The World If 2018

I have started to work through the current instalment of 'The World If' series - a published supplement to The Economist. Although two points don't make a trend, there is a regularity that is appearing within these publications. They remain a set of end state scenarios. They continue to be organised into four sections: politics, business & economics, science & technology, and history. One difference this year appears to be a greater inclusion of a process based approach to the end state scenarios. The path by which we arrive at the end state scenarios has taken a greater emphasis. It is hoped that this trend continues.

Some of the scenarios continue some of the themes from 2017. For example, there is a scenario that asks what if China were to dominate the world order in 2024. What would the world look like if it were to be a Chinese rules based system? This is an interesting question that is predicated by a Trump second term, which was one of the speculations in the 2017 edition. The answer to that question suggested by the piece is pretty discomforting to western readers. We see a fairly full deployment of the surveillance state. The automation of transport and the internet of things are used to harvest masses of data about individuals which is then used for the purposes of social control. The scenario draws a picture of a Chinese world order as one in which an authoritarian state is greatly enhanced. I imagine that we have all been warned now.

Another scenario that caught my eye is not set too far in the future - in 2020, to be exact - and concerns the break up of the European Union. In this scenario, there are two triggers - an increasing authoritarianism in Eastern Europe (Poland in this case), and a growing disillusionment with the Euro as a currency (in Italy, in this case). There is also a backdrop of a further migrant crisis in the summer of 2019, which just sharpens the point a little. It's quite a well worked scenario. By being very close to the present, there are a number of pointers in European politics to be aware of. The most acute of these is the European budget, which has yet to be set, and has the uncertainty of not knowing what contribution, if any, can be expected from the United Kingdom. In this scenario, then monetary arrangements are the breaking point. That sounds about right.

There are one or two fanciful scenarios. For example, one asks what the world would be like if there were to be no moon. I accept that this is an interesting question, but I see it as no more than an indulgent curiosity. I do wonder of the editorial team has run out of steam? There are far more interesting questions that a future science & technology pose that could have been asked, but weren't. For example, we could have bee asked if there is a technological solution to climate change? Or does synthetic biology have the potential to feed the world whilst retaining our dietary habits? I do wonder about the contributions of futurists to this publication because they seem fairly absent. I wonder if their inclusion would improve it?

The historical scenario is an interesting counter-factual speculation on what might have happened had Martin Luther King not been assassinated? This I found interesting because the article suggested that his reputation would have been much lower than currently is. He might have lived, but his reputation would have been nowhere near as high as it currently stands. What I found interesting is the parallel this scenario has with one in which President Kennedy hadn't been assassinated. Both speculations suggest that they were killed at the peak of their reputations, which have only been enhanced as the memory fades and the myth takes over, and the myth then becomes extended and exaggerated. Of course, this is just idle speculation.

I shall add these scenarios to my bank of end state scenarios because they provide useful way points in constructing timelines. My current take away is the significance of the current push by President Trump to be re-elected and how Europe adjusts to a post-Brexit environment. Both of these are imminent and both appear to be significant potential turning points. They are currently not studied as much as they ought to be, but that only provides a commercial opportunity for a futurist in practice.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2018

The World If 2017

In what has become an annual publication, The Economist has taken to publishing a series of speculative scenarios that consider what the world would look like if certain key events were to happen. The speculations are in the form of end state scenarios (i.e. they describe what the world looks like at that key point in the future) rather than process scenarios (i.e. they are fairly thin on how we managed to arrive at that end state). They represent how a more general readership expects to consume futures work.

From our perspective, we tend to be more involved in process scenarios because it seems to us more important to see how we get from the present to the future. The timelines involved are central because they can provide milestones to gauge which future, from an array of competing alternative futures, is emerging as we move away from the present. This is not to invalidate end state futures. It is simply not our cup of tea.

The scenarios were published in the summer of 2017. I read them at the time, but set them aside for more mature reflection. Coming to them again in the summer of 2018 gives me the benefit of a year's hindsight. The most striking thing about the scenarios is the way in which they reflect the hopes and concerns of summer 2017. Some are current a year later, some are really no longer that interesting. 

For example, the opening piece examines what France could look like if President Macron's reforms were to be successful. The reforms would not only rejuvenate the French economy, but also give France a stronger voice within the European framework. They would give Mr Macron (who is assumed to be re-elected for a second term) a platform to encourage Germany to undertake the public investment that it is currently reluctant to do. Those were the hopes of 2017. The reality of 2018 is President Macron struggling to reform the French economy, Germany to continue to pull ahead of France, and underinvestment in public services continuing in Germany. This has become an idle hope.

It contrasts quite strongly with the following piece, which considers what the world would look like if President Trump were to win a second term. We may shudder at that thought, but it ought to be given serious consideration. The most serious speculation is that a second Trump term would simply run out of steam. The view is expressed that the Trump administration is policy light, which allows him to be buffeted by events. There is a certain attractiveness to this view. Once the tax cuts have been passed, what else is there? The wall between the US and Mexico continues unbuilt, President Trump continues to be disengaged in foreign affairs, and he has the good luck to enjoy an economy that motors along. One note in the piece sounds off today - President Trump is very unlikely to stand against Mark Zuckerberg in 2020. In less than a year, Mr Zuckerberg has become very damaged goods.

The scenarios are organised into four sections: politics, business & economics, science & technology, and history. The historical section contains only one piece on what the world would have looked like had the Ottoman Empire not collapsed after World War I. My favourite piece is in the science & technology section. It examines what the world would be like if an electro-magnetic pulse were to disable large parts of the electrical grid in the US. This is already the subject of a number of works in fiction, but this piece draws together in short form some of the various consequences. It is one of those wild card futures that deserves more attention than it receives.

I imagine that I will return to these scenarios from time to time. I quite enjoyed reading them. They are well written and well thought out, even if they have dated quite soon. They are an expression of our thinking in 2017 and in no way constitute a forecast of future events. They are an idle speculation, if this were to happen, then what would the world look like? It's best to bear that in mind when reading them.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2018

What If ... An Exercise In Alternatives

I just happened to have some time to kill in our local supermarket a few weeks back. Normally, the way I like to while away my time is to browse either the wine or the magazine sections. Good fortune that day put me into the magazine section, and I came across 'What If … Book Of Alternative History'. I had to buy it.

I take the view that if we want to master alternative futures, we must also learn to grapple with alternative pasts. There happens to be a genre of fiction - Alternative History - that caters for this. Some of it is quite good. Some of it quite poor. However, the point is not to conduct literary criticism, but to be able to derive from a common starting point an alternative route into the present. If a futurist can master that technique, they will be able to start at a point in the present, and navigate a route into the future. To do this several times, with different results, is to produce a set of alternative futures. Or scenarios, as we commonly call them.

This little publication - it calls itself a bookazine, a cross between a book and a magazine - is a mixed bag. It is American in origin and reflects a set of American values and priorities. Each piece starts with a question, outlines what actually happened, describes the pivotal event, and then presents a narrative as if the pivotal event hadn't happened. As a template for exploring alternative history, it has much to commend it. As a methodology to explore alternative futures, it is very important.

One pivotal point in history, a favourite of the alternative history genre, considers what might have happened had the Confederate States performed better at Gettysburg? This work contains an entry on this subject. It outlines the fault lines in American politics that led to the Civil War, and explains how, with the loss at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the South could no longer win. But what if Lee were to have been victorious at Gettysburg? That is the starting point of the narrative. It has McClellan  defeating Lincoln in the 1864 election, a negotiated peace following, and then a divided continent. The narrative places something of a brake upon the industrialisation in the North, and provides a different trajectory for the expansion of the frontier westwards. It finishes with both the Confederate and Union governments taking a non-aligned stance in World War I.

We can argue over specific events along this timeline, and that is it's point. The purpose of a counter-factual timeline is to provide discussion points. Only by examining these key events can we understand their significance. The fun then starts when we add one timeline to another. For example, the US neutrality result of the American Civil War piece ties in naturally with the piece considering what may have resulted from Germany not losing World War I. Could that have led to the marginalisation of the Nazi Party in German politics? I find these questions interesting as an intellectual challenge, but the main benefit from them comes when we apply then to our consideration of the future.

Take Brexit as an example. This is a highly complicated situation with many moving parts. Anyone who can say what will or will not happen in Brexit is a fantasist. There are so many possibilities that the only way to view the situation is from the lens of multiple futures. At this point in time, each of those futures deserves an equal weight because they are equally likely to happen. We can narrow down the range of potential futures by mapping out a rudimentary timeline. Will Brexit be Hard or Soft? Will the detachment be amicable or acrimonious? Will there be a last minute change of heart by the British public? And so the questions go on. The point is that the answer to each of these questions unlocks a different timeline. The identification of these potential timelines is where the technique shows its worth.

I am a fan of alternative futures and timelines. This little magazine, despite its flaws, is an interesting exercise in timeline construction. That's why it commends itself to me.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2018

When Central Banks Go To War

I had a chance to give Dragonstrike Revisited an outing a couple of weeks back. It was at a gaming conference where the players were experienced gamers, but who had little subject knowledge of financial markets and economic warfare. For me, it was an interesting experiment in moving a game from one context (great subject knowledge, little gaming experience) to another (little subject knowledge, a good deal of gaming experience). We used the same narrative as before, but had a greater focus on the economic wargaming aspects.

Most of the players managed to pick up the basic context after a couple of turns. I am fairly sure that the same group of players would play a better game the second time round simply because they had a greater familiarity with the game mechanisms and underlying concepts. By construct, there was very little central bank co-ordination and co-operation. The game was channelled along the lines of using the financial markets as an instrument of war, and conflict was inevitable.

The setting was an armed confrontation between China and Japan just off the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. There have been several confrontations in the past off the coast of China, the latest being in 2013. What marked the difference in this game is the willingness of the US to provide military support to Japan in the incident. The game was set over just a few days (21st April 2020 to 15th May 2020) and represents the prelude to a US carrier strike group sailing from San Diego to the Paracel Islands. The diplomatic manoeuvring of this period was external to the game, whose focus was to be the movements in the financial markets during this period.

As umpire, I played all roles other than those played by the players. The play sequence was quite straightforward. Each turn, I would announce the events within that turn, and invite the players to respond to those events in relation to how they moved the markets. I appreciate that this was a steep learning curve for the players, who tended not to have a background in financial markets. To that extent, it was something of a learning experience. The players would then tell me what they intended to do, I would map out the consequences of this onto a master scoreboard, and we would move on to the next turn.

The scoreboard consisted of a series of financial indicators in five key areas – stock market indices, the foreign exchange markets, the bond markets, shipping rates, and commodity prices. The actions, or inactions, of the players would move the markets, up, down, and sideways, according to what they did. The aim was to move the markets to achieve the goals of their characters.

In the event, we only managed to play four turns before running out of time. This represented the period 21st April 2020 to 29th April 2020, a bit more than a week. In this time, stock markets worldwide fell, in the US more than Japan and China. This represented the activities of the People’s Bank of China in the US stock markets, who were very aggressive in shorting the market. I would have liked to explore that further. The Dollar fell appreciably against the Euro, as the Euro became a safe haven. I found that interesting. The bond markets were quite unstable, with the US and Japan both experiencing a downgrade. I think that reflected quite aggressive behaviour on the part of the China player, but it was to be expected. Shipping rates rose considerably. This was to be expected if the South China Sea were to become a conflict zone, but it also reflected the purchase of spare shipping capacity by Chinese and Japanese governmental agencies. Commodity prices rose as all nations started to stockpile key resources, and the price of oil rose significantly. This was to be expected. Looking at the results as a whole, there were no major surprises in store. In a sense, that’s satisfying because it argues for the validation of the game, if only a limited validation.

There were a number of features of the game that could do with further thought. Once again, the question of the ability of the Chinese monetary authorities to de-stabilise the US financial markets became a moot point. This is worth some further thought because it is almost a default first move for the China player. Opinion does differ on this, and it could do with more thought about the process by which this could happen. The stockpiling of strategic commodities and shipping capacity was also another feature worth further consideration. These are some of the issues we shall think about in the weeks to come.


Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2018