Putin Rolls The Dice ...

'Blue on Blue' as the Coalition player forgets that Poland is now

a member of NATO and orders the air suppression of the Polish

army outside of Riga, which is occupied by the Russians.

We are currently working through a series of geopolitical futures centred around a more expansionist and aggressive Russia. The time frame is the near future - possibly the next ten years or so - and the focus is on what might encourage or discourage President Putin to gamble on a swift seizure of a number of former Soviet Socialist Republics. This is the sort of exercise that is well suited to gaming.

It would be entirely possible to design a bespoke game to explore the issues here, but I naturally gravitate towards a number of commercial games that could be modified to fit the purpose of the exercise. One such game is 'Putin's War' by Ty Bomba. The political premise of the game is that President Putin decides to roll the dice and to move from hybrid war to a full scale military operation to recover the 'lost' former Soviet Socialist Republics in eastern Europe. This fits the bill, so we decided to give the game a try out.

The initial try out was designed just to examine the game mechanism. From a purely military perspective, the game seemed to work reasonably well. The Russian forces made great progress over the 30 day window for the scenario, but didn't have sufficient impetus to achieve their military objectives. That's the sort of result that we felt intuitively would be a fair result. In our try out, the Russian forces became bogged down in Kiev and didn't have enough impetus to over-run Vilnius in Lithuania. The 30 day window is significant because it is estimated that would be the length of time needed for US reinforcements to arrive in appreciable strength to have an impact upon any military confrontation, should Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty be invoked and America honour it's treaty obligations. Of course, this has the effect of moving the review from the military arena to that of the political.

The game lends itself to being deconstructed from the political perspective. It contains a number of political assumptions that can be changed. For example, the game assumes that the Baltic States, Belarus, and Moldova are equal and willing participants of the anti-Russian coalition. I would characterise things as slightly different. The Baltic States are NATO members, with the right of protection under Article 5. Belarus is more closely aligned to Russia than NATO, although it admittedly has a foot in both camps. Moldova has close links to the US, but also has a breakaway region of Transdniester, which has close links to Russia and represents a frozen conflict zone. The point here is that there are quite a lot of working parts within the framework to render a number of scenarios useful.

The political dimension of the commercial game is inadequate for our use. However, it does lend itself to having a matrix game grafted onto it to account for the political dimensions. For example, what if the starting point is a joint Russian/ Belarussian military exercise on the borders of the Baltic States? This is one scenario that does have credence with NATO planners. Alternatively, what if the Baltic States invoke Article 5, but, say, Germany refuses to honour the commitment? This is one scenario that the governments of the Baltic States have in the back of their minds. Yet again, what if Russian aggression is limited to a full scale invasion of Ukraine, which, not being a member of NATO, is unable to invoke Article 5? Would NATO be prepared for a full scale military conflict with Russia for the sake of Ukraine? It is quite possible for the game to be replayed, each time varying the political assumptions that are brought to the game.

There is no allowance in the commercial game  for a nuclear exchange. An interesting question arises over whether or not to introduce it. Having played the commercial version, I do feel that there could be grounds for including a nuclear option, especially when the Russian forces reach the high water mark of their advance. The temptation for a tactical nuclear strike to keep the Russian advance rolling forward was quite strong. It would be interesting to model that option into the game. It could provide an additional political dimension to an accompanying matrix game played alongside the commercial game.

I would question the extent to which the Russian forces can be seen as monolithic. It would be interesting to introduce a set of rivalries and jealousies between the various Russian army groups, and have those feed back into the game through the availability of replacements of personnel and resources. The game is designed for a four week period, but the Russian military keeps a three week inventory. With supply lines extended across Ukraine to Moldova, across the Baltic States to the Polish border, I do think that questions of Russian resupply are likely to arise in the final three or four turns of the game. Rivalries within the Russian side are likely to manifest themselves over the availability of supply, and it would be interesting to model these into the political game.

One final point of interest concerns what is happening elsewhere while the game is going on. An actual or potential conflict between Russia and NATO is a newsworthy item. What is China doing? What is happening at the UN? How does this impact on the Middle East? East Asia? Africa? The commercial game looks at the conflict abstracted away from the rest of the world. When producing scenarios, this is something that cannot be overlooked easily. For example, would the reaction of the bond market cause the NATO nations to seek a negotiated settlement at the earliest opportunity? There are a large number of moving parts, each important in their own right, and each systemically important. A political game would need to accommodate these.

In our run through of the commercial game, Russia secured control of Moldova, Estonia, and Latvia. Most of Ukraine was occupied, with the exception of Kiev. From this perspective, Putin rolled the dice and lost. However, the game did allow us to question the political assumptions of the game and some useful scenario building can come from this. For example, the willingness of other NATO nations to honour the commitment under Article 5 did come into question. This underlines the importance of the NATO enhanced forward presence programme. Not only does it reassure the frontline nations of the commitment of the more distant nations, it also sends a message to potential aggressors of that commitment.

Of course, there can be a game within a game here. One in which the leader of a NATO nation, who may or may not be beholden to Russian interests, who suggests that the commitment to Article 5 is purely transactional, and who undermines the basis on which the North Atlantic Treaty is founded. That, as they say, is anther story.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2017

Shifting Sands

The January edition of Foreign Affairs contained a series of articles on the future of the international system. The series consisted of six articles. Richard Haas considered whether globalisation is irreversible, and if it isn't, whether we would need what he called a 'World Order 2.0'? Joseph Nye asks whether the liberal order - what is known as the Washington Consensus of liberal democracy and free market economics - can survive? Robin Niblett considers what might replace the liberal order if it is in retreat. Michael Mazarr what might come after hegemony if the American unipolar moment has passed? Evan Feigenbaum examines how the US should respond to accommodate a rising and expansive China. Finally, Kori Schake considers the implications of America embracing a doctrine of offshore balancing - a form of isolationism last seen in the 1930s. All of the authors are well respected experts in their areas. They certainly represent a body of authority that commands our attention.

The reader might be forgiven for asking what are they saying? Why are they saying it? And why are they saying it just now? The answers to these three questions provide an interesting set of answers. One that highlights the contours of an emergent future.

A common premise to the series of articles is that the election of President Trump has changed something. Exactly what has been changed remains to be seen. However, the last Presidential election is seen to have represented one of those pivotal moments when a distinct change can be identified. The Trump administration appears to have heralded a change in US policy. It seems to be based more on a transactional basis than on a value based policy. In this regard, if the early showings are continued into the future to form a new trend, then there has been a significant change.

If the rhetoric is converted into action, then we can expect a greater focus on trading relationships in US foreign policy, less emphasis on the promotion of liberal democracy, and a much reduced willingness for America to act as the world police force.

Let us suppose that this happens. The implication is that a vacuum is likely to form in the international system and some feature will expand to fill that vacuum. We might expect the autocracies of the world to feel emboldened. Russia might attempt to bully Eastern Europe a bit more, China might feel empowered to be expansionary in the South China Sea, North Korea or Iran might be tempted to actually complete their nuclear weapons programmes.

On the other side of the table, American allies around the world are likely to be wondering exactly what their American security guarantees are actually worth. This might not have a wholly beneficial effect for the United States. If the American allies conclude that their security guarantees are not worth a great deal, there would be an incentive to distance themselves from Washington in favour of a closer relationship with the local hegemon. To a certain extent, we can already see this happening in Asia.

President Trump walked away from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. He did so because he felt it to be a bad trade deal. What was not explained to him clearly enough is that there is more to it than trade. The TPP would have allowed the US to determine the trading architecture of the Pacific Rim for the best part of this century. By pulling out of TPP, President Trump has left the American allies in the Pacific wondering about the reliability of Washington. The US withdrawal created a policy vacuum which China is now seeking to fill with it's 'One Belt, One Road' policy. President Trump has handed to China the strategic initiative in East Asia in less that half a year.

In that sense, something profound has changed, and the future of the international system does need to be considered.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2017

Strange Bedfellows

I like to run two parallel book lists at the same time. They reflect the way that I read and the amount of time that I can commit to reading. I like to have one list which I read over lunch and into the early afternoon. These are my hardcore work related books. They tend to be fairly heavy and occasionally pretty turgid. To lighten the load, I also like to have a series of books which I read in the evening and at bedtime. These tend to be lighter books, which are well written, and help me to wind down before going to sleep. On occasions, a pair of strange bedfellows enters my reading list by accident. Now is such a time.

I am currently reading 'What Next' by Daniel Hannan as my work related book, and 'Atlas Shrugged' by Ayn Rand as my bedtime book. It has come as a surprise to me how the one book fits into the other. What attracted me to Mr Hannan's book is that it outlines a positive vision of Britain after Brexit. It was often said that the Leave side in the Referendum didn't have a plan for Britain after Brexit. The purpose of this book is to address that criticism.

In reading Mr Hannan's book, I was struck by how much of the criticism of the European Union - more specifically the European Commission - parallels the corporatist and statist word described in Atlas Shrugged. Ayn Rand describes a world in which individual endeavour is stifled by collective rules, where intellectual honesty is captured by vested interests who only peddle what we now call 'fake news', and where humanity is gradually drifting backwards rather than moving forwards. These are exactly the reasons why Mr Hannan argued for Brexit.

It is possible to wax lyrical about life following art, but I do find this an interesting co-incidence. It is almost as if I am currently reading a theoretical treatise alongside a practical application of the theory. I guess that it's one way to use my time.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2017

A Beginners Guide To Brexit

We recently held a retreat to think about issues that are likely to impact upon the future of the UK out to 2050. Naturally enough, Brexit appeared as one of those issues that would be very significant. We decided to give our thoughts some shape in order to help frame our conversations around these issues. In doing so, we felt that the best tool to help us here would be the Three Horizons Model, simply because it allows us to think in terms of a "before" (Horizon 1 - H1), an "after" (Horizon 3 - H3), and a "transition" period (Horizon 2 - H2). We decided that the output would be a timeline onto which our thinking could be placed. We could then use that timeline as a backdrop to some more specific scenario work following on from this review.

In stylising the three horizons, we thought that H1 would be dominated by determining what it is that the UK doesn't want from Europe. This process has been under way for some years and was given a sharper edge in the process leading up to the referendum vote in 2016. It would seem that there is a desire to assert the sovereignty of Parliament and to derogate from the four freedoms that are an essential part of the European Union. In particular, there is a desire to derogate from the free movement of labour in order to begin to control the flow of immigration into the UK. In our view, the bulk of H1 would take place in the years up to 2017. It forms the essence of the British position in the negotiations to withdraw from the EU.

The negotiations to leave the EU are the trigger for H2. We have stylised this as the "WTF Phase". It contains the complex interactions between the EU nations and the UK; the EU nations with each other; and between the EU nations, the UK, and third party nations. We have already seen some of the issues that could arise in this phase. Could Spain use this as an opportunity to resolve the question of Gibraltar? Could Greece use this as an opportunity to insist upon the return of the Elgin Marbles? Could the European Commission use this as an opportunity to create a united Ireland? There are some really difficult questions to be settled during this phase.

We took the view that the period of two years 2017-19 is not long enough to resolve these questions. Even if all sides were willing to negotiate in good faith, the matter is too complex to yield a stable solution. In our view, H2 is likely to split into three phases: (a) the negotiation phase - where the Lisbon Treaty is adhered to but not much progress is made, (b) an hostility phase - where each side tries to act to gain an advantage over the others, and (c) a resolution phase - where each side actually finds common ground to reach an accommodation with each other. In our thinking, the negotiation phase would dominate the period 2017-19, the hostility phase could occupy the period from 2019 to the mid-2020s, and the resolution phase would take the second half of the next decade to work through.

The outcome of the resolution phase of H2 is likely to determine the shape of H3. We alternately called this the phase where the dust settles and the phase of the new world. We see this as a period beyond 2030. The exact shape of the contours of this period are a bit hard to discern at this moment because we need an appreciation of how other key actors have developed in this period. For example, will the Euro have collapsed? Will the Schengen area continue? Will other members of the EU decide to leave as well?

Despite these uncertainties, of some things we can be certain. Britain will find it almost impossible to live without Europe, which suggests that some form of accommodation - with the attendant price - will be reached. Equally, Britain is such a sufficiently large European nation that the EU nations are likely to thrive better if the UK is engaged rather than isolated. This relationship, taken away from the institutional framework of the EU, is rather important to both sides. The sooner this is appreciated by both sides, the sooner we can move away from H2 to H3.

If this broad sketch of the Brexit trajectory is anywhere near correct, then it is likely to have considerable impacts upon the UK economy, especially during the hostility phase of H2. To a certain degree, to be forewarned of its likelihood allows us to hedge against its possibility. We are going to pass through some highly uncertain times during the next few years. Hopefully, enjoining conversation around those uncertainties will help to make them less opaque.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2017