluses provided the basis on which loans were later made to overseas companies and governments in the form of overseas investments. 

Although this system had weakened before the First World War - the industrial production of the rest of Europe and North America had closed the gap with Great Britain - it was the cost of the war that turned Britain into a debtor nation. War had inflated public spending to the point where the economy only stayed afloat through borrowing from abroad. The stock of UK public debt stood at 25% of GDP in 1914. It rose to 135% of GDP in 1919. This is the point from which we can establish the decline of Great Britain as a great power. It took 30 years for that decline to burn through - which we mark by Indian independence - but it was evident in 1919.

In 1919, the principal holder of UK national debt was the United States. This, in turn, is another telling point. Here we can chart the transition from one declining great power - the United Kingdom - and the rise of the succeeding great power - the United States. This transfer of indebtedness is something that has great resonance today.

The past forty years have been characterised by the rise of China as an industrial nation. The US is the largest customer for Chinese manufactured goods, which has given rise to large Chinese trade surpluses with the US for a good number of years. Rather than repatriate these earnings - which are denominated in the global reserve currency, the US Dollar - which would cause the Yuan to appreciate, the Dollar earnings of Chinese entities have been recycled into American financial instruments. Mainly into US Treasuries.

This growing source of US indebtedness to China has been a cause of concern for years and is the root cause of the bout of economic warfare in recent years. From the American perspective, the retention of Chinese funds offshore artificially supresses the Yuan against the US Dollar, giving China an 'unfair' trade advantage with the US. The growing hostility between the US and China calls into question the use of America by China as an investment destination for Chinese funds. 

The COVID pandemic has served to make matter worse. The fiscal response in the US - over $US2 trillion - has provided a cash injection that has served to generate a recovery in China that is faster than expected and an increase in Chinese trade surpluses with the US. The Yuan hasn't appreciated in this process and China hasn't stepped up its purchases of US Treasuries. The question remains of where the Chinese surpluses are being recycled. Data from the Bank for International Settlements indicates that, compared with 2016, Chinese commercial banks have increased lending to developing countries, increasing the footprint from under 20% of all lending in 2016 to over 25% in 2020. This is skewed towards lending in the Asia Pacific region, and Africa and the Middle East. 

We have now reached a really odd situation. The US taxpayer is funding the US consumer, who is buying manufactured goods made in China. This causes a Chinese trade surplus with America in US Dollar terms, which is recycled to developing nations along the BRI as Chinese financial assistance denominated in US Dollars. In turn, this financial assistance is subject to a flight of safety, where institutions in the developing world are looking for a safe harbour in US Treasuries, which goes to fund the US fiscal deficit. And so the circle is closed.

There are two points to note. First, the cycle is inherently unstable. The link between the US and China is not a stable one. Even with a change of President in the US, it is unlikely that the economic hostility between the two nations will diminish greatly. China is the rising power and the US is the declining one. There is bound to be a degree of friction in this process. Second, the ability of the US to act as a safe haven presupposes that investor confidence in the US Dollar remains high. The prospects are that it will not as the US struggles to deal with an ageing population later in this decade.

That all leaves us potentially at one of those inflection points in history. The key event is where the Chinese surpluses are switched from purchasing US Treasuries to commercial lending to entities in the developing world as part of a targeted foreign policy. This heralds a form of imperial expansion, with a distinctly Chinese footprint - tributary diplomacy. The key uncertainty as we peer ahead is whether or not the United States has an answer to this? If it does, then the system will continue for now. If it doesn't, then the retreat of American interests could be very fast indeed.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Belarussian Right Hook - Lessons Learned

If we are to use a game framework as a learning experience, then it does no harm to consider what the lessons learned from the experience might be. This game was an experiment in producing a top level geopolitical game to feed a timeline into a mid-tier economic and financial game. How well did that go? 

We can examine this question on two levels. First, how did this game play as a game? What changes would we want to introduce of we were to play the game again? How could we refine the game even further? Second, how useful was the timeline the game produced? Does it capture a reasonable flow of events? Are there other factors that we might want to add to the game to derive a better timeline? Let's think about these questions.

The main premise of the game was to give Russia an advantage by starting from Belarus. I'm not sure that advantage was fully used in the game. Russian forces did start at Brest, but didn't enter the game until Turn 4 (D+12). I felt that was a bit late in the day. I think that it would have played better if the Russian forces had entered the game at the outset. Perhaps an amendment might be that Russian forces can start Turn 1 in Belarus, but have to vacate Belarus by the end of Turn 1? That would bring the advantage to the foreground.

I'm not sure that we got the Russian reinforcements right. We rolled a dice to see when reinforcements could arrive through Crimea, and it came out at Turn 3 (D+9). I feel that this was a bit late in the day. I think that in future games, we ought to allow Russian forces to come through Crimea at the start of Turn 2. Equally, we rolled a dice to determine when Russian reinforcements from the Central and Far Eastern Military Districts would arrive. This came out as Turn 6 (D+18). Once again, I felt that this was a bit late in the day. In future games, we ought to allow for these reinforcements to arrive sooner - possibly at some point in the first three turns.

The Blue Team military structure would always present a problem. There are three parts to the Blue Team - NATO, the EU Common Defence and Security structure outside of NATO, and the rest of the Blue Team (Ukraine and Moldova). Perhaps the way to deal with this issue is for three players to act for the Blue Team? Failing that, there will always have to be a degree of flexibility in representing the Blue Team. In this game, the EU Nordic Battlegroup was eager to get to grips with Russian forces. There is scope for another game where it is less so, and there is scope for yet another game where some elements are keen to be involved (the Baltic States) and others less so (Sweden and Finland). The operation of the Blue Team gives us great scope to mix and match varying operational conditions to generate a set of very different games.

The central object of the game was to generate a convincing timeline. Did we do that? In many respects we did, but the timeline needs to be adjusted to account for factors outside of the game. The big question surrounds the attitude of China towards events in Europe. Would conflict in Eastern Europe lead to Chinese adventurism against the US in the western Pacific? Or against Russia in the Siberian Far East? 

These are great questions that the game doesn't answer. I am not at all certain that it should. We had to assert a degree of containment within the game. We did not allow Russia or the US to advance to the nuclear threshold, although the actions of the Nordic Battlegroup made that more likely. A small tactical nuke on arriving Swedish and Finnish forces through Riga would have slowed the advance into north western Russia considerably. However, it would have led to a very different game to the one we wanted to play, so neither side was allowed to escalate to the nuclear threshold. That was an umpire assertion which could be changed in future games, especially if the Russian forces in Kaliningrad were to play a greater role.

In producing the timeline, we have added a set of reactions from China and Japan, who would feature in an economic and financial game, but not in the geopolitical game. This is an act of converting the result of the geopolitical game into a format that could be used for the economic and financial game. Whilst there is scope to improve the geopolitical game, it has yielded a timeline that we can put to good use in an economic and financial game. In that respect, it has served the purpose for which it was played.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Belarussian Right Hook - The Timeline

The object of this game was to derive a timeline that could be used as an input into an economic and financial wargame at a later stage. This begs the question of what that timeline would look like and how we would order the output for that purpose. Key to our thinking is simultaneity - if that is happening here, then what is happening there? The geopolitical game provides us with a narrative from which we can develop the timeline.

The first issue we have to address is whose timeline? This touches upon a core issue of who the actors should be in the economic and financial game. This expands the focus of the game from being concerned about regional events in Eastern Europe to being concerned about global reactions to these events. That is quite a switch. 

The geopolitical game laid down an event, and we now have to consider how that event would be viewed by the actors in the economic and financial game. A first run at who the actors would be are: the US Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, the People's Bank of China. This would imply a five player game. This could be adjusted at a later date to include other financial actors representing other financial centres. 

This thinking lends itself readily to a cross impact matrix style of thinking. This is our first attempt at weaving this into a timeline:

Timeline: D+3

Geopolitical headline: Russia advances across southern Ukraine and besieges Kiev. Romania maintains the independence of Moldova.

Response in: 

Washington: Concern at events, diplomatic efforts to contain the situation. 

Brussels: Concern at events, diplomatic efforts to contain the situation. 

Tokyo: Concern at events. 

London: Concern at events, diplomatic efforts to contain the situation. 

Beijing: Concern at events

Timeline: D+6

Geopolitical headline: Kiev falls, Russia consolidates it's hold on southern Ukraine, Romania invades Ukraine.

Response in: 

Washington: Diplomatic efforts to restrain Romania. 

Brussels: Diplomatic efforts to restrain Romania. 

Tokyo: Concern at escalation of events. 

London: Diplomatic efforts to restrain Romania.  

Beijing: Concern at escalation of events.

Timeline: D+9

Geopolitical headline: The Ukrainian army is largely destroyed and the Romanian Army is defeated and retreats back towards Moldova.

Response in: 

Washington: Warns Russia that Romania is a member of the NATO alliance, has been defeated, and ought to be allowed to withdraw to Moldova. 

Brussels: Under the Common Security and Defence Policy, the Visegrad Battlegroup and the Nordic Battlegroup are alerted to activation.  

Tokyo: Concerned by events, places armed forces on alert. 

London: Follows US lead within the NATO framework.

Beijing: Concerned by events, places armed forces on alert.

Timeline: D+12

Geopolitical headline: Romanian Army destroyed in Ukraine, Poland invades Ukraine and advances towards Kiev, the Lithuanian Army invades northern Russia.

Response in: 

Washington: Facilitates escalation in Eastern Europe, considers the actions of Lithuania and Poland as occurring within the NATO framework as a response to actions against the Romanian Army.

Brussels: Under the Common Security and Defence Policy, the Visegrad and Nordic Battlegroups are committed to action. Hungary dissents, Germany remains undecided. 

Tokyo: Concerned by events, armed forces remain on alert. 

London: Places armed forces on alert, waits for lead from Washington. 

Beijing: Concerned by events, armed forces remain on alert.

Timeline: D+15

Geopolitical headline: Article 5 triggered and NATO airpower committed to action in Ukraine. Polish forces capture Kiev and the Nordic Battlegroup drives further into Russia.

Response in: 

Washington: Congress approves Presidential action, US forces to be committed as they become available. 

Brussels: Proposal to commit EU to NATO actions. 

Tokyo: Concerned by events, armed forces remain on alert. 

London: Commits RAF and Royal Navy to the conflict, along with land based forces when they are available. 

Beijing: Concerned by events, armed forces remain on alert.

Timeline: D+18

Geopolitical headline: Germany supports Poland, Sweden and Finland arrive in the Baltic States. The Nordic Battlegroup drives on to the Dnieper.

Response in: 

Washington: Diplomatic and material assistance to NATO allies, USAF committed to action. 

Brussels: Wrangling over the degree of commitment to provide to NATO. Hungary, Greece and Cyprus objecting to the EU becoming involved.

Tokyo: Concerned by events, armed forces remain on alert. 

London: Commits to supporting NATO action. 

Beijing: Concerned by events, armed forces remain on alert.

Timeline: D+21

Geopolitical headline: Russia destroys the Lithuanian Army and advances to repel the invaders. Russia advances in Ukraine to besiege Kiev again.

Response in: 

Washington: Diplomatic and material assistance to NATO allies, USAF committed to action. 

Brussels: Wrangling over the degree of commitment to provide to NATO. Hungary, Greece and Cyprus objecting to the EU becoming involved. 

Tokyo: Concerned by events, armed forces remain on alert. 

London:  Commits to supporting NATO action. 

Beijing: Concerned by events, armed forces remain on alert.

Timeline: D+24

Geopolitical headline: NATO forces in Ukraine push back Russian forces across southern Ukraine. Nordic Battlegroup pushed back in north west Russia.

Response in: 

Washington: Diplomatic and material assistance to NATO allies, USAF committed to action. 

Brussels: Wrangling over the degree of commitment to provide to NATO. Hungary, Greece and Cyprus objecting to the EU becoming involved. 

Tokyo: Concerned by events, armed forces remain on alert. 

London: Commits to supporting NATO action. 

Beijing: Concerned by events, all armed forces remain on alert. Forces stationed across the Taiwan Strait and by the South China Sea placed on very high alert.

Timeline: D+27

Geopolitical headline: Russian forces largely expelled from Ukraine. The Nordic Battlegroup make gains in north west Russia.

Response in: 

Washington: Diplomatic and material assistance to NATO allies, USAF committed to action. 

Brussels: Watered down and ineffective commitment to support NATO. 

Tokyo: Concerned by events, armed forces placed on high alert. 

London: Commits to supporting NATO action. 

Beijing: Concerned by events, all armed forces remain on alert. Forces stationed across the Taiwan Strait and by the South China Sea readied for action.

This framework gives us about four weeks of events to map into the economic and financial game. All of the central bank actors will be expected to support the geopolitical and diplomatic efforts of their governments. At the end of the sequence, we wanted to hint at the possibility of China becoming more aggressive in south east Asia as the US becomes distracted by events in Eastern Europe. This isn't the only possibility. We could have placed the possibility of Chinese support to the US in return for China annexing a slice of Far Eastern Russia. Either possibility would provide an interesting game focused on Chinese opportunism.

We now have a developed timeline resulting from the game that can be used as a sequence of inputs for a ten turn economic and financial game (we need to include D+0, the opening position) involving five players. However, before we turn to that, we would like just one more post on this game that looks at the lessons learned. This framework is something of an experiment for us in nested scenario building and it would pay us to reflect on the technique and the outcome.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Belarussian Right Hook - The Game

This was our first attempt at producing a nested gaming framework. I'm not sure that we altogether succeeded, but it's interesting to look at where we feel uneasy. We wanted to keep the geopolitical element of the nesting relatively simple. We were looking for a straightforward geopolitical narrative that we could play over a deeper economic and financial game. The game Putin's War provides one such possibility. It offers the potential to create a geopolitical narrative based around Russian activity in Ukraine and the Baltic States in the near future.

One feature of this part of the world is that Belarus sits between Ukraine and the Baltic States. Belarus is often seen as a Russian proxy, which is normally a reasonable assumption, and one fear of NATO is that combined Russian and Belarussian wargames could provide a launch pad for Russian intervention in the region. There are two lovely possibilities here: (a) the wargames provide a launch pad into the Baltic States - the the Belarussian Left Hook, and (b) the wargames provide a launch pad into Ukraine - the the Belarussian Right Hook. It is this latter possibility that we wanted to examine in this game, leaving the former possibility for a subsequent game.

In setting up the game, elements of the Russian Western Military District would start in Belarus, with the intention of falling upon Ukraine from the north, between the River Bug and the Pripyat Marshes, starting in the region of Brest. The Belarussian forces would support the Russian forces if Belarus was invaded and would not undertake any activity outside of Belarus. Elements of the Russian Southern Military District were available for the Russian player, at the outset from the region of Rostov and Kursk, or through Crimea after a delay (determined by a dice roll). They would be joined by reinforcements from the Central and Far Eastern Military Districts after a delay (determined by a further dice roll). The NATO and non-NATO blue team forces would operate under current operating policies. Each turn represents roughly three days in real time, with somewhere between two to three turns representing a week. 

At the outset of the game, the main force invading Ukraine originated from the Russian Western and Southern Military Districts. As NATO wasn't involved at that point, Russia had air superiority, which was used to assist an assault and capture of Kharkov. Ukraine responded to the invasion by attacking the Operational Group Transnistria (OGT), an army strength formation based in Transnistria. This formation was routed and forced to withdraw into Moldova, which not only brought Moldova into the conflict, but also Romania. The Romanian Army destroyed the OGT and then advanced to secure Odessa. By D+3, Russian forces had advanced far enough to lay siege to Kiev.

The Russian 49th Army went on to capture Kiev and President Putin held a rather hastily assembled victory parade. The Ukrainian and Romanian Armies fought back and made territorial gains in southern Ukraine. By D+6, Russia had started to garrison the cities captured in Ukraine, despite Ukrainian forces having crossed the Dnieper. Russia counter-attacked across the Dnieper, at which point reinforcements from the Southern Military District arrived through Crimea. By D+9, most of the Ukrainian Army had been destroyed and the Romanian Army had been pushed back towards Moldova. Russia had cleared the territory east of the Dnieper, cleared all Ukrainian cities other than Lvov, and enjoyed almost complete air superiority.

This proved to be the turning point in the game. Russia continued to enjoy air superiority and used that feature to destroy the Romanian Army. The destruction of the Romanian Army prompted a response from Poland. The Polish 2nd Army Corps invaded western Ukraine to meet the Russian challenge. By D+12, the Polish forces had advanced to almost reach Kiev. In the north, the Lithuanian Army, avoiding Belarussian territory, crossed into Russia south of the Dvina River. NATO was gradually being drawn into the conflict. The North Atlantic Council met and decided that although the Romanian actions had been outside of the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty, the destruction of the Romanian Army did constitute a breach of Article 5, justifying the actions of the Polish and Lithuanian Armies. This released the NATO air capacity.

The intervention of NATO air power allowed, by D+15, the Polish Army to capture Kiev, the Lithuanian Army to move southwards to capture Smolensk and then Bryansk, the Estonian Army to capture Rzhev, and the Latvian Army to secure the Russia-Belarus border. At this point, Belarus was cut off from Russia. The Russian reinforcements from the Central and Far Eastern Military Districts then entered the fray. Whilst seeking to consolidate their gains in southern Ukraine, the main focus of the Russian forces was to repel the invasion from the Baltic States. By D+18, the forces of the Baltic States had been pushed north of the Dnieper River, but at the cost of Russian losses in central Ukraine as the German Army reinforced the Polish forces in the area of Kiev and the 13th Ukrainian Army Corps occupied Odessa. Elsewhere, the Swedish and Finnish Armies, as part of the EU Nordic Battlegroup, landed in Riga and had started to deploy for action through Latvia.

The Russian push continued, aided by control of the air. In the east, the main focus was an advance across the Dnieper to recapture Smolensk. By D+21, this resulted in the Lithuanian Army being destroyed, but the Swedish and Finnish Armies advancing to contact along the line of the Dnieper. Whilst in the west, the focus was a push to recapture Kiev. The Russian 5th and 58th Armies laid siege to the Polish 2nd Army in Kiev. The Poles were aided by a reconstituted Romanian Army, the German Army, and the Czech Army Corps, which had just entered operations. This proved to be enough to mount an effective counter-attack. By D+24, the NATO forces had pushed the Russian forces back as far as Kharkov and threatened to invade western Russia from Ukraine. The Russian advance north across the Dnieper continued, resulting in the destruction of the Finnish Army, but at a heavy cost to the Russian forces. By D+27, the German Army had occupied Dnipropetrovsk, the Romanian Army had occupied Kharkov, and the Polish 2nd Army had occupied Bryansk. The Nordic Battlegroup was advancing towards Smolensk.

At this point we ended the game. We rather felt that it was something of a NATO win. Russia had failed to secure their objectives in Ukraine and the NATO allies had the opportunity to determine a peace that was worse than the opening position for Russia, possibly giving Crimea back to Ukraine. I think that we ought to have kept more detail of the moves, which is from where my disquiet about the game originates. However, I may be worrying unnecessarily. By photographing each move, I was able to retain a certain amount of detail that I have been able to recreate here.

If I were to play this game again, I would like the right hook to come in Turn 1, and for it to be heavier than a single unit. I would have the OGT stay in Transnistria and the additional forces come into play sooner. We need to work on the NATO political mechanism. It's far more complicated than we modelled and I don't feel that we adequately captured that complexity. However, looking back, it was a reasonable first stab at creating a timeline, so perhaps I'm being a bit too hard upon myself?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Lure Of Nested Gaming

It often happens that, when gaming a series of future events, a game within a game presents itself. The most recent example was in our game 'The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe' (see here for more detail). This game contained a military engagement on the Caspian Sea and in south Turkmenistan between Russia, the US, and Kazakhstan on one side; and China and the Taliban on the other; with Iran intervening to act defensively. We dubbed this the 'Battle Of Turkmenbashi 2045' (see here for more detail). 

Without going into the detail of how we would play the Battle of Turkmenbashi as a stand alone game, the whole concept of the game within a game set me thinking about the question of nested gaming. To begin with, ought we to confine ourselves to a single game within a game? Could there be more than one? In many ways, the idea of a succession of nested games within a game is the core of campaign gaming. A situation where a single event does not necessarily shape the eventual outcome, and where subsequent events can have a more decisive impact the other way. For example, the campaign in France in 1940 didn't settle the Second World War. From the Allied defeat came the basis for their eventual victory as fortunes eventually turned in favour of the Allies.

This, however, misses the flavour of nested gaming. What I am thinking of concerns the third - or even fourth - order events arising from the game. Take The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe as an example. That was the first order game. Within that game was the Battle of Turkmenbashi, as a second order game. Within The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe, the umpires determined, for example, the impact of events on the financial markets. What we could have done was to game the impact on the financial markets. This would have provided an interesting third order game. Gaming the reactions of market players could have provided an interesting set of fourth order games. This is an idea I find quite attractive.

One feature of nested games that seems apparent are the time scales involved. It seems to me that the lower the order of game, the shorter the time scale that is needed. For example, The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe was set over a time scale of 50 years. The second order game Battle of Turkmenbashi was set over a few days. To have built in these events as exogenous factors in a financial markets game would have represented hours rather than days. It is from here that my thoughts originate.

I would like to play a sequence of nested games. In my mind, we could have geopolitical events driving economic and financial events in two levels of gaming. Nested within that structure, we could then have a series of economic actors, such as Hedge Funds, looking to game, model, and profit from events as a third order game. Taking things further, we could even introduce a competitive element between the the players - or teams of players - in the third order game.

Thinking about where we could start, we have a number of games that could provide a number of quick and easy to play timelines for geopolitical events. For example, we have previously played games around the implosion of China (see here for an example) and the Russian invasion of the Baltic States (see here for an example). What we didn't do was to record in detail the timeline of events. That we can now do. The resulting timeline can then be used to input into a subsequent game examining the response of the financial markets to these geopolitical events. We do have one such game that could be taken off the shelf, updated, and given a new lease of life (see here for a description of the game). 

Following on from that, with a timeline of geopolitical events and the associated policy responses from the financial markets, it ought to be relatively straightforward to devise a framework in which players can respond at the level of the individual firm. I think that ought to provide an interesting exercise. Hopefully we will be able to generate sufficient support to make it possible as an aspiration for 2021.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe - Lessons Learned

At the end of a game that we have designed, nurtured, and umpired, it is useful to sit back and reflect on the lessons we have learned from the game. There are two dimensions to this. What lessons of game design stand out? And what lessons about the subject matter stand out? In this case, the former question is just as useful as the latter. Normally, we ask what a game has taught us from the perspective of the subject matter. However, in this case, because we were trying to do things that were new to us, it is also worth spending time on the structure of the game design.

The main difference between this game and those we normally play is the degree of concealment within 'The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe'. The five unconcealed players knew of each other, had a good idea of the resources they could command, and could see on the game map the contours of each other's interests. They knew very little about the Taliban. They knew little of the Taliban location and the resources at the command of the Taliban. Much of the game was based upon strategic assumptions, and as umpires we hinted in those cases where a reappraisal, in our view, ought to have been undertaken. Only one player attempted an intelligence assessment of the Taliban, with partial success. Of course, concealment for one player meant that we also had to offer the facility to the other players. Russia and the United States both undertook concealed moves, with varying degrees of success.

We feel that the concealment question was well addressed for the Taliban player through the use of secret maps and secret briefings, but it had a more limited impact for other players. Once the game play had taken on a collective dimension, the players had to demonstrate to their peers that they had undertaken what they had promised to do. This channelled the game play into a more open form. The Taliban eventually entered into this framework once they had achieved a degree of territoriality. Perhaps this tells us something about the design of games where one or more players are not territorial?

We found that the game developed more or less along the lines expected. It caught the dissonance between the Sunni and Shia worlds quite well. Initially, we felt that the game would highlight three combinations: China, Russia and Kazakhstan; China and Iran; and the US and the Taliban. In terms of conflict, the main competitors would be China and Iran against the US and the Taliban. A key co-operation axis would be between China, Russia, and Kazakhstan. Things didn't quite work out that way.

The US made common cause with Russia and Kazakhstan against the Taliban. China found common cause with the Taliban against the US, Russia, and Kazakhstan. Iran become a hermit republic. The game generated two axes of co-operation, one between China and Russia on the northern arm of the BRI and one with the Taliban on the southern arm of the BRI. We feel that Kazakhstan was left rather isolated by this development and it did beg the question in the Wash Up Session of whether or not Kazakhstan was ripe for partition in 2050 by China and Russia. That was a question we left hanging at the end of the game.

Did the game generate anything useful? In one sense it was useful in laying down a baseline scenario out to 2050. We aimed at examining what could happen if current policies were followed for the next thirty years. The result that China had the field to itself to roll out the BRI in Central Asia didn't contain too many surprises. It did beg the interesting question of what China's peer rival - the US - could do to counter this? Our view was that the US would need to 'out-China China' through something like an Asian equivalent of the Marshall Plan. This would also provide a useful counter to the expansion of Taliban influence. 

Perhaps that could be the basis of a future game?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe - Outcomes

In the framework we followed during the game, we allowed a week to pass between each turn being declared. This gave the players ample time to work upon a collective approach to various issues, to hammer out agreements between themselves, and to reflect upon how they were progressing in relation to their objectives. At the end of Turn 6, we gave everyone a week of reflection before attending a final wash up session to consider the degree to which they achieved - or otherwise - their objectives. The umpires would also undertake this exercise separately, and the notes between the two groups would be compared at the meeting. Where they agreed, we would pass on. Where they differed, or where they threw out an interesting point, we would go back over the assessment as a research point.

The United States player had three objectives, which were to maintain the three US bases in the region and to expand the US presence by a further three military bases; to check and counter Russian and Chinese ambitions in the region; and to ensure that Iran and the Taliban fail in the economic development of their respective territorial areas. In the assessment of both the umpires and the player concerned, all three objectives were not achieved. This was interesting in itself not because of the result but because of the manner in which it was achieved. At the request of the game designer, the American player adopted a 'War Hawk' stance to the game play. That it led to failure in achieving the core objectives was seen by the group as significant.

The objectives of the Russian player were to maintain the three Russian bases in the region and to expand the Russian presence by a further three military bases; to achieve the removal of US sanctions placed upon Russia; and to ensure that Russia remains the main Chinese ally in the region. The assessment of the umpires was that the first and second objective had been achieved, and possibly also the third. The assessment of the player was a bit more restrained. They had mixed feelings over the first objectives whilst agreeing with the umpires over the second and third. Two research flags were placed upon this result. One concerning the degree to which Russian bases are truly Russian if they had been largely infiltrated by the Taliban forces. The second begged the question over what it meant to be the principal Chinese ally in the region. Especially as the Taliban could reasonably lay claim to that title.

The China player was aiming to secure the supply of hydrocarbons from within the region; to extend and strengthen the BRI across the region; and to secure military and commercial port facilities at Bandar Abbas. Both the umpires and the player agreed that the first and second objective had been achieved, whilst the third had not. However, a research flag was placed on the third objective because, in the course of the game, the Chinese game play had altered the strategic landscape. Instead of planning the BRI across Iran, access to Turkey - and subsequently Greece and Europe - was routed across Turkmenistan instead. Did that render the Iranian extension redundant?

The player of Kazakhstan sought to provide a freight and hydrocarbon transit route from Kazakhstan and Russia to China; to impede the development of hydrocarbon transit routes between the Persian Gulf and China; and to provide a mechanism whereby all actors can evade western imposed sanctions. In the opinion of the umpires and the player, the first objective had been achieved whilst the third had not. There was a difference of emphasis over the second objective. The umpires felt that Kazakhstan might possibly have impeded the export of hydrocarbons from the Persian Gulf to China, but the player wasn't sure about that. It was felt that this difference was reasonably minor, so no research flag was placed over it.

During the game, Iran was seeking to fully circumvent western imposed sanctions on both goods and access to capital markets; to sell hydrocarbons directly overland to China; and to have developed fully functioning nuclear weapons. Both the umpires and the player agreed that the three objectives had not been achieved. In discussion, it was felt that a research point ought to be placed on the first objective. Within the game, the Iranian player developed a fully consistent siege economy, largely isolated from the global economy, except for the maritime export of hydrocarbons to China. In the light of this, it is reasonable to ask of western sanctions actually matter? The Iranian player felt that Iran was frustrated in the second objective because of the hostility of the Taliban in the game. In discussion, it was decided to place a research marker on this point because it captured the whole of the dissonance between the Shia and Sunni world. The game was designed to make this happen.

Which brings us to the Taliban player. Their objectives were to drive out the American presence from the region; to establish a form of territoriality and a provisional government; and to ensure that the BRI develops north of the Caspian Sea rather than the south of it. Both the umpires and the player agreed that the first two objectives had been achieved. The umpires felt that the Taliban had possibly achieved the third objective, whereas the player felt the result was more mixed. This was owing to China altering the proposals for the southern branch of the BRI. It was agreed to place a research on the second objective because although a degree of territoriality had been achieved, the new governments of Turkmenistan and Afghanistan were not universally recognised within the international community and a question arose over how much legitimacy could be conferred until that happened.

All in all the game was a mixed bag. Many of the objectives were zero sum, which meant that those who achieved their objectives would naturally prevent others from doing so. Looking at the outcome overall, a number of research points stand out:

1. We touched upon the issue of ownership and control within the game. Both the US and Russia established military training facilities deep in Taliban territory with the consequent result that they both trained and armed the Taliban military wing. This has an authentic air about it. However, what could the players have done to prevent it? This is definitely a point for further review.

2. At the start of the game, we would have predicted that Russia would end the game as the principal Chinese ally in the region. It was a surprise to find that the Taliban could challenge Russia to that title. Does this say something about the progress of Russian diplomacy? Or does it say more about the utilitarian nature of Chinese diplomacy? Perhaps the Taliban were playing more of a Chinese game than Russia managed to play?

3. The game play of Iran led to some interesting questions centred around the effectiveness of western sanctions. They are much used nowadays - over-used in our opinion - and run the risk of the sanctioned nation developing a siege economy. This was possible in the game owing to China continuing to buy Iranian hydrocarbons. However it does raise the question where a nation is comfortably disconnected from the world economy and doesn't see it as a priority to restore access. Could that mean that we have seen the use of sanctions pass their most effective point? In future, could they be no more than a gesture?

4. The rise of the Taliban as a territorial entity raised a number of tantalising questions. By starting as a non-state actor, the game allowed the Taliban to secure control of two countries - Turkmenistan and Afghanistan - and to become a dominant fact in three more - Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The model by which this happened - poverty alleviation, social assistance, and a relatively incorrupt justice system - is worth further study. Discussion at the end of the game was centred around how the Taliban could have been defeated within the game. The view of the umpires was that less corruption, less neglect of the population, and more public works would have undermined the case for the Taliban. The problem was how to achieve this is the existing governments are unwilling to reform?

These are some of the questions we were left with at the end of the game. The game itself didn't provide answers to these questions, but they are worthy of further study. In some respects, they have held to uncover the 'known unknowns'. We know what we don't know. Surely that has to be a step forward?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe - Turn 6 (2050)

By 2050 the players had already come to blows. The key question, as Turn 6 starts, is whether or not we have seen the opening salvoes of World War III? As it turned out, we hadn't. However, there is a case to argue that the Battle of Turkmenbashi in 2045 was World War III, and that all of the combatants had stepped back from the threshold of allowing things to escalate. Or did they?

Iran proposes to construct an overland network of water and hydrocarbon pipes south of the Karakum desert, across Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and into China. The proposal never gains traction as the Taliban - despite an apparent commitment - refuse to fund it and, encouraged by China, refuses to support the plans.

China takes steps to extend and strengthen the BRI in the region. This results in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan becoming full participating members of the BRI. Chinese investment in work creation programmes in these countries helps to improve the mood of the populations, resulting in one unhappy face being removed from each country.

A new BRI rail corridor between Bukhara-Mari-Ashgabat-Turkmenbashi is surveyed and built. Commercial port facilities are upgraded at Turkmenbashi, with the construction of a new mercantile fleet being laid down at Turkmenbashi. The trade between Turkmenbashi and Baku resumes.

Turkmenistan and Afghanistan will enjoy preferential freight tariffs for goods originating in these countries, to include manufactures, agricultural produce, and extracted hydrocarbons.

Russia joins the BRI as a full participating member. As a member of the BRI, Russia receives assistance in tackling the Siberian forest fires, utilising the climate refugees as agricultural workers and establishing newly cleared farms in the region. The cost of this is borne by Russian borrowing on the North American capital markets, guaranteed by China and secured on the underlying assets.

The flow of oil and freight between Russia and China is restored, allowing Russian commercial interests to start to enjoy these revenue steams again. 

The new farmlands serve to reduce the population pressure in Siberia, and the restored rail routes and oil pipelines help to improve prosperity in the region. This results in the unhappy faces in the region being removed. The land resources, with technical assistance from China, are now better managed by Russian entities.

The US commander in Afghanistan detaches himself from the chain of command and orders the surrender of all US troops in country to the Taliban. After years of neglect, substantial water and food shortages, and regular mortar and artillery fire, the vast majority of US troops obey the commander's order. The Taliban offer safe passage to all surrendering troops through Afghanistan and across Pakistan to the port of Gwadar, from where they will return to North America. China will finance the evacuation and guarantee the safe passage of the US troops.

A few holdouts remain, but they are easily disarmed by the Taliban forces in Afghanistan and face the Afghan legal system for any criminality that occurs in this process. The US Commander is one of the last to leave and accompanies his troops to Gwadar, from where he is returned to Washington to face a court martial for disobeying the chain of command.

Under the terms of the surrender, no US personnel may take any weaponry in the evacuation. The Taliban occupies the former US bases and secures the armouries. However, the Taliban fighters lack the technical skills to operate and maintain much of the equipment on the bases. The bases now become Taliban bases. The unhappy faces are removed and a happy face is placed on each base.

The United States calls for an emergency session of the UN Security Council to discuss the situation in Central Asia, with a view to imposing sanctions on Turkmenistan, resolve the military stand off in the region, and to secure the rescue of the US troops in Afghanistan. China vetoes this on the basis that the military stand off has resolved itself, that Chinese infrastructure will not be used to enable a military build up in the region, and that China - through the agency of the Taliban - has already resolved the question of US forces in Afghanistan.

Kazakhstan seeks to initiate a climate mitigation plan, which has the features of continuing to build water infrastructure, increasing internal security, and deploying food depots in cities. There is a problem with financing this because the hydrocarbon transit fees from Turkmenistan have petered out and China is delaying payment of hydrocarbons originating in Kazakhstan. This is starting to upset the delicate balance of power from within the ruling elite of Kazakhstan.

Whilst control of the population is maintained, climate refugees continue to flow into Kazakhstan. The population is starting to become hungry and fractious. There are small showings of popular discontent, but they are on a rising trend.

At this point the game ends. We see the United States routed in the region by the Taliban, who are now a new Chinese proxy, we see the encirclement and isolation of Iran, and we see China dominating Russia in the Eurasian Heartland. The fate of Kazakhstan is in the balance, outside the protection of the BRI, detached from support by Russia, and in somewhat of a limbo. Who can tell what would happen next? However, that would be a different game.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020