The January edition of Foreign Affairs contained a series of articles on the future of the international system. The series consisted of six articles. Richard Haas considered whether globalisation is irreversible, and if it isn't, whether we would need what he called a 'World Order 2.0'? Joseph Nye asks whether the liberal order - what is known as the Washington Consensus of liberal democracy and free market economics - can survive? Robin Niblett considers what might replace the liberal order if it is in retreat. Michael Mazarr what might come after hegemony if the American unipolar moment has passed? Evan Feigenbaum examines how the US should respond to accommodate a rising and expansive China. Finally, Kori Schake considers the implications of America embracing a doctrine of offshore balancing - a form of isolationism last seen in the 1930s. All of the authors are well respected experts in their areas. They certainly represent a body of authority that commands our attention.
The reader might be forgiven for asking what are they saying? Why are they saying it? And why are they saying it just now? The answers to these three questions provide an interesting set of answers. One that highlights the contours of an emergent future.
A common premise to the series of articles is that the election of President Trump has changed something. Exactly what has been changed remains to be seen. However, the last Presidential election is seen to have represented one of those pivotal moments when a distinct change can be identified. The Trump administration appears to have heralded a change in US policy. It seems to be based more on a transactional basis than on a value based policy. In this regard, if the early showings are continued into the future to form a new trend, then there has been a significant change.
If the rhetoric is converted into action, then we can expect a greater focus on trading relationships in US foreign policy, less emphasis on the promotion of liberal democracy, and a much reduced willingness for America to act as the world police force.
Let us suppose that this happens. The implication is that a vacuum is likely to form in the international system and some feature will expand to fill that vacuum. We might expect the autocracies of the world to feel emboldened. Russia might attempt to bully Eastern Europe a bit more, China might feel empowered to be expansionary in the South China Sea, North Korea or Iran might be tempted to actually complete their nuclear weapons programmes.
On the other side of the table, American allies around the world are likely to be wondering exactly what their American security guarantees are actually worth. This might not have a wholly beneficial effect for the United States. If the American allies conclude that their security guarantees are not worth a great deal, there would be an incentive to distance themselves from Washington in favour of a closer relationship with the local hegemon. To a certain extent, we can already see this happening in Asia.
President Trump walked away from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. He did so because he felt it to be a bad trade deal. What was not explained to him clearly enough is that there is more to it than trade. The TPP would have allowed the US to determine the trading architecture of the Pacific Rim for the best part of this century. By pulling out of TPP, President Trump has left the American allies in the Pacific wondering about the reliability of Washington. The US withdrawal created a policy vacuum which China is now seeking to fill with it's 'One Belt, One Road' policy. President Trump has handed to China the strategic initiative in East Asia in less that half a year.
In that sense, something profound has changed, and the future of the international system does need to be considered.
Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2017
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