The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe - The Starting Point In 2020

Once we have defined the scope of the game, the next step was to narrow the focus a little to determine what it is that the actors were seeking to achieve and then to set out the resources they had at their disposal at the start of the game. We felt that a good opening game would be one that defined a baseline scenario for 2050. This would be a continuation of current trends resulting from current policy. The players could change the direction of policy from within the game, but we felt it would be interesting to play the game as a continuation scenario.

In subsequent games, we might like to explore a transformational scenario, a new equilibrium scenario, or even a collapse scenario. We would do this by modifying the objectives of the players and the resources they have at their disposal at the start of the game. However, this was a continuation scenario, and that determined the player's objectives. 

We felt that two aspects of the game would be key - the struggle between Shia Iran and the Sunni Taliban. and the civilisational clash between a Russia and US in the descendent and a China in the ascendant. Much of the former struggle would play out in the C4 nations (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan), whilst most of the latter struggle would lay out in Kazakhstan. The game was further complicated through the Taliban occupying an extra territorial role that involved hidden briefings and concealed moves. We deliberately denied the other players information about the location and disposition of the Taliban in order to heighten the tension within the game.

The Taliban started the game controlling much of Afghanistan, the Karakum Desert in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and the Hindu Kush in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. We gave the Taliban a small presence in eastern Iran and Xingjian Province in China, just to create a strategic option, if necessary. The Taliban started the game with hydrocarbon transit fees from China and financial support from the Gulf States. The main aim of the Taliban in the game was to develop a degree of territoriality through the formation of a provisional government, to drive out the American presence across the region, and to isolate Iran strategically by ensuring that the BRI develops north of the Caspian Sea rather than south of it. This was quite a tall order.

Iran, on the other hand, had a degree of territoriality, but was facing strategic isolation. At the start of the game, Iran was already selling gas to China via an overland pipe network and was selling oil to China that was shipped by sea. A BRI rail corridor had been surveyed between Mashad and Bandar Abbas, but still needed to be built out. This helped to determine the objectives for Iran. We felt that Iran ought to seek to transport oil to China overland rather than by sea. To do so would involve circumventing western imposed sanctions on goods and capital, so we had that as an Iranian objective. Finally, we felt that Iran would only feel secure in the region by having possession of a nuclear weapon, so we made that a national imperative as well.

This would naturally bring Iran into conflict with the United States. The United States is challenged in the region. On the one hand, it needs to maintain a degree of territoriality through the operation of a network of bases. Hence one of the US objectives was to maintain the three bases in Afghanistan at the start of the game and to acquire a further three bases in the region. This was to check and counter Russian and Chinese ambitions in the region, a second objective. This would naturally challenge the US because Russian ambitions were territorial, whilst Chinese ambitions were commercial. This objective would need to be deftly handled. The final American objective was to ensure the economic failure of both Iran and the Taliban in their respective territorial areas.

The issue of bases was a theme that we introduced to the Russian player. Our opening view of Russia was one where there had been a loss of empire over the previous 30 years, but in which Russia was still dominant both economically and culturally. We wanted to encourage the assertion of Russian authority in the region. For this reason, the Russian objective was to maintain the three bases in the region at the start of the game and to extend their influence by acquiring a further three bases. Russia is somewhat hampered by western sanctions in 2020, so a further objective was to circumvent those in order to gain access to the global capital markets. We also interpreted Russia as essentially realist, so we felt that Russia would take the view that if they had to be an ally of China, they would be the principal one in the region.

Chinese ambitions for the region are mainly commercial. The region occupies a key transit position between China and Europe. It also is a source of key minerals and hydrocarbons and increasingly has a pool of cheap labour that can be used for the manufacture of goods as Chinese manufacturing moves up the value chain. This determined the Chinese objectives. First and foremost was to secure the supply of hydrocarbons from within the region. The infrastructure to do this is not fully built out in 2020, so a core objective would be to build that out. In addition to that, the development of BRI rail corridors are important to China as points of economic development along the route between China and Europe, but also as a means of exercising Chinese tributary diplomacy. Chinese diplomacy requires China to become the indispensable power within the region. China also looks for strategic options, so we felt that a core objective would be to acquire commercial and military port facilities at the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas.

If Iran were the southern end of Chinese ambitions, then Kazakhstan would be involved in the northern end. Kazakhstan provides a key link in the chain between China and Europe. Formerly part of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan still looks to Moscow for leadership within the region. As a key transit corridor, one important objective for Kazakhstan would be to facilitate the passage of freight and hydrocarbons between Russia and China. This would involve the further development of the gas and oil pipeline network, as well as the building out of the surveyed rail transportation corridors. Equally, we felt that it would be in the interests of Kazakhstan to impede the development of hydrocarbon transit routes between the Persian Gulf and China in order to accentuate the importance of Kazakhstan. In 2020, the Kazakh government seeks to make Astana (now Nur Sultan) a key financial centre for the region. Our interpretation of this was to give Kazakhstan the objective of developing a means by which all actors can evade western imposed sanctions. 

In 2020, the intentions of the actors had taken shape, but much was to be build out and made real. There was an element of constrained resources, which allowed the possibility of the players developing through the game play. Everything was set up for the collision of interests in Central Asia in the first half of this century. What would the players make of it?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Rise Of The Civilisational State - A Review

This is one of those books that ought to command our attention. It contains the seeds that are necessary to understand China's foreign policy and Russia's use of hybrid warfare. Underlying that, it begs the question: if the Westphalian system is failing, what may replace it? This is one of the larger questions of our times.

The western liberal democracies certainly feel as if they are in retreat, or at least in need of renewal. Whether this can be ascribed to terminal decline or just simply a process of updating remains to be seen. However, the populist surge, the rise of myopic nationalism, and the development of siege economies all point towards a very different world in the years to come. I am not entirely convinced by the argument of civilisational decline, and neither is the author. And yet if we are in a period of terminal decline, what other options are there?

The author argues that the China of Xi Jinping aspires to become a civilisational state. I think that he has a case. Much of Chinese policy can seem opaque when viewed through a Westphalian lens. Yet when through a Chinese lens, it makes perfect sense. For example, take the case of the BRI. This baffles many western strategists because it makes no sense in transactional terms. However, in terms of tributary diplomacy, it fits into a pattern of Chinese foreign policy that goes back for centuries. The concept of the civilisational state helps us to understand contemporary, and future, policy.

Another aspirant to become a civilisational state is the Russia of President Putin. The author is a bit sceptical of this claim. The desire of Russia, it is stated, is to establish a Eurasian civilisation, with Russia at it's head. There is more than a grain of truth to this view. The exercise of power by contemporary Russia contradicts the claim. The use of raw power to achieve national and factional objectives undermines the claim to be acting on behalf of a civilisation. Yet the core view helps us to understand why Russia feels itself the guardian of the Slavic civilisation, and why it feels compelled to act in it's near neighbourhood.

The book considers two other interesting contenders to be seen as civilisational states - India and ISIS. The claim by India to be a civilisational state is undermined by the absence of an Indian civilisation. There is an Indian culture, but that culture has such diverse origins from within the sub-continent that it is too much of a stretch to call it an Indian civilisation. The claim by ISIS to represent an Islamic civilisation is again undermined by the sheer diversity of experience and belief within that putative civilisation. It does beg the question of whether a religion could represent a civilisation, but it would be outside the scope of the book to give that question too deep a consideration.

The book is reasonably well written for an academic text. The arguments are presented clearly and are easy to follow. I was impressed by the scholarship of the author, who seems to have grasped his subject very well. This is definitely a specialist book, and one I can recommend to those who have an interest in this area.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

Introducing The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe

The largest geopolitical development in the first half of this century is arguably the Belt and Road Initiative that is being championed by China. The BRI consists of a large number of commercial projects that are designed to link China to Europe through the development of all points in between. The Steppes of Central Asia are of vital importance to the land based element of the BRI. Whilst being commercial in their implementation, the BRI also has a distinct geopolitical aspect as well. The purpose of this matrix game was to explore these nuances.

The strategic thinking was not undertaken in a void. Central Asia is of interest because it is one of the places where the interests of China, Russia and the US come into contact and have to interact with one another. In thinking about this framework, we were rather influenced by Christopher Coker's book 'The Rise Of The Civilisational State'. Coker maintains that the policies of China, Russia, and the US have a civilisational dimension to them and that where they bump into each other, we have conflict that is civilisational in nature. This sounded like the basis of a good game.

According to Coker's thesis, the Chinese civilisational approach has a commercial underpinning. The traditional policy of tributary diplomacy has an expression in the current policy of BRI. China receives from the tributary states, but gives back far more in return. This sounds odd to the more transactional approach that is associated with western civilisation, but it does establish the role of Chinese leadership.

By way of contrast, the Russian civilisational approach is characterised by the occupation of territory. The past two hundred years has been characterised by the expansion of Russia into Central Asia and the Far East. This territorial expansion was checked and moved back in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. As we move into the twenty first century, a degree of push back has started. We can expect that to continue in the years ahead.

The American approach is a hybrid between the territorial approach of Russia and the commercial approach of China. The US can take a transactional approach to it's dealings in Central Asia, and the advancement of US commercial interests - especially in the hydrocarbons sector - is of paramount importance. However, the US is thousands of miles away from home base, so a degree of territoriality is needed in order to secure American commercial interests.

This determined the first axis to be considered - Russia would be territorial, China commercial, and the US would be somewhere in between. Once having taken that decision, the next question in the design of the game was who else to include. Kazakhstan occupies the territory between Russia and China, it has a vital transportation corridor going through it, so it would be difficult to leave out Kazakhstan. Following the lead of Russia, we felt that Kazakhstan would be more territorially inclined.

An overlay of conflict within the region is the struggle between Shia Islam and Sunni Islam. We wanted to capture this because it does have a bearing upon the development of Central Asia. We included Iran to represent Shia Islam and the Taliban to represent Sunni Islam. Both are hostile towards the US and open to relationships with Russia and China. We felt that, owing to the impact of western sanctions, Iran would have more of a commercial focus, whilst the Taliban, in search of a state, would have more of a territorial focus. We decided to let the umpires play the governments of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan as they have only a minor role in the region much of which is controlled by the Taliban.

The second axis was far easier to define. The big three - Russia, China, and the US - in a scheme of civilisational conflict have to be gravitating towards a unipolar world order. Civilisational conflict, the fundamental assumption of the game, is characterised by one civilisation dominating all others. Against this, we felt that the minor actors - Iran, Kazakhstan, and the Taliban - would be content with a greater degree of multi-polarity. This does involve a question of degree, which we introduced through the game objectives.

In this way, we generated our 2x2 matrix to define the position of the actors, as shown above. There was sufficient space between the positions of the players to allow conflict to develop. As our focus was developments to 2050, we settled on a game of six turns from 2020, each representing five years of time elapsed. All that was then needed was to write the specific player briefings, which we will deal with in a subsequent post. 

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

Is Car Leasing over Ownership an Inevitable Future?

During 2019 the UK enshrined in law their pledge for a green future. In this future, the UK’s emissions by 2050 must be net zero. If not, the UK will breach it's own laws and UK citizens will be able to seek a judicial remedy to force the government to obey it's own laws.. One way in which we can see this new law put into action during 2020 is the government's plan to put an end of the sale of new petrol, diesel or hybrid cars in the UK. From 2035, no new cars of these type can be sold. But what does that mean for consumers?

Affordability is likely to be a constraint to car ownership in the future. The current average price of a car is £10,500, rising to £15,400 for finance purchases. This is significantly lower than the starting price of electric cars. The Nissan Leaf, the UK’s most popular electric car, prices start at £26,000.

Not only do electric cars cost significantly more, but owners also take on the liability of recharging them. Within the UK there would need to be 25 million charging points if all cars were swapped to electric by 2050. Currently there are 11,000 located predominantly within London and Scotland. The cost of these additional charging points is roughly £300bn, around the same cost as coronavirus to the UK.

We have seen over the series of “Is Car Ownership the Way of the Future?” that average household income is £30,420 and that annual car costs are £4,500 - about 15% of household income. Therefore, from 2035, the answer is likely to be no because cars are set to become unaffordable. Car ownership appears set to be a thing of the past by 2050.

However, there in lies an opportunity not only for business but for individuals. If 31 million drivers took a 15% increase to their disposable cash, what would society look like?  

There are many steps that need to be put in place before we are ready to stop owning cars. We have all experienced freedom now and few will want to give this up. This creates a long-term opportunity for businesses. Companies such as Enterprise Car Club are already capitalising on this growing area. They offer day hire for vehicles at a fixed rate which includes all costs, including fuel, at a price as low as £30. While this has been a preferred option within cities where parking is limited and many car hire options include free parking, in towns adoption has been sluggish.  

Without the guarantee of personal liberty and spontaneity that accessible electric car hire can offer, renting over owning will not succeed. A shift in societal expectation also needs to evolve by 2050. While we have all had a glimpse of a car free life during 2020, only 2% of trips involved cycling and 27% walking. Perhaps 2020 will be the tipping point for us to reassess our day to day activities. If cycling to the destination can be both beautiful and safe, a post coronavirus world could see the 2% increase. This not only will give more available cash to the individual, but also eliminate the stress of driving and help reverse health effects of a sedentary lifestyle. However, this will also mean less distance can be travelled. Rather than an hour’s drive for a spontaneous day trip, we might instead have an hour’s mindfulness walk. 

Car ownership can only be the way of the future if we are committed to evolving our habits. There must be sufficient notice for businesses to adapt to this change. If we do not, 2050 will come and many will feel the sharp restrictions of a carbon neutral society. 

Charlotte Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Unfrozen North - Lessons Learned

The Unfrozen North was a game played across a number of dimensions. We wanted to examine how a northern element to China's Belt & Road Initiative (the BRI) could unfold. We wanted to examine the consequences of institutional weakness in the Arctic Council and a lack of cohesion amongst the NATO allies. More than that, we also wanted to examine to degree of potential co-operation there could be between Russia and China - with the acquiescence of Japan - in northern Asia. The study yielded some interesting conclusions that may be worth further consideration in the years to come.

The most obvious conclusion we reached is that, with the absence of a cohesive and unified approach from the NATO allies, the strategic initiative in the Arctic Ocean would pass to a Russia that is driven by China. This allowed both Russia and China to station fleets in the Arctic Ocean with no response from NATO. It allowed Russia to dominate the sea lanes for freight transit and to control the operation of the Arctic fisheries. This was conducted entirely to the benefit of western interests in the game, but it is not difficult to foresee a point in the future when that situation might change, with NATO having no answer to the question.

In 2020, much of the region is under-developed. The port facilities are sparse and the transportation corridors are few and far between. In the game, we assumed that the only nation with the desire and ability to change this situation would be China. We think that a reasonable assumption and the purpose of the game was to tease out some of the consequences of that assumption. The results were more or less what we could have expected them to be and we see this as a reasonably stable base line scenario for the Arctic.

The resulting development was not wholly beneficial to the environment of the Arctic. We had Canada and the European Commission advancing a green agenda, but with the lack of co-operation from Russia and the US, this was something of a forlorn hope. Canada was unable to limit the degree of poaching in the Arctic fisheries because there was a lack of naval assets to provide fishery protection. In many ways, this was an organisational matter that may have been better served by a clearer focus on whose mission fishery protection is, and the providing that agency with the tools to do the job.

Russia was very much the junior partner to China. In one sense, that is because we structured the game that way. We deliberately froze Russia out of the western capital markets and we deliberately placed the technical expertise in the hands of China. This facilitated a pivot of Russia away from Europe towards Asia. It was our intention to see how well the two actors would get on together. As it turned out, they got on rather well. They teamed up quite early in the game and the partnership provided a solid core for their achievements. A different, and more interesting, game would be to factor into the relationship more conflict than co-operation.

Japan managed to derive many of the benefits of the Polar Silk Road without incurring too many of the costs. Beneficial fishing rights were negotiated with Russia, as were beneficial transit fees along the Northern Sea Route. In the game, China was too busy building out the BRI to be bothered by Japan. An interesting extension might be to introduce a fuller spectrum of diplomatic relations by including, say, the Senkaku Islands as a point of conflict. However, that's a different game.

The structure of the game reflected our belief that the Arctic is more of a strategic priority for Canada than it is for the US. This came out in the game play and had an authentic feel to it. We could have given a bit more emphasis upon hydrocarbon extraction in Alaska just to tease out that point of conflict, In the end, there appeared to be an internal resolution of the conflict between hydrocarbon extraction and preserving the natural environment. This is an interesting way of interpreting the current situation in Alaska.

We inserted a fractured and disinterested Europe into the game. There were more pressing issues for the European Commission to deal with than the commercial development of the Arctic region. Europe has an interest in the region, but found it difficult to gain traction with events there. We found this to be reasonably accurate a portrayal of European politics. There are always more pressing matters than the Arctic, and any problem in the Arctic can be resolved through the use of liberal funding. 

Looking back at the game, allowing for a period of reflection, we feel that the results were reasonably valid as a base line scenario. A Russian-Chinese caucus is likely be dominant. Japan is likely to free ride the commercial development. The US and Europe are distracted by far more pressing matters, and Canada alone is unable to move the needle. This scenario is not written in stone. Things can change if we act to effect those changes. Perhaps we might explore that in future games?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Unfrozen North - Outcomes

At the conclusion of each game, it is worth taking time to assess how well each player managed to achieve the objectives of their actor. As we have said previously, each player was given three objectives for their actor to achieve by the conclusion of Turn 6. It is always a salutary lesson to compare how well the players feel they performed against how well the umpires feel that the objectives had been achieved. We come into this exercise expecting a degree of overlap and a degree of mismatch. Where the mismatch is pronounced, we should go on to flag that divergence for further review and study.

In The Unfrozen North, six players each had three objectives. Of the eighteen total objectives, ten of those saw the players and umpires in agreement, with the remaining eight marking disagreement between the players and umpires. In one case - that of Canada - the umpires and the player concerned were in complete agreement. In four cases the players and umpires disagreed on a single objective. In one case the umpires and the player concerned disagreed over all three objectives.

The greatest disagreement concerned China. China was tasked with establishing the Polar Silk Road, to deepen ties with the tributary states, and to mark the centenary of the end of the 'Century of Humiliation'. The player felt that the Polar Silk Road had been established. The umpires largely agreed, but felt that more work ought to have been undertaken to develop the destination ports, in particular Baltimore and Felixstowe, for this to be fully achieved. The player felt rather lukewarm about the deepened ties with the tributary states. The umpires felt that this objective had largely been achieved concerning Russia. Finally, the player felt that the centenary had not been adequately celebrated, whilst the umpires felt that, with a military review on the North Pole, possibly enough had been done.

In the case of the United States, the player did not feel that the option to develop hydrocarbons within the region had been created, whilst the umpires thought that it possibly might have been with the development at Prudhoe Bay and Nome. In the case of the European Commission, the player had felt that they had not been successful in representing the interests of Greenland at the Arctic Council. The umpires felt that the player had possibly been successful. Russia felt that the Northern Sea Route was fully functioning, whereas the umpires felt that to be only possibly the case owing to the lack of development of the destination ports. The Japanese player felt that they had possibly maintained the territorial integrity of the Japanese state, but the umpires felt that the continued Russian occupation of the Kuril Islands called that into question.

Looking at the assessment overall, a number of review points seem to stand out:

1. What does it mean to have the Polar Silk Road completed? Does that necessarily involve the development of the destination ports? Or does it just mean the opening of the sea lanes?

2. What level of readiness is needed for port facilities to anticipate the passage of hydrocarbons? What pipelines and storage facilities need to be built? By whom, and at what cost?

3. How are the interests of non-members represented at the Arctic Council? Does the Arctic Council represent an ossified power structure? How might that change over time?

4. To what extent should legacy conflicts, such as over the Kuril Islands, influence future policy development? Are the current facts in the ground the basis for future conflict? Is this how we want the Arctic to be?

The game did not provide many answers to these questions. However, they do provide a useful starting point for future games and further research.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Unfrozen North - Turn 6 (2050)

By 2050, the eastern half of the Arctic Ocean is almost completely free of ice. A small remnant of the Polar Ice Cap sits at the North Pole and the Central Route is almost open. The North West Passage remains open via Cambridge Bay and Resolute. At that point, there is far greater activity in the Arctic Ocean than seen in 2020.

There is a commercial agreement between Japan and Russia to provide Japan with preferential transit rates along the Northern Route across the Arctic. This operates in conjunction with a set of preferential fishing access tariffs paid by the Japanese commercial fishing fleet to the Russian commercial interests collecting them. In a further act of collaboration, Japan and Russia agreed to the Japanese purchase of Russian hydrocarbons and minerals originating in the Arctic. These contracts are to be denominated in US Dollars and settled in Tokyo, this giving Russian commercial entities access to the Tokyo capital markets. Russia has strengthened her sales of hydrocarbons and minerals to the UK and Japan, and deepened her presence in the capital markets of both nations.

As an act of hubris, China held a military parade on the North Pole to celebrate the centenary of the ending of the 'Century of Humiliation'. Russia agrees to permit the parade as a means of asserting their territorial claim to the North Pole, and Russian military units joined with Chinese military units for the celebration. Military units from the US, Japan, Canada, and Europe were invited to join the celebration, but declined. The review parade started from the Russian and Chinese military port facilities in Tiksi. The result of the parade was to underline the existence of the Polar Silk Road and to provide internal propaganda value to China, even though the international community was far from impressed.

Elsewhere, the flow of Kazakh, Tajik, and Turkmen refugees has now entered the Xinjiang region of China causing a large degree of dissent amongst the native Uighur residents. A series of outrages have been committed by the East Turkestan Party against Han Chinese residents in Xinjiang. More worryingly, the unrest and dissent has now spread to Tibet.

The United States attempts to resolve the refugee crisis through internal and external actions. Whilst achieving widespread popular support, the necessary funding is not approved by Congress. In the meantime, the flow of climate and economic refugees from Central America continues unabated. The lack of economic opportunities in the US, coupled by heavy handed policing, has led to a period of considerable racial tension and urban disorder. At the same time, many refugees from Central America have continued their migration northwards into Canada. There are growing racial tensions in the cities of Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. Disorder so far has been minor and spasmodic. 

The European Commission seeks to form a fiscal compact between the Arctic EU nations and the southern EU nations that are suffering the impact of the refugee crisis. Significant funds are proposed to resolve the twin problems, but do not receive support from the contributory nations, led by Germany. The proposal remains scheduled, but is not put to a vote.

In the meantime, the unabated flow of refugees into Europe from Africa and the Middle East has given rise to growing support of far right parties, which combine a brand of forceful repatriation with Euroscepticism. The 2049 elections to the European Parliament saw a majority of seats going to the Identity and Democracy faction. The new Commission President will be a Eurosceptic who does not believe in the EU project.

Canada continues to seek to activate the Arctic military assets with minimal success. Much infrastructure remains suited to the Cold War and the Frozen North and is badly in need of upgrade. In 2049, a submarine of unknown origin laid a sequence of mines in the waterways just south of Resolute. The mines later proved to be inactivated dummies and took over eight months to clear. The capability of an unknown actor to close the North West Passage had been demonstrated and insurance rates for freight using that route rose to impossibly high levels.

At this point we closed the game. The Arctic Ocean had become a major shipping transit route, a key source of hydrocarbons and minerals, and a fishery of significance. The region had become militarised by Russia and China, with the greater degree of development along the Russian Arctic coast. China had built out the Polar Silk Road, Russia had gained readmittance to the European and Far Eastern capital markets, and Japan had achieved a degree of energy security whilst preserving the use of key trade routes in the Arctic Ocean. The NATO nations fared less well. The US was absorbed by internal matters. Without it's lead, Canada suffered environmental degradation along their Arctic coastline. Europe continued the perpetual squabble about who gets what, and who pays for it.

The world in 2050 had a distinctly Asian feel to it. Perhaps it will be an Asian Century after all?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

If There Were No Cars, What Would Happen to Roads and Parking?

Look down any residential street and there is one guarantee; you will see infrastructure for cars. Cars are now embedded in society. But what if there was an alternative? 

From 2035, Great Britain will introduce new laws to reduce pollution levels. This new law will ban the sale of new diesel, petrol and hybrid cars. During 2019, these sales represented 93% of all new car sales in Great Britain. With the alternative fuel type being electric cars, this is likely to have a knock-on effect on the number of new car sales. The most popular electric car in Great Britain starts at £26,000 for the basic model. While Great Britain’s average annual salary is £30,420, large parts of the market could well be squeezed out. 

This gives a significant opportunity to make material change by 2035. Whether this is as a result of being priced out of the electric car market or simply lifestyle changes, the need for roads and parking will reduce. 

In Great Britain, there are roughly 250,000 miles of road networks and 5,000 parking facilities. This is an unnecessary burden for a small island but with changing appetite in a coronavirus world this opportunity could be realised. Parking facilities typically are multi-storied and open planned. Therefore, re-purposing these could be done quickly and in the interest of the community in which they are located. This might even be a solution to the 2020 question of how to educate students while maintaining social distance. 

Lessons can even be learned from the United States where in New York they have been taking a proactive approach for a number of years on their disused parking lots. Owners of such garages found that repurposing these buildings not only gave a larger sense of community but also offer more financial gains. Such garages now serve as bars, arcades, art galleries and restaurants in the city centre. 

However, parking facilities need not only be for profit. Great Britain has a housing problem that has a long way to be solved. First time buyers are struggling to get on the housing ladder and aging individuals finding themselves needing domiciliary care. This could give Great Britain an opportunity to build the first purpose built multi-generational home. Were grandparents, parents and children all under one spacious roof, this could reduce the burden of childcare and social care. 

There are also opportunities to rethink the road layouts currently in operation. No longer would drivers make the heart stopping right turn into busy two-way traffic. But instead, roads could be planned and linked based on today's use, with unused roads being given back to communities and nature. This would inevitably result larger proportions of society engaging in cycling and walking as they feel safer to do so. With only 33% of men and 40% of women in Great Britain at a healthy weight perhaps this could offer an improvement in health also. 

The alternatives might appear quite radical at first glance, but with increasing numbers of the workforce working from home, now poses an opportunity to tear up the rule book. If we do not, change will be forced in 2035 on an unprepared society. 

Charlotte Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Unfrozen North - Turn 5 (2045)

By 2045, the eastern hemisphere was almost ice free. The retreat of the Polar Ice Cap had started to accelerate along the Canadian coastline. The North West Passage, via Cambridge Bay and Resolute, is now open. This will allow seaborne transit between the Beaufort Sea and Baffin Bay.

The United States Senate voted to ratify US approval of UNCLOS, and voted to join the institutional framework surrounding the convention.

As a response to the opening of the North West Passage, the RCMP has been repurposed to include an Arctic capability. A summer naval station at Nanisivik is available to be repurposed as an Arctic home port. The port would need to be transferred to the RCMP and needs to have a supply and aviation facility developed to become fully operational. The current fleet of RCMP vessels are unsuited to the task of Arctic operations, but are suited to protect Canadian sovereign territories and seaways, and to maintain the environmental integrity of the Great Lakes area.

Russia is extracting mineral and hydrocarbons from the Barents Sea area, in addition to the hydrocarbons being extracted from the Yamal area. Russia and China signed a 99 year lease for commercial and military port facilities at Tiksi. Operations include securing the sea lanes within the Arctic and assisting the Russian navy with it's anti-poaching and anti-piracy operations. Chinese investments have strengthened the Polar Silk Road, which is now a major trade route between China, Central Asia, Europe, and the eastern US seaboard. Japan endorses the Polar Silk Road, but South Korea remains ambivalent about it.

Japan proposed an East Asian Union but the idea failed to take root with China, Russia, Malaysia, and the Philippines blocking the proposal. However, the proposal did bring forward an expression of friendly relations between Russia and Japan. The Japanese military presence on the Kamchatka Peninsula was clarified by Russia. It consists of a naval logistics facility without any warfighting capability, whose mission is to supply Japanese naval vessels involved in securing the Arctic sea lanes.

The European Commission repealed the obligation of Greenland, Iceland, and Norway to collect the 80% tariff formerly imposed upon fishing catches originating in the Arctic and landed on their respective home ports. The populations of Greenland, Iceland, and Norway are less unhappy with the European Commission as a result of this.

The role of the Arctic Council only received a modest boost from the European tariffs being purposed for research into biodiversity. Russia confirmed that the tariffs collected by the various commercial entities operating under their programme didn't see research on biodiversity as a priority.

There was a major oil spill at an oil terminal at Tiksi owing to Russian negligence in operating the newly installed machinery and faulty Chinese installation. It was exacerbated by a delay in reporting the problem and an unwillingness to own up to it. Given the winds, tides, and currents, the oil slick is circulating anticlockwise around the Arctic Ocean, and is now evident in the Beaufort Sea. It is washing up on both the Canadian and US coastline and will require a major clean-up effort.

The climate refugee crisis has now turned into a major political crisis. The United States is suffering from political gridlock in Congress. The bi-partisanship behind ratifying UNCLOS has now vanished and the President can from now on expect a hostile Congress, one in which no Presidential initiatives will pass.

Elsewhere, large numbers of Kazakh, Tajik, and Turkmen refugees have entered the Xinjiang Region of China causing a degree of dissent amongst the native Uighur residents. There have been a series of outbreaks of disorder, that have been relatively low level, but have the capacity to escalate into something more serious.

Further west, large numbers of African and Middle Eastern refugees have been entering Europe and now threaten to turn a humanitarian crisis into a political crisis. Greece, Italy, and Spain have threatened to halt all European business unless the situation is relieved. Croatia, Hungary, and Austria have threatened to block all European business if there is an attempt to relieve the situation. The refugee crisis is now at the top of the European policy agenda.

The world in 2045 is one that is characterised by environmental setbacks caused by climate change, large flows of people moving away from an ever worsening climate, and the early signs of conflict resulting from these changes. Will the picture improve by 2050?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020