Is A New Heartland Emerging?

The concept of the Heartland is usually associated with Halford Mackinder. Mackinder, an Edwardian geographer, suggested that the bulk of the Eurasian landmass could dominate world history and that the core of that landmass constitutes the 'Pivot of History'. He pointed to the development of technologies of integration - the railways, the telegraph, road transportation improvements - to support his thesis. His geopolitical contention was that if an integrated core could develop, it would dominate the world.

Subsequent events showed the thesis to be flawed. The maritime powers - first Great Britain and then the United States - came to dominate the twentieth century. The Heartland fell into relative backwardness as sea power came to dominate land power. The core proposition of the thesis - that the key to world dominance was to control Eastern Europe - proved to be flawed as the Austro-Hungarian, Nazi German, and Soviet Russian empires all collapsed despite controlling Eastern Europe. It was the maritime powers and the powers of the European 'Rimland' that dominated the twentieth century.

Events in the twenty-first century could run somewhat differently. The first quarter of the century has been dominated by the rise of China. Despite ambitions in the South China Sea, China has shown itself to be more of a land power than a maritime one. The expansion of Chinese influence through the keystone of the BRI programme has been directed towards growing her land power rather than sea power. Observers in the west have focussed upon the expansion of the Chinese navy, but this may prove to be something of a misdirection because the focus of Chinese investment has been upon developing land routes between the Far East and both Europe and Africa.

We consider these to be important developments, into which we have put some effort in gaming. There have been three areas of our gaming focus so far - the Arctic, Central Asia, and the Middle East. In Mackinder's day, the Arctic was written off as inaccessible. With the climate warming, the Arctic ice cover is melting, giving rise to the Arctic Ocean becoming a transit route between the Far East and both Europe and the North American seaboard. This is a possibility for the future. For the present, there are the tangible trade routes across Central Asia and the Middle East into Europe. This has been the focus of Chinese investment.

As a fact of geography, the Caspian Sea causes the rail and road corridors from China to pass first through Central Asia, and then either through Russia and on to Europe, or through Iran and Turkey into Europe. This would naturally suggest that relations between China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey are of relative importance. These commercial factors that pull the four together have been enhanced by the actions of the United States and the European nations.

A growing hostility towards China on the part of America and Europe could have left China rather isolated. Instead, a confrontational approach to Russia has forced both China and Russia to share a number of common interests. This confrontational approach has been extended to Iran over the use of nuclear technology, again acting as a stimulus for closer relations between China, Russia, and Iran. Turkey is a slightly different case. For over two decades Europe has held out to Turkey the prospect of joining the EU. This prospect has come to nothing and Turkey now realises this. In a national re-appraisal, Turkey has decided to become more of an Asian nation and less of a European one. This, accompanied by a degree of antipathy from the US, has guided Turkey into the orbit of China.

The prospect of stronger ties between China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey in the years ahead naturally leads us back to Mackinder's Heartland Theory. Could this grouping of powers come to dominate the world? If so, what could possibly prevent it? As things stand, both Russia, Iran, and Turkey are becoming more assertive about their interests. The response of the US and Europe is an ever growing array of sanctions. However, given the size of China in the global economy, sanctions need the co-operation of China to be fully effective. A point in time is coming where it would be advantageous for China, Russia, and Iran to develop an alternative financial framework using a currency other than the US Dollar. This would be a pivotal moment, and in the absence of a degree of renewal of the West, it would signify the growing dominance of the Heartland powers.

What could be the basis of western renewal? The single word answer is 'productivity'! The basis for the growth in Chinese power, which underwrites the BRI and the development of the Heartland, is economic development as a global power. Europe and North America does not have a large pool of unproductive labour on which to draw, but they could leverage such pools on the Indian Sub-Continent and Africa. Interestingly enough, China is doing exactly this in Pakistan and various African nations. In this world, if Europe and North America continue to be inward looking and self-absorbed, it will be at their cost in the longer term. It is certainly the trajectory on which they are currently travelling.

There is a strong argument that a new Heartland is emerging. Driven by China, with the active support of Russia, Iran, and Turkey, it is likely to be a feature of the twenty-first century. Exactly how Europe and North America responds to this will shape our common futures. At present, the new Heartland appears to be in the ascendant.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - The Lessons Learned

At the end of a game that has been designed, nurtured, and umpired, it is useful to sit back and reflect on the lessons we have learned from it. There are two dimensions to this. What lessons of game design stand out? And what lessons about the subject matter stand out? In this case, the former question is just as useful as the latter. Normally, we ask what a game has taught us from the perspective of the subject matter. However, in this case, because we were trying to do things that were new to us, it is also worth spending time on the structure of the game design.

The most significant observation made to us was that China rather had an easy time of it within the game. The United States was unable to leverage an effective degree of opposition to Chinese ambitions in the region. Part of this may be down to gameplay, but far more of it would be down to the case that a disengaged America has far fewer assets to play with in the region. The United States could have orchestrated Saudi resistance to Iran, especially in Syria, as a means to counteracting Russian influence, but there was very little incentive for Saudi Arabia to adopt that cause.

The Chinese objectives were fairly straightforward - build a railroad. To achieve this, as a matter of game design, China needed to orchestrate Iran, Russia, and Turkey. This happened in the game because the priorities of the players were reasonably aligned. However, what options to China were available if, say, Turkey decided to look west rather than east? A renewed Turkish commitment to NATO would certainly have altered the calculations of the BRI. Perhaps this could have been encouraged by exacerbating Turkish suspicions over Russian intentions in the region? That's an interesting possibility that could be explored in future runs of the game.

Within the game, Iran wasn't a particularly aggressive regional player. This was more gameplay than game structure because the Iranian player had the opportunity to be more aggressive in their approach, but decided not to be. Boosting the Iranian economy and strengthening Iranian civil society meant that Iran was fairly secure internally. By courting China and Russia, Iran achieved a degree of external security as well. As interesting point of uncertainty concerns what could have happened had Iran been more aggressive over, say, the partition of Iraq? By 2050, Iran controlled much of eastern Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. It is interesting to speculate on how relations with Turkey would have resulted had Iran been more expansionary within the region. Would Turkey have allowed this?

What we did see is the rise of Iran from being a local actor to being one with a far larger regional footprint. As the custodian of the Shia inheritance, Iran counter-balanced the Sunni guarantor - Saudi Arabia - quite well. We didn't write too much of this conflict into the game and it didn't reveal itself as part of the gameplay either. In this sense, this aspect of the game remained quite underdeveloped. In future run throughs, perhaps this aspect could be brought into stronger focus?

The game was designed to explore some aspects of unitary government - as opposed to federal government - within the region. Unsurprisingly, we found that unitary government in conjunction with strong backers gave a more stable result than a federal structure without any strong focussed backing. Syria, with the backing of Iran and Russia, fared a lot better than Iraq, which received the lukewarm support of a largely disengaged United States. The disengagement of America created a power vacuum into which China expanded her influence, Iran extended her control of the region, and the Kurds had a go at forming an independent Kurdistan. In this sense, the game achieved the result that had been baked into the design of the game. However, are we convinced by the outcome?

That raises the broader question of how satisfied we might be with the results of the game? We were quite pleased to see that a US withdrawal from the region created a power vacuum into which Chinese influence flowed. The main beneficiary of this was Iran. The way the BRI is structured, China plans to exert influence over a territory rather than occupying it, which means that China is always in need of local partners. The ascendancy of Iran fits this role very well. We found this aspect of the game to be quite convincing.

Hanging around that were the responses of Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. The protection of China helped the relationship between Russia and Iran. Chinese and Russian interests were reasonably well aligned as time wore on. We found this convincing. The game didn't expose the fragility of western sanctions in the face of Chinese support, which is something we would have liked to see develop. It would have provided an alternative financial and commercial structure into which Syria and Kurdistan could well have played. There is also sufficient scope to draw Turkey into such a framework.

To do so would have given Saudi Arabia an awkward choice. On the one hand, Saudi policy could remain wedded to the present structures - deeply engaged with the US and underwriting the Arabic world. On the other hand, with the US disengaging in the region, retreating into a core heartland south of the Persian Gulf and allowing Iran, more or less, a free hand north of it. Whilst not entirely convinced by this outcome, it does, at least, seem plausible.

The game generated an interesting vision of the region in 2050. The currents are incredibly complex and there are many moving parts, so we are uncertain that we generated a stable baseline for exploring the future of this region. It feels as if the same game played again would generate entirely different results. This is probably a good thing because it does speak to the complexity and instability of the region. However, of one thing we are certain, if the BRI is to extend south of the Caspian Sea, China will have to impose some sort of order to the region. That alone makes the game both interesting and important.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - The Outcomes

Control of Syria 2050

In the framework we followed during the game, we allowed a week to pass between each turn being declared. This gave the players ample time to work upon a collective approach to various issues as they arose, to hammer out agreements between themselves, and to reflect upon how they were progressing in relation to their objectives. At the end of Turn 6, we gave everyone a period of reflection before bringing together a final wash up session to consider the degree to which they achieved - or otherwise - their objectives. The umpires would also undertake this exercise separately, and the notes between the two groups would be compared at that point. Where they agreed, we would pass on. Where they differed, or where they threw out an interesting point, we would go back over the assessment as a research point.

The United States was tasked with maintaining the US bases and extending the presence in the region, checking and countering Russian and Chinese ambitions, and ensuring that Iran remained isolated and failed in the economic development of its territorial area. There were mixed views over the US presence in the region. On the one hand, the number of bases increased. On the other hand, America was unable to counter China, Russia, and Iran in the region. One research point that did arise was the difference between presence - in the form of bases - and influence - the ability to direct and control events. This spoke to the 'Biden Doctrine' as it emerged in the early stages. It was felt that this might not lead to stable outcomes.

Russia had three objectives: to acquire port facilities on the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean Sea, to support Russian and Chinese commercial ambitions whilst increasing Russian military and diplomatic influence in the region, and to ensure that a good working relationship with Saudi Arabia is maintained to manage the price of oil. It was felt that the first two objectives had been achieved, but there was uncertainty over the relationship between Russia and Saudi Arabia. In the game, the price of oil didn't become a factor, so that issue wasn't really tested.

China was tasked with building out the BRI transport corridor across the region, securing port facilities at Bandar Abbas and Basheri and assisting Russia and Iran in evading western sanctions. It was felt that the transport corridors had been built out, the port facilities were largely acquired, but the evasion of western sanctions hadn't quite gone far enough. China had a fairly free run in the construction of the physical infrastructure, but the attendant financial and commercial infrastructure remained largely in western hands.

Saudi Arabia was challenged to contain Iran throughout the region, ensuring that the US maintained the present number of military bases on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf, and used Saudi financial and hydrocarbon assets to secure stability within the region. It was felt that Saudi Arabia hadn't managed to help to contain Iran, but had managed to keep the US engaged and had secured stability on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf. Beyond that, Saudi influence was very limited.

Iran, on the other hand, was asked to fully circumvent western imposed sanctions on both goods and access to capital markets, to sell hydrocarbons directly overland to China, and to have developed fully functioning nuclear weapons. Iran did acquire nuclear weapons and did sell hydrocarbons overland to China, but didn't fully circumvent western imposed sanctions. Two questions arose over the Iranian gameplay. The first was the degree to which the Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would trigger a response from the rest of the world. In the game, there was very little response. Second, to what extent would the gameplay be different if we included a Peak Oil scenario? These are interesting questions that warrant further thought.

Onto this complexity we need to add Turkey. Turkey was charged with developing a deeper relationship with Chinese commercial interests, ensuring that the BRI is fully built out in the region, ensuring that Kurdish national aspirations are thwarted, and securing the stability of the southern border with Syria. It was felt that Turkey had developed a deeper relationship with China, but hadn't managed to fully thwart Kurdish national aspirations and probably had helped to secure the border with Syria.

Syria itself was tasked with ensuring that the Russia remained engaged in Syria and continued to offer a security guarantee, ensuring that good relations are maintained with the regional powers of Turkey and Iran, whilst limiting the influence of Saudi Arabia, and ensuring that Kurdish aspirations for nationhood were frustrated. By and large, Syria did manage to maintain good relations with Russia, Turkey, and Iran, who together managed to maintain the unitary state in Syria. Kurdish national aspirations didn't gain a foothold in Syria, but weren't frustrated either.

Kurdish aspirations made the greatest progress in Iraq. The Iraqi Federal Government was asked to ensure that the US remained engaged in Iraq, to ensure that good relations were maintained with the regional powers, and that Kurdish aspirations for nationhood were frustrated with Kurdish gains in the federal constitution being rolled back. By and large, Iraq failed in these objectives. The United States remained engaged, but with much reduced support and influence. By 2050 Iran had become more bellicose towards Iraq and had a greater influence in Iraqi affairs than America. The regional powers were content to allow this to happen and the Iraqi Kurds had declared themselves an independent nation.

This was core to the Kurdistan game play. Kurdistan was tasked with ensuring that the wider Kurdistan achieves independent nationhood, that the newly formed Kurdistan receives a security guarantee from both the United States and Russia, and that Kurdistan is placed along the BRI and receives developmental support from China. Whilst some progress was made along these lines, the objectives had by no means been achieved by 2050. It did allow us to focus on what an independent Kurdistan might look like. It certainly gave us a feel for the difficulties that could arise from such a change and would merit further consideration in the future.

All in all the game was a mixed bag. Many of the objectives were zero sum, which meant that those who achieved their objectives would naturally prevent others from doing so. Looking at the outcome overall, a number of research points stand out:

1. The biggest question coming from the game was the extent to which the 'Biden Doctrine' - which we accept is emerging and not fully formed - could be a stable basis for long term policy. The US withdrawal from the northern side of the Persian Gulf rather leaves the region open to Russian and Chinese influence. Could that really happen?

2. The game assumed that Russia still covets warm water ports - on the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea. How realistic is that assumption? To what extent would that remain dependent upon Chinese largesse?

3. At the start of the game, we would have predicted that Iran would end the game as the principal Chinese ally in the region. It was no surprise to find this the case. However, there was little push back within the game to the growing relationship between the two, especially when China approved the Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. Would China really accept a nuclear Iran just to get the railroad built?

4. The game play touched upon western sanctions in a number of places. These weren't given a sharper focus within the game, but they did raise the question of effectiveness and the degree to which their use gives rise to an incentive to develop an alternative financial architecture. The game was ready for this - a Chinese, Russian, and Iranian financial infrastructure to challenge the present North American/ European one. The game missed this aspect, which is worth further consideration.

5. The issue of Kurdistan, especially in the context of Iraq, gave rise to a number of questions about nationhood and independence in the region. The game suggested that national aspirations could not be met within the confines of the present arrangements. If these are not stable, then we can expect to see further outbreaks of instability within the region. If the United States is not prepared to maintain the present world order, then might we see a new, possibly Chinese, one?

These are some of the questions we were left with at the end of the game. The game itself didn't provide answers to these questions, but they are worthy of further study. In some respects, they have helped to uncover the 'known unknowns'. We know what we don't know. Surely that has to be a step forward?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022