The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe - Turn 4 (2040)

As we move into the second half of the game, the positions of the players are starting to become defined. The axes of co-operation and conflict are starting to show through as the players try to achieve their objectives. We are at the point where strategic assumptions need to be reviewed to work out what other players want and what they could be offered. As part of the background, the climate is becoming more of a factor within the region.

Iran revived its nuclear programme. This is dual purpose - to supply power within Iran and to secure a by-product that can be used in the creation of a nuclear weapon. Iran has sold some nuclear capability to North Korea. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Israel are unhappy in the region and pressures the US to take counter-measures. South Korea and Japan are unhappy about the North Korean involvement and pressure US to take counter-measures. They also make representations to China to limit North Korea. Internally in the US, the support for the President diminishes (his opponents denounce him).

It was established that Iran continues to supply China with oil, by sea from Bandar Abbas. It was also established that the Iranian diaspora was generally unsympathetic to the government of Iran, but too weak to become a factor within Iranian domestic politics.

The Taliban forms a provisional government in Turkmenistan. They receive official recognition from Iran, China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Contracts with China and Iran concerning the flow of hydrocarbons are honoured, and hydrocarbons flow again across the Karakum Desert. The border between Iran and Turkmenistan remains open.

The new government of Turkmenistan is not recognised by the US, Russia, and Kazakhstan. All US assets in Turkmenistan are nationalised with all contracts voided. The US business community is extremely upset with the President and support for the President diminishes even further (his supporters now denounce him). All Russian assets in Turkmenistan are nationalised with all contracts voided. The Siloviki are very unhappy with the Russian President and now openly question his competence. The border between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan remains open allowing trade to continue, but all contracts are voided owing to the lack of Kazakh recognition of the new government in Turkmenistan.

The government of Turkmenistan expresses a desire for the US training facility at Mari to remain open. The US decides to close the facility and the troops are withdrawn without incident.

The Taliban decides to close the US training facility at Bukhara in Uzbekistan. The US resists. In the resulting firefight, the US troops suffer 80% casualties, finding the Taliban troops well armed, well trained, and having the element of surprise. It is revealed that the US training facilities at Mari and Bukhara have been arming and training Taliban fighters since they were created in 2025.

A squadron of F35s are assigned to provide air support for the garrison at Bukhara. The first flight of four aircraft are shot down over the Karakum desert as soon as they enter Uzbek airspace, with two crews confirmed dead, one missing and presumed dead, and one captured. AWACs oversight reports that the F35s were shot down by Russian SA500 air defence missiles that appeared to be available in significant quantities. All military flights in the region are cancelled pending the outcome of a Congressional investigation.

The government of Afghanistan has become fearful of its position.

China acts to take control of the construction of the Urumqi to Orenburg gas pipeline. China will build out the pipeline with support from Kazakhstan and Russia, who will provide the project security. This increases and improves relations with Kazakhstan and will improve the flow of hydrocarbons into China when built. It increases China's role as an investor and consumer within the region. The pipeline will be complete in 2045.

As a result of the Chinese intervention in the Urumqi to Orenburg gas pipeline, ownership of the pipeline passes from Russian to Chinese entities. The Russian entities have to write off their investment. This causes even further discontent amongst the Siloviki with the current Russian leadership.

Russia seeks to develop GMO crop varieties to address the food crisis. The programme draws upon collaboration from the US and China and will make the new crop varieties available to Central Asian countries. The offer of seed is accepted by Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan for local food production.

Kazakhstan undertakes a scheme of public works with a focus on water security. Desalination plants are constructed in Tengiz and beside Lake Balkhash using a technology transfer from Russia, China, and the US. This improves the situation of many Kazakh people and creates partnerships with Russia, China, the US, and Iran. The Kazakh technological capability is raised marginally, despite the slight impact on the local water tables and the prevalence of corruption and waste.

The US seeks to reform and modernise the banking system in Central Asia. Attempts are hampered by a general lack of digital infrastructure in the region. An unsuccessful attempt is made to disrupt the traditional Hawala system of financial transactions. The US received support from Russia, but fails to gain support from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. China refuses to pressure Pakistan to join the initiative, but the US pressures Afghanistan to join the initiative.

The US can exert a degree of influence over the formal monetary structures within the region, but most of the transactions occur in the informal sector. The US loses further support from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

There is major popular discontent in Afghanistan. There are significant and peaceful demonstrations in Kabul, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif against continued US presence in the country.

The hot, dry, weather continues and worsens a little.

There is a movement of populations from the larger population areas in the region northwards. Iran remains relatively water and food secure. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have programmes of social assistance and poverty relief. The urban populations are hungry, thirsty, poor, and angry. Unhappy faces will go on the capital cities of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kabul. Climate refugees arriving in Russia and Iran are causing a degree of friction with the local populations.

The adverse weather continues to affect construction activity across the region.

In the years 2041 to 2045 the average price of oil rises from $51 per barrel to $54 per barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

Lessons From A Small Country - A Review

Jane Davidson is a conviction politician. That tends to sit awkwardly with the futures community because conviction politicians tend to create a single point future and focus upon that to the exclusion of all other possible futures. There is little nuance about alternative futures. There is little account of uncertainty in an evolving situation. There is only a focus on the conviction that they are right. Of course, the futurist would ask what if they are wrong? And this is where conviction comes into play. They can only conceive of a single future in which they are right.

Jane Davidson's fixed point future is one of climate collapse. Based on the supposition that it is a correct view of the future, how should one act in the present? The author is very much convinced by the cause of environmentalism, reducing species loss, and living within the planetary boundary. So are others, some of whom endorse the book. However, whilst they might be content with the distribution of wealth as it currently stands, the author isn't. In addition to planetary justice, the author seeks a form of social justice as well. In particular, the relief of poverty and a more equal society. This is where the book unravels a little.

Achieving planetary balance will necessarily involve far less economic activity than we currently undertake. A redistribution from the haves to the have-nots on a global scale will also skew this process towards less economic activity as well. The question of how we do this, whilst maintaining decent jobs and livelihoods is one the author grapples with, but in a fairly unconvincing way. The book needs far more thought about the transition from where we are to where the author wants us to be. I remain sceptical. The Gilets Jaunes in France give us an idea of what happens when over-excited conviction politicians get too far ahead of public opinion. Their cause collapses.

I can see the same thing here. The author assumes that she is absolutely right about her single point future and does not consider any alternatives. As a result of her conviction, she is certain that all right minded people agree with her and that anyone who doesn't is simply being obstructive or represents entrenched vested interests. However, we boil things down to two core questions. Is the author's view of the future right? And if it is right, are her recommendations for action the best thing to do?

I am not convinced about the first question. There is an argument that future generations will be better informed than the present, that they will have better technologies than the present, and they will have greater resources than the present. If you accept that argument, then there is a case to say that by restricting ourselves in the present, we are blighting the prospects of future generations. In this case, the best policy would be to do nothing and just muddle through. In my mind, the author is too convinced about only her view being the correct one to be blinded to the possibility of an alternative future. Myself, I quite like the idea of muddling through because, in my experience that is what most people do.

This book is a political Apologia Sua Vita. For me, the politics are too certain and can easily transition into a form of technocratic authoritarianism. If we can believe the book, we are already seeing this in Wales. I am unconvinced by the author's recommendations for action because they feel too prescriptive for a liberal democracy. There is too much compulsion for my taste. 

In many ways, the test will come in twenty years or so. If young Welsh people move to England because their prospects have been blighted by this legislation, then we will know that it has failed. If the direction of travel is the other way around, then this legislation will have been absolutely the right thing to do. The great thing about the future is that you won't know until you get there.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe - Turn 3 (2035)

The game has started to move towards its core events. We are now halfway through the game and the positions of the players are starting to unfold. We are starting to see collaboration in the northern part of the map and conflict in the southern part. No single player has yet come to dominate the game. The climate, though, is starting to make itself felt.

As a consequence of the adverse weather conditions, agricultural yields - especially those of cereal crops - have fallen across the region. Within the region, demand for agricultural produce exhibits a high degree of price inelasticity, meaning the increase in price outweighs the reduction in quantity sold. As a result, agricultural revenues increase. In the C4 nations, this increased revenue largely flows out of the country. 

Using the additional revenues from their agricultural operations, the Taliban undertakes a a major programme of poverty alleviation in the area under their control. This results in a deepening of popular support for the Taliban in those areas under their control. 

Iran embarked on a programme to survey potential routes for oil and water pipelines across Iran and the Hindu Kush. A survey of the route Busher (the main base of the water exchange) - Shiraz - Esfahan - Tehran - Mashad commences, and should be complete by 2040. The proposed route across the Hindu Kush was opposed by the Taliban, so work to date has not started on that proposal.

The United States undertook a programme to gain a degree of intelligence on Central Asia. This was partially successful. The areas under Taliban control in 2020 were made known to the American player. Since 2020, the Taliban have extended their support base across the region and they have deepened their support base across the region.

Intelligence was also obtained on the Taliban intentions in the region as follows:

"Funds raised by trade are routed via financial institutions in Astana, Tashkent, and Ashgabat. The Taliban have a mixed relationship with the central Asian states. On the one hand, the Kazakh, Uzbek, and Turkmen institutions are keen to process Taliban finances, much of which is in US Dollars. On the other hand, the central Asian states, such as Kazakhstan, are suspicious of Taliban motives and are unwilling to be fully supportive because they feel their southern boundaries to be vulnerable to Islamist influence."

The United States also obtained intelligence on Russia as follows:

"The event known as 9-11 led to a change of US policy in the region. To punish the Taliban, an American led coalition of nations on a policy of regime change in Afghanistan. This was successful, the Taliban were de-throned. However, they were defeated but not destroyed and have been resisting the US for a generation. The threat of the Taliban and the lack of American success has allowed Russia to establish military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, with whom Russia has quite cordial relations."

The United States also obtained a military assessment of the Taliban that states that the Taliban are well armed with both US and Russian weaponry that has a contemporary vintage, they are very numerous across the C4 region, and that the experience the Russian attempts to establish a new military camp in south Kyrgyzstan suggests that, in the absence of a significant increase in troop numbers, the US would be outclassed by the Taliban. They are well funded, well equipped, and well organised.

Russia, Kazakhstan, and China jointly embarked on a programme to build out the Kurgan to Urumqi BRI rail route. China would finance the work, Russia would construct it, and Kazakhstan would operate the rolling stock on the Russian owned track. The work would take 20 years to complete and is set to open, if unopposed, in 2050. The adverse weather has affected construction activity across the region. Conditions have worsened leading to the Orenburg-Urumqi gas pipeline to run late. It is now scheduled for completion in 2050.

As a consequence of building out the Kurgan to Urumqi BRI rail route, the Russian state now has a substantial long term indebtedness to Chinese banks. This, along with sanctions imposed by western agencies, will limit the ability of Russia to access further capital. It will hamper the ability of Russia to conduct military operations in the region.

There is a movement of populations from the rural hinterlands into the larger population areas in the region. With the exception of Iran (which has a relative abundance of water and food after 2025), the urban populations are hungry, thirsty, poor, and angry. Unhappy faces will go on all capital cities of the C5 nations and Kabul.

The flow of hydrocarbons for all entities, except those of US origin, across the Karakum Desert continues to be severely disrupted.

In the years 2036 to 2040 the average price of oil rises from $50 per barrel to $51 per barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe - The Hunt For The Elusive Taliban

It was something of a gamble to include the Taliban as an actor in the game. Their location and the assets under their control were only known to the Taliban player. A key factor in the game was exactly where were the Taliban located and what support did they command? In this respect, an element of the gameplay was the hunt for an elusive adversary.

The game design pushed the players along one of two lines. One option would be to co-operate with the Taliban, in which case their location and disposition was of lesser importance as long as they delivered their promises. In the game, China adopted this approach. At the start of the game, Chinese remittances to the Taliban for hydrocarbon transit fees were an important source of income for the Taliban. This formed the basis for later co-operation. Iran also tried to adopt this approach, but with little success because the Taliban saw Iran as an adversary rather than an ally. The Taliban saw their role as one of frustrating the Iranian ambitions in the region.

The other option was a more confrontational approach. This approach was adopted by the US, Russia, and Kazakhstan. In many respects, the US missed an opportunity by not co-operating with the Taliban. At the start of the game, the Taliban and the US had started to work together in Afghanistan. If America was to counter Chinese ambitions in the region, they would have to work with the Taliban, probably against Russia and Kazakhstan. The conflict between Russia and the Taliban was more direct. Russia started the game as the power of influence in the region, but that influence was in decline, just as that of China and the Taliban was in the ascendant. Kazakhstan tended to follow the lead of Russia, which placed it on a trajectory of conflict with the Taliban.

At the start of the game, as a feature of design, we gave the Taliban areas of control in the Karakum Desert in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in eastern Iran, northern Afghanistan, south Turkmenistan and south Uzbekistan; and a third area in the Hindu Kush across southern Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and western China. These are the areas shaded solid green in the map and are based upon the actual areas of Taliban support in 2020. The degree of support in 2020 varied from strong to fairly weak.

In the first two moves, the Taliban player sought to extend the areas of support further into Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan (shaded with green lines in the map). They also sought to deepen their support amongst the population through a programme of income support, social provision, and by instituting a form of local justice. In areas where the local justice system is characterised by corruption, where incomes are very low and social provision is generally lacking, the modest governance of the Taliban, the umpires felt, would be preferable to the governance of the legacy-Soviet regimes in place. This allowed the Taliban to become very dug in across their support areas.

In this endeavour, they were assisted by the changing climate. At the end of 2025, a sequence of benign growing seasons were experienced that favoured the growth of opium poppies. This flooded Europe and North America with cheaply produced heroin. To counter this, the United States instituted a programme where cereals were purchased directly from the Taliban at prices that were far in excess of market rates. This programme continued out to 2050. 

By 2030, the climate had started to turn hostile to cereal growth, reducing crop yields. The relative price inelasticity of demand for cereal crops gave yet a further revenue boost to the Taliban. In turn, the Taliban used these revenues partly for the purchase of weaponry, but mostly for income support and social assistance across the region. This further bolstered their support. The Taliban continued the programme of poverty alleviation well into 2035, by which time the climate had started to become quite hostile to human life.

The United States attempted to counter the influence of the Taliban in 2030 by training the local security forces at Mari in Turkmenistan and at Bukhara in Uzbekistan. Unknown to the Americans, these sites were in the heart of Taliban territory, and where the local support for the Taliban was well entrenched. The umpires decided that most of the local recruits to these facilities would be Taliban and ruled that of the recruits, 80% didn't follow the chain of command, 15% were 'no shows', and 5% took the training seriously and kept to the chain of command. In this respect, the US was training and equipping the Taliban military forces.

It was a similar story with the Russians. Russia established a training facility at Kulob in Tajikistan and at Bishket in Kyrgyzstan. Kulob was in the heart of Taliban territory in the Hindu Kush, with a similar result as that experienced by the United States. Bishket was outside of the area of Taliban control, so more recruits there followed the Russian chain of command.

The prowess of the newly trained and armed Taliban military force was demonstrated in 2030. At that time, the Russian player sought to establish a military base in south Kyrgyzstan on the border with China. There was a fierce firefight that resulted in the Russians withdrawing from that position after considerable losses and abandoning the idea of establishing a military base in that part of the Hindu Kush.

The effective strength of the Taliban in the region had somewhat surprised the other actors. In 2035, the United States undertook a full intelligence review of Taliban strength and intentions. This was only partially successful, with only out of date information about Taliban dispositions being uncovered, and only a partial review of Taliban intentions becoming known to America.

By 2040, the Taliban were strong enough to seize control of Turkmenistan and to form a provisional government. The new government was recognised by Iran, China, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Existing contracts for the flow of hydrocarbons with China and Iran were confirmed and would be honoured in the future. The border between Iran and Turkmenistan remained open.

The government of Turkmenistan was not recognised by the United States, Russia, and Kazakhstan. All US, Russian, and Kazakh assets in Turkmenistan were nationalised and existing contracts voided. This upset various American and Russian business interests. The border between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan remained open, allowing trade to continue, but on an uncertain contractual basis.

The Taliban asked the government of the United States to vacate the training facility at Mari. The US complied and vacated the base. Encouraged by this, the Taliban sought to forcibly close the US training base at Bukhara in Uzbekistan. The US troops resisted and in the resulting firefight suffered very high casualties. All actors were surprised at how well trained and well armed the Taliban military forces were. The US commander called in ground support from US air assets in Afghanistan, but these were intercepted and shot down by Taliban surface to air missiles in southern Uzbekistan that had a distinct Russian signature. All US military flights in the region were grounded pending an investigation and the government of Afghanistan became fearful of its position.

The events in the Karakum Desert in 2040 started a chain of events that would result in the Battle of Turkmenbashi in 2045. However, that's a different story for a different day.

It was interesting to operate an actor that was largely concealed to the other players. Those who worked with the Taliban tended to fare better than those in conflict with them. The Taliban were helped enormously by the poverty and corruption within the region. The lack of social and economic development from the other players gave the Taliban an uncontested run at their objectives. Towards the end of the game, China managed to counter the Taliban objectives. Interestingly enough, that was from within a co-operative framework rather than one of conflict. Perhaps that's an important lesson to be learned from the game?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe - Turn 2 (2030)

Having made their opening moves, the players are now starting to focus on building their positions to achieve their objectives by the end of the game. The patterns of player relationships are starting to emerge as the actors start to reach for their goals. A few hidden moves still have an impact on the game, but the contours of gameplay are starting to become evident.

China, with the agreement of the US, builds out a series of LNG trans-shipment facilities on the West Coast of the US. These are fully operational by 2030. This helps to reduce Chinese dependence upon Central Asian gas supplies.

The Taliban engages in a campaign of area denial in the Karakum Desert. The campaign manages to reduce the flows of hydrocarbons across the desert by 90% to 95% of the 2025 levels. They can do this because of the degree of popular support they enjoy in the area and the relative ineffectiveness of the local Turkmen and Uzbek security forces.

Iran, using internally generated funding and knowledge of local operating conditions, embarks on a programme to develop a new pipeline material, based around the use of graphene. This will allow pipes to be laid that are tolerant of extreme weather conditions and which are flexible for use in extreme terrains. The technology is being researched at Shiraz and will be completed by 2035. The effort to produce this material has exhausted the supply of internal funding in Iran.

Kazakhstan is seeking to develop a tech sector to support the Kazakh economy. The Kazakh authorities sought to draw upon their previous investments in the transportation sector but were hampered by the relative lack of success in that endeavour. Transport in Kazakhstan remains primitive. The rail network, in 2030, is only 45% electrified. The improvements in this area were achieved by diverting power from the household sector to the rail sector. The bulk of electricity generated in the country - mainly from coal - is used to fuel the extractive industries. The road network, apart from a small number of vanity projects and BRI financed highways, retains the same pattern laid down by the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Little has been maintained effectively or upgraded.

Kazakhstan does receive a degree of technology transfer from Russia, China and the US, so the technology sector has started to be developed. In developmental terms, it has placed Kazakhstan to a similar situation enjoyed by the US in the early 1990s. Compared to the other C4 nations, Kazakhstan has a far higher degree of technological development, which improves the reputation of Kazakhstan amongst it's neighbours. However, there has been little improvement of the life conditions of the majority of the population.

The US has embarked upon a programme to support the agricultural diversification of the Central Asian region. This involved the US purchasing cereal crops from the Taliban at an extremely high intervention price that meant that many farmers have switched away from opium poppies to wheat. The US anti-narcotics programme was supported by Russia, China, and Kazakhstan, and approved by the Taliban. The roll out of the programme highlighted the results of the training missions in Mari and Bukhara. It transpired that 80% of the recruits refused to follow the established chain of command, 15% of the recruits were 'no shows', and only 5% of the recruits took their tasks seriously. Of this latter group, there is a high turnover owing to their relatively high mortality rate.

As a result of the US action, there was a decrease in the locally grown narcotic crop and an increase in the locally grown cereal crop. However, terrorist operations in the region were not significantly defunded. US relations with the Taliban, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan all improved.

Russia, with the acquiescence of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, establishes a border security programme. This involves establishing a training facility at Kulob and Bishket. Russia provides the necessary technology and security assistance through training and equipment upgrades. This results in a decreased drug flow into Russia involving increased security co-operation with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, but not Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 

Unknown to other players, this greatly assists the Taliban who control the town of Kulob and the associated hinterland. It means that the Taliban supply 80% of the recruits to the Russian training programme, who can now be considered as being trained in the latest Russian military doctrine using the latest Russian weapons. The troops are available for deployment anywhere in the region under Taliban control, either as Talban troops or as false flag troops pretending to be Russians.

Russia attempted to establish a new military camp in south Kyrgyzstan but was opposed by the Taliban. This did not go well for the Russians. There was intense fighting around the camp and along the access corridor, resulting with the Russians abandoning the plans to establish the camp. Russian survivors reported their opponents to be using quite modern weaponry and tactics of both US and Russian origin.

The years 2031 to 2035 will experience a prolonged heatwave with an associated lack of rainfall. These provide a hostile environment for the growth of cereals and other agricultural produce. A certain degree of water stress is experienced across the region.

In the years 2031 to 2035, the average price of oil rises from $45 per barrel to $50 per barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

Brexit - The Never Ending Saga

In 2017 we wrote about some thinking we had undertaken on the likely trajectory of Brexit over the next decade or so (see 'A Beginners Guide To Brexit'). Using the Three Horizons Model as a way of viewing the issue we suggested that it would be very optimistic to expect the question of Brexit to be resolved before the UK had left the European Union. With the benefit of hindsight over the past three years, and as the issue of Brexit has become one of international concern, now might be a good time to revisit that piece of work for an update.

In our original thinking, we felt that the period 2017-19 would be one in which the UK would attempt to negotiate a departure from the EU on beneficial terms. This would be unlikely to succeed because the UK had yet to determine exactly how it saw the relationship with the EU unfolding in the coming years. What we failed to appreciate was the degree to which the issue would polarise British society and the degree to which the British Establishment would hinder the process of leaving the European Union. Ultimately, this rearguard action failed. In December 2019, the British public voted decisively, by a large margin, for a government committed to leaving the European Union, as soon as possible, at any cost.

It was the decision to leave at any cost that is the cause for concern. After years of division and bitter recrimination, the British public has decisively decided what it doesn't want. What the United Kingdom has failed to do is to define what it does want. It is because of this fundamental mismatch between aspiration and capability that the UK government still appears vacillating. It also suggests that any attempt to determine a post-Brexit relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union is doomed to failure at this point. In contemporary language, we seem to be heading towards a 'Hard Brexit' unless either side is willing to compromise upon their core values and interests.

If we are right, our modelling suggests that we shall then go into a hostility phase. In our original thinking, we felt that this could last well into the mid-2020s. During this period, we shall see if the United Kingdom can be a viable independent nation off the coast of the European continent. We shall see if there is any merit to the aspiration of a 'Global Britain'. We shall see if 'Singapore-Upon-Thames' is just a dream (or nightmare, depending upon one's perspective). Of course, this isn't all one way. We shall also see if migration - especially of climate refugees - pulls apart the free movement of labour in Europe. We shall see if the unfinished monetary union is ever completed. And we shall see if the EU is really building a debt fuelled siege economy that is dependent upon the subsidies of state aid. By the mid-2020s, all of these uncertainties will have gone some way to being resolved.

The model then suggests that, from the mid-2020s onwards, we shall see a form of resolution starting to unfold. Where the new relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union starts to take shape. Each party will see aspects of each other that they like the look of. This will form the basis for reconciliation. It is at this point that issues such as finding a lasting trade deal will come into play. Our model suggests that this phase will not be a significant feature much before the end of this decade.

Where does that leave us? So far, the model seems to have stood up well to the test of reality. One factor not in the model is Scotland, and that is a feature that we might like to think about further. The core uncertainty here is whether or not Brexit has advanced the cause of Scottish Independence to the point where it actually occurs. It seems unlikely in the first half of the decade, simply because the Parliamentary arithmetic speaks against it. It could be a possibility for the second half of the decade, assuming that a General Election in 2023-24 changes the Parliamentary arithmetic dramatically, but a potential rapprochement between the UK and the EU in the second half of the decade would undermine the cause of Scottish Independence. This is certainly a factor to watch.

If we lay aside the question of Scotland, the model seems to be standing up to the test of time quite well. There are no real reasons why we would want to change the model at this point. Our expectation is that we shall see both the UK and the EU both becoming intransigent over the next four or five years. The question will be which can suffer the strain better? It is assumed that the United Kingdom, as the smaller party, will fare worse than the European Union. We feel that this assumption may not be correct because it under-estimates the determination of the United Kingdom to leave the EU, even at a very high price. It also does not take into account that the European Union may have a much lower pain threshold than the United Kingdom. That will be in the hands of politics and events, which the model can't fully anticipate.

Whatever happens, the United Kingdom will still be 12 miles away from continental Europe at the nearest point. Nothing will change that, which means that both sides will have an impact upon each other for some time to come.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe - Turn 1 (2025)

The opening moves in any game are always a little tentative, as the players start to feel their way around the issues involved and as they start to sound out the other players to see who they can work with, and who they will compete against. This was very much how we began the game in the opening turn. Equally true, the players started to lay down their initial moves to allow them to move towards their ultimate objectives.

The initial move of the Taliban was to extend and consolidate the areas under their control. This move extended the influence of the Taliban across the Karakum Desert further into Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and further across the Hindu Kush into Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, deeper into both Iran and China. The Taliban consolidated their influence through a programme of income support and an impartial system of local justice, free from the corruption that is endemic in the region.

Iran took steps to ensure a degree of water security by developing a network of desalinisation plants. This would draw upon existing technical expertise in this area and provide an outlet for domestically generated investment funds. The programme would utilise Iranian energy reserves and be used to bolster food security through an irrigation programme. The result was to improve the levels of happiness within Iran by reducing the degree of social and economic distress caused by water shortages, food shortages, and rural poverty.

Kazakhstan embarked upon a major programme to improve the transportation sector. Drawing upon Russian and Chinese technical expertise through the involvement of Russian and Chinese companies, Kazakhstan starts to become a regional player in the transportation sector. This allows the government to offer space launch and landing services to other nations at the Baikonur space facility.

The rail enhancements in Kazakhstan are to be built on the old Soviet railway gauge. This creates the need for an off-loading and on-loading facility to be constructed at the Dzungarian Gate because the Chinese railway system operates on the standard railway gauge. Freight would have to be off-loaded from Chinese rolling stock and loaded onto Kazakh rolling stock at the border.

China planned to complete the rail link between Tashkent and Bandar Abbas, going via Samarkand, Bukhara, Mari, and Mashad. China had wanted Kazakhstan, Russia, Iran, and the Taliban to partner the development of the rail link, but these actors refused to co-operate. Iran and the Taliban did not see the proposal as mutually beneficial. An understanding of sorts was achieved between Russia and China, but not between Kazakhstan, the Taliban, and China. The prospect floundered and no action was taken to complete the rail link.

The US sought to establish military and police training facilities in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to enhance the security environment in the region. Russia supports the initiative, which is welcomed by Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, but not by Kazakhstan. The proposal is to be delivered by USAID. It will involve the direct use of US military personnel, but without any basing facilities. Training facilities are established at Bukhara in Uzbekistan and at Mari in Turkmenistan. Diplomatic relations between Kazakhstan and the US improve, despite the US rebuttal over the offer of training facilities.

Unknown to other players, this greatly assists the Taliban who control the towns of Mari and Bukhara and the associated hinterlands. It means that the Taliban supply 80% of the recruits to the US training programme, who can now be considered as being trained in the latest US military doctrine using the latest US weapons. The troops are available for deployment anywhere in the region under Taliban control, either as Talban troops or as false flag troops pretending to be Americans.

Russia planned to build out the Orenburg to Urumqi gas pipeline. It has the support of China, the US, Iran, and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. An agreement is reached between Russia and the US over the security of the pipeline, but Kazakhstan has remained aloof from the agreement. Russia and Iran reach a mutual understanding concerning each of their infrastructure projects that involve China. This allows Russia to stay within the good grace of China. The pipeline construction is scheduled for completion in 2045.

In the years 2026 to 2030, there are a sequence of benign growing seasons in the Hindu Kush. This gives rise to a bumper poppy crop, leading to a flood of heroin and opiates onto the European and North American markets. The newly upgraded transportation facilities will enhance this trade. 

Unknown to other players, this greatly assists the Taliban, who control the opium trade in a region that supplies the vast majority of global opium poppy output. The proceeds of the trade are laundered through Dubai, from where the Taliban operates the financial dimension of their operations.

In the years 2026 to 2030, the average price of oil rises from $40 per barrel to $45 per barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Dawn Of Eurasia - A Review

A key precursor to the study of the future is to have a decent understanding of the past and present. This is one of those books that can help you with this. We may have an understanding of the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), but do we have a wider context in which we can place it? If the influence of China is to spread westwards across Asia, then how does Russia fit into this? And what of the former Asian imperial powers? Iran? Turkey? India? These are interesting questions that this book addresses.

The book starts by trying to find where Europe ends and where Asia begins. This is not as easy as it sounds. The distinction highlights the background and upbringing of the beholder. For someone like me, the dividing line has been arbitrarily placed at the Ural Mountains. However, that places Azerbaijan in Europe, which has a distinctly awkward feel about it. The point is made that any dividing line will be arbitrary in nature because there is no clear place at which Europe ends and Asia begins.

Perhaps it might be beneficial to think of the whole area as a single landmass? To view Eurasia as a single entity? There is a case here as the economies and societies in this landmass start to integrate. China is onto something with the BRI. This is a policy to further accelerate this process of integration. It makes a lot of sense. However, the question arises of who will set the agenda for this process?

It's obvious that China believes that it has a central role. But what do the others think? Interestingly enough, this process gives Russia a role in the post-Soviet world and explains much about the way in which Russia has behaved in recent years. Whilst Europeans have been anxious about Ukraine, Russian attention has been focused further south and further east. It is almost as if Russia has turned its back on Europe and has decided to become an Asiatic nation.

Something similar could be said about Turkey. For decades Turkey tried to gain acceptance in European circles and was rebuffed. Many Turks now see their future eastwards rather than westwards, especially as China tries to lure them into it's circle of influence through the BRI. This means that something of the Chinese system has rubbed off onto Turkey, placing further distance between it and Europe.

Europe occupies the far end of the Eurasian landmass. Important in historical terms, but uncertain about the future. The European Union has achieved a degree of cohesion, but is no longer looking outwards. Increasingly it is creating a siege economy with a focus of keeping outsiders from Europe and European wealth within it. Over the long term, this is not a recipe for success.

Where, we might ask, is America in all of this? Bluntly, it isn't. As America gives in to its isolationist cravings, so the rest of the world is content to allow this to happen. America is still an indispensable nation, but less so than it used to be. This is a feature that might dominate our affairs in the coming decades because there is every sign that America will not fade away gracefully. The ultimate threat to America is the BRI. Very few Americans know this. President Trump has merely accelerated an existing trend.

I quite liked this book. It's insightful and it's possible to learn a lot from it. The style is not academic, but it's not an easy read either. The reader has to maintain their attention and it's easy to miss something important. If the reader is looking for a very wide overview of near future geopolitics, this is a really useful starting point.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020