The Lure Of Nested Gaming

It often happens that, when gaming a series of future events, a game within a game presents itself. The most recent example was in our game 'The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe' (see here for more detail). This game contained a military engagement on the Caspian Sea and in south Turkmenistan between Russia, the US, and Kazakhstan on one side; and China and the Taliban on the other; with Iran intervening to act defensively. We dubbed this the 'Battle Of Turkmenbashi 2045' (see here for more detail). 

Without going into the detail of how we would play the Battle of Turkmenbashi as a stand alone game, the whole concept of the game within a game set me thinking about the question of nested gaming. To begin with, ought we to confine ourselves to a single game within a game? Could there be more than one? In many ways, the idea of a succession of nested games within a game is the core of campaign gaming. A situation where a single event does not necessarily shape the eventual outcome, and where subsequent events can have a more decisive impact the other way. For example, the campaign in France in 1940 didn't settle the Second World War. From the Allied defeat came the basis for their eventual victory as fortunes eventually turned in favour of the Allies.

This, however, misses the flavour of nested gaming. What I am thinking of concerns the third - or even fourth - order events arising from the game. Take The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe as an example. That was the first order game. Within that game was the Battle of Turkmenbashi, as a second order game. Within The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe, the umpires determined, for example, the impact of events on the financial markets. What we could have done was to game the impact on the financial markets. This would have provided an interesting third order game. Gaming the reactions of market players could have provided an interesting set of fourth order games. This is an idea I find quite attractive.

One feature of nested games that seems apparent are the time scales involved. It seems to me that the lower the order of game, the shorter the time scale that is needed. For example, The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe was set over a time scale of 50 years. The second order game Battle of Turkmenbashi was set over a few days. To have built in these events as exogenous factors in a financial markets game would have represented hours rather than days. It is from here that my thoughts originate.

I would like to play a sequence of nested games. In my mind, we could have geopolitical events driving economic and financial events in two levels of gaming. Nested within that structure, we could then have a series of economic actors, such as Hedge Funds, looking to game, model, and profit from events as a third order game. Taking things further, we could even introduce a competitive element between the the players - or teams of players - in the third order game.

Thinking about where we could start, we have a number of games that could provide a number of quick and easy to play timelines for geopolitical events. For example, we have previously played games around the implosion of China (see here for an example) and the Russian invasion of the Baltic States (see here for an example). What we didn't do was to record in detail the timeline of events. That we can now do. The resulting timeline can then be used to input into a subsequent game examining the response of the financial markets to these geopolitical events. We do have one such game that could be taken off the shelf, updated, and given a new lease of life (see here for a description of the game). 

Following on from that, with a timeline of geopolitical events and the associated policy responses from the financial markets, it ought to be relatively straightforward to devise a framework in which players can respond at the level of the individual firm. I think that ought to provide an interesting exercise. Hopefully we will be able to generate sufficient support to make it possible as an aspiration for 2021.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe - Lessons Learned

At the end of a game that we have designed, nurtured, and umpired, it is useful to sit back and reflect on the lessons we have learned from the game. There are two dimensions to this. What lessons of game design stand out? And what lessons about the subject matter stand out? In this case, the former question is just as useful as the latter. Normally, we ask what a game has taught us from the perspective of the subject matter. However, in this case, because we were trying to do things that were new to us, it is also worth spending time on the structure of the game design.

The main difference between this game and those we normally play is the degree of concealment within 'The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe'. The five unconcealed players knew of each other, had a good idea of the resources they could command, and could see on the game map the contours of each other's interests. They knew very little about the Taliban. They knew little of the Taliban location and the resources at the command of the Taliban. Much of the game was based upon strategic assumptions, and as umpires we hinted in those cases where a reappraisal, in our view, ought to have been undertaken. Only one player attempted an intelligence assessment of the Taliban, with partial success. Of course, concealment for one player meant that we also had to offer the facility to the other players. Russia and the United States both undertook concealed moves, with varying degrees of success.

We feel that the concealment question was well addressed for the Taliban player through the use of secret maps and secret briefings, but it had a more limited impact for other players. Once the game play had taken on a collective dimension, the players had to demonstrate to their peers that they had undertaken what they had promised to do. This channelled the game play into a more open form. The Taliban eventually entered into this framework once they had achieved a degree of territoriality. Perhaps this tells us something about the design of games where one or more players are not territorial?

We found that the game developed more or less along the lines expected. It caught the dissonance between the Sunni and Shia worlds quite well. Initially, we felt that the game would highlight three combinations: China, Russia and Kazakhstan; China and Iran; and the US and the Taliban. In terms of conflict, the main competitors would be China and Iran against the US and the Taliban. A key co-operation axis would be between China, Russia, and Kazakhstan. Things didn't quite work out that way.

The US made common cause with Russia and Kazakhstan against the Taliban. China found common cause with the Taliban against the US, Russia, and Kazakhstan. Iran become a hermit republic. The game generated two axes of co-operation, one between China and Russia on the northern arm of the BRI and one with the Taliban on the southern arm of the BRI. We feel that Kazakhstan was left rather isolated by this development and it did beg the question in the Wash Up Session of whether or not Kazakhstan was ripe for partition in 2050 by China and Russia. That was a question we left hanging at the end of the game.

Did the game generate anything useful? In one sense it was useful in laying down a baseline scenario out to 2050. We aimed at examining what could happen if current policies were followed for the next thirty years. The result that China had the field to itself to roll out the BRI in Central Asia didn't contain too many surprises. It did beg the interesting question of what China's peer rival - the US - could do to counter this? Our view was that the US would need to 'out-China China' through something like an Asian equivalent of the Marshall Plan. This would also provide a useful counter to the expansion of Taliban influence. 

Perhaps that could be the basis of a future game?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe - Outcomes

In the framework we followed during the game, we allowed a week to pass between each turn being declared. This gave the players ample time to work upon a collective approach to various issues, to hammer out agreements between themselves, and to reflect upon how they were progressing in relation to their objectives. At the end of Turn 6, we gave everyone a week of reflection before attending a final wash up session to consider the degree to which they achieved - or otherwise - their objectives. The umpires would also undertake this exercise separately, and the notes between the two groups would be compared at the meeting. Where they agreed, we would pass on. Where they differed, or where they threw out an interesting point, we would go back over the assessment as a research point.

The United States player had three objectives, which were to maintain the three US bases in the region and to expand the US presence by a further three military bases; to check and counter Russian and Chinese ambitions in the region; and to ensure that Iran and the Taliban fail in the economic development of their respective territorial areas. In the assessment of both the umpires and the player concerned, all three objectives were not achieved. This was interesting in itself not because of the result but because of the manner in which it was achieved. At the request of the game designer, the American player adopted a 'War Hawk' stance to the game play. That it led to failure in achieving the core objectives was seen by the group as significant.

The objectives of the Russian player were to maintain the three Russian bases in the region and to expand the Russian presence by a further three military bases; to achieve the removal of US sanctions placed upon Russia; and to ensure that Russia remains the main Chinese ally in the region. The assessment of the umpires was that the first and second objective had been achieved, and possibly also the third. The assessment of the player was a bit more restrained. They had mixed feelings over the first objectives whilst agreeing with the umpires over the second and third. Two research flags were placed upon this result. One concerning the degree to which Russian bases are truly Russian if they had been largely infiltrated by the Taliban forces. The second begged the question over what it meant to be the principal Chinese ally in the region. Especially as the Taliban could reasonably lay claim to that title.

The China player was aiming to secure the supply of hydrocarbons from within the region; to extend and strengthen the BRI across the region; and to secure military and commercial port facilities at Bandar Abbas. Both the umpires and the player agreed that the first and second objective had been achieved, whilst the third had not. However, a research flag was placed on the third objective because, in the course of the game, the Chinese game play had altered the strategic landscape. Instead of planning the BRI across Iran, access to Turkey - and subsequently Greece and Europe - was routed across Turkmenistan instead. Did that render the Iranian extension redundant?

The player of Kazakhstan sought to provide a freight and hydrocarbon transit route from Kazakhstan and Russia to China; to impede the development of hydrocarbon transit routes between the Persian Gulf and China; and to provide a mechanism whereby all actors can evade western imposed sanctions. In the opinion of the umpires and the player, the first objective had been achieved whilst the third had not. There was a difference of emphasis over the second objective. The umpires felt that Kazakhstan might possibly have impeded the export of hydrocarbons from the Persian Gulf to China, but the player wasn't sure about that. It was felt that this difference was reasonably minor, so no research flag was placed over it.

During the game, Iran was seeking to fully circumvent western imposed sanctions on both goods and access to capital markets; to sell hydrocarbons directly overland to China; and to have developed fully functioning nuclear weapons. Both the umpires and the player agreed that the three objectives had not been achieved. In discussion, it was felt that a research point ought to be placed on the first objective. Within the game, the Iranian player developed a fully consistent siege economy, largely isolated from the global economy, except for the maritime export of hydrocarbons to China. In the light of this, it is reasonable to ask of western sanctions actually matter? The Iranian player felt that Iran was frustrated in the second objective because of the hostility of the Taliban in the game. In discussion, it was decided to place a research marker on this point because it captured the whole of the dissonance between the Shia and Sunni world. The game was designed to make this happen.

Which brings us to the Taliban player. Their objectives were to drive out the American presence from the region; to establish a form of territoriality and a provisional government; and to ensure that the BRI develops north of the Caspian Sea rather than the south of it. Both the umpires and the player agreed that the first two objectives had been achieved. The umpires felt that the Taliban had possibly achieved the third objective, whereas the player felt the result was more mixed. This was owing to China altering the proposals for the southern branch of the BRI. It was agreed to place a research on the second objective because although a degree of territoriality had been achieved, the new governments of Turkmenistan and Afghanistan were not universally recognised within the international community and a question arose over how much legitimacy could be conferred until that happened.

All in all the game was a mixed bag. Many of the objectives were zero sum, which meant that those who achieved their objectives would naturally prevent others from doing so. Looking at the outcome overall, a number of research points stand out:

1. We touched upon the issue of ownership and control within the game. Both the US and Russia established military training facilities deep in Taliban territory with the consequent result that they both trained and armed the Taliban military wing. This has an authentic air about it. However, what could the players have done to prevent it? This is definitely a point for further review.

2. At the start of the game, we would have predicted that Russia would end the game as the principal Chinese ally in the region. It was a surprise to find that the Taliban could challenge Russia to that title. Does this say something about the progress of Russian diplomacy? Or does it say more about the utilitarian nature of Chinese diplomacy? Perhaps the Taliban were playing more of a Chinese game than Russia managed to play?

3. The game play of Iran led to some interesting questions centred around the effectiveness of western sanctions. They are much used nowadays - over-used in our opinion - and run the risk of the sanctioned nation developing a siege economy. This was possible in the game owing to China continuing to buy Iranian hydrocarbons. However it does raise the question where a nation is comfortably disconnected from the world economy and doesn't see it as a priority to restore access. Could that mean that we have seen the use of sanctions pass their most effective point? In future, could they be no more than a gesture?

4. The rise of the Taliban as a territorial entity raised a number of tantalising questions. By starting as a non-state actor, the game allowed the Taliban to secure control of two countries - Turkmenistan and Afghanistan - and to become a dominant fact in three more - Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The model by which this happened - poverty alleviation, social assistance, and a relatively incorrupt justice system - is worth further study. Discussion at the end of the game was centred around how the Taliban could have been defeated within the game. The view of the umpires was that less corruption, less neglect of the population, and more public works would have undermined the case for the Taliban. The problem was how to achieve this is the existing governments are unwilling to reform?

These are some of the questions we were left with at the end of the game. The game itself didn't provide answers to these questions, but they are worthy of further study. In some respects, they have held to uncover the 'known unknowns'. We know what we don't know. Surely that has to be a step forward?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe - Turn 6 (2050)

By 2050 the players had already come to blows. The key question, as Turn 6 starts, is whether or not we have seen the opening salvoes of World War III? As it turned out, we hadn't. However, there is a case to argue that the Battle of Turkmenbashi in 2045 was World War III, and that all of the combatants had stepped back from the threshold of allowing things to escalate. Or did they?

Iran proposes to construct an overland network of water and hydrocarbon pipes south of the Karakum desert, across Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and into China. The proposal never gains traction as the Taliban - despite an apparent commitment - refuse to fund it and, encouraged by China, refuses to support the plans.

China takes steps to extend and strengthen the BRI in the region. This results in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan becoming full participating members of the BRI. Chinese investment in work creation programmes in these countries helps to improve the mood of the populations, resulting in one unhappy face being removed from each country.

A new BRI rail corridor between Bukhara-Mari-Ashgabat-Turkmenbashi is surveyed and built. Commercial port facilities are upgraded at Turkmenbashi, with the construction of a new mercantile fleet being laid down at Turkmenbashi. The trade between Turkmenbashi and Baku resumes.

Turkmenistan and Afghanistan will enjoy preferential freight tariffs for goods originating in these countries, to include manufactures, agricultural produce, and extracted hydrocarbons.

Russia joins the BRI as a full participating member. As a member of the BRI, Russia receives assistance in tackling the Siberian forest fires, utilising the climate refugees as agricultural workers and establishing newly cleared farms in the region. The cost of this is borne by Russian borrowing on the North American capital markets, guaranteed by China and secured on the underlying assets.

The flow of oil and freight between Russia and China is restored, allowing Russian commercial interests to start to enjoy these revenue steams again. 

The new farmlands serve to reduce the population pressure in Siberia, and the restored rail routes and oil pipelines help to improve prosperity in the region. This results in the unhappy faces in the region being removed. The land resources, with technical assistance from China, are now better managed by Russian entities.

The US commander in Afghanistan detaches himself from the chain of command and orders the surrender of all US troops in country to the Taliban. After years of neglect, substantial water and food shortages, and regular mortar and artillery fire, the vast majority of US troops obey the commander's order. The Taliban offer safe passage to all surrendering troops through Afghanistan and across Pakistan to the port of Gwadar, from where they will return to North America. China will finance the evacuation and guarantee the safe passage of the US troops.

A few holdouts remain, but they are easily disarmed by the Taliban forces in Afghanistan and face the Afghan legal system for any criminality that occurs in this process. The US Commander is one of the last to leave and accompanies his troops to Gwadar, from where he is returned to Washington to face a court martial for disobeying the chain of command.

Under the terms of the surrender, no US personnel may take any weaponry in the evacuation. The Taliban occupies the former US bases and secures the armouries. However, the Taliban fighters lack the technical skills to operate and maintain much of the equipment on the bases. The bases now become Taliban bases. The unhappy faces are removed and a happy face is placed on each base.

The United States calls for an emergency session of the UN Security Council to discuss the situation in Central Asia, with a view to imposing sanctions on Turkmenistan, resolve the military stand off in the region, and to secure the rescue of the US troops in Afghanistan. China vetoes this on the basis that the military stand off has resolved itself, that Chinese infrastructure will not be used to enable a military build up in the region, and that China - through the agency of the Taliban - has already resolved the question of US forces in Afghanistan.

Kazakhstan seeks to initiate a climate mitigation plan, which has the features of continuing to build water infrastructure, increasing internal security, and deploying food depots in cities. There is a problem with financing this because the hydrocarbon transit fees from Turkmenistan have petered out and China is delaying payment of hydrocarbons originating in Kazakhstan. This is starting to upset the delicate balance of power from within the ruling elite of Kazakhstan.

Whilst control of the population is maintained, climate refugees continue to flow into Kazakhstan. The population is starting to become hungry and fractious. There are small showings of popular discontent, but they are on a rising trend.

At this point the game ends. We see the United States routed in the region by the Taliban, who are now a new Chinese proxy, we see the encirclement and isolation of Iran, and we see China dominating Russia in the Eurasian Heartland. The fate of Kazakhstan is in the balance, outside the protection of the BRI, detached from support by Russia, and in somewhat of a limbo. Who can tell what would happen next? However, that would be a different game.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe - The Battle Of Turkmenbashi 2045

The Battle of Turkmenbashi turned out to be a pivotal event in the game. It is interesting from a game design point of view and it has results that are interesting from the point of view of the outcome of the game. In terms of game design, the umpires had the question of time compression to deal with. Each turn represented five years, and yet the hostilities represented only a few days, possibly a couple of weeks, in time. How ought we to have dealt with that time compression?

Our first view was that, unless argued to the contrary, the non-combat processes would be dealt with first. In Turn 5, Iran continued a policy of economic and social development that had originated in previous turns, so Iran moved first. The Taliban moved to contest elections in Afghanistan. Once again, this was a process that had been undertaken in previous turns, so they moved second. The Chinese move was to further build out the BRI from Tashkent to Turkmenbashi. Once again, this was part of a long term strategy that had unfolded during the game, so China moved third. The development of a Chinese military facility at Turkmenbashi was the logical extension of this move. It proved to be central to events in 2045. Kazakhstan was next to move. Their move consisted of developing the Kazakh water infrastructure further, but also allowing Russia to expand the military port facilities at Aktau. 

These were all relatively long term activities that fit well into a five year turn. The Russian move was to enhance the naval and air facilities at Aktau - a long term process - and to establish a naval blockade of Turkmen commercial shipping in the south Caspian Sea - s process of much shorter duration. At this point, the time element in the move was becoming quite compressed. For this reason we scheduled the Russian turn as fifth in line. Finally, the US turn consisted of a cruise missile strike , a surface to surface missile strike, and a long range air strike, all on southern Turkmenistan. The duration represented here would be hours, so we placed the US turn as the final one. As a final response, the Chinese player was allowed to retaliate with a surface to space attack on Russian and American satellite networks.

It could be argued that the order of appearance made a difference in the eventual outcome. We have great sympathy with that view. However, none of the players argued to move first, as they could have done in the Matrix framework, which left it to the umpires to settle the issue of the compression of time. Having made those decisions, how did the battle unfold?

In logical time, the Chinese forces had started to build up the naval facility in Turkmenbashi and the Russian navy had secured port facilities in Aktau. This was against a backdrop of increasing tension in the region, as the Taliban had seized control of the government of Turkmenistan; had nationalised Russian, American, and Kazakh commercial entities in the country; and had halted the flow of hydrocarbons across the Karakum Desert. Both the Russians and the Americans had attempted direct military intervention previously with local forces, but had failed completely to dislodge them. It was felt that a more determined approach was needed.

The Russian Caspian Flotilla - consisting of two frigates and eight corvettes - sailed south from Aktau to position itself across the Baku to Turkmenbashi trade route. The Berkarar, the sole vessel in the Turkmen commercial fleet, set out to Baku from Turkmenbashi. It was intercepted by Astrakhan, a corvette in the Russian Caspian Flotilla, and ordered to heave to. The Berkarar failed to respond, so the Astrakhan fired a warning shot across its bows. The Berkarar again failed to heave to so a boarding party from the Astrakhan landed and seized control of the Berkarar. As the entire Turkmen commercial fleet had now been impounded, the Russian Caspian Flotilla was ordered back to the home port of Astrakhan.

As the Russian Caspian Flotilla sailed northwards, the Turkmen navy - consisting of three missile boats - was ordered from port at Turkmenbashi to shadow the Russians sailing northwards. Once the Russians had reached port, the Turkmen considered three targets in the region - the Russian naval port at Astrakhan, the Russian naval facility at Aktau, or the Kazakh desalinisation plants at Tengiz. Chinese diplomats urged restraint upon the Turkmen to no avail. The Taliban decided to strike against the Kazakh desalinisation plants at Tengiz. The missile strike was largely ineffectual and only caused minor damage, failing to disrupt water production at all.

Having spent their ammunition, the Turkmen boats were ordered to return to Turkmenbashi. As a response to the missile salvo at Tengiz, the Russian Caspian Flotilla was ordered to intercept the Turkmen fleet, which it did just north west of Turkmenbashi. There was an exchange of fire with two of the Turkmen missile boats being sunk and the remaining missile boat being severely damaged. The Turkmen authorities called upon their Chinese allies for military assistance. The shore based Chinese missile batteries opened fire on the Russian Caspian Flotilla, sinking one frigate and all eight corvettes. The remaining frigate was severely damaged and returned to Astrakhan for repairs.

At this point, the United States entered the fray. The US Fifth Fleet, anchored at the base port of Bahrain, fired a salvo of 20 Tomahawk Cruise Missiles aimed at targets in southern Turkmenistan. The route of the missiles involved overflight across Iranian territory. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard successfully hacked into the guidance systems of 6 of the missiles and effected a 'return to sender' programme, causing all six missiles to detonate on the ships from which they originated. There was significant loss of life and severe damage to the US Naval ships in Bahrain. Six vessels were either crippled beyond repair or sunk. The remaining 14 missiles flew on to detonate on their targets in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, causing substantial local damage in the vicinity of their targets. They did not seriously degrade the Taliban anti-aircraft missile systems, which were their targets.

The cruise missile salvo was followed by a salvo of five long range surface to surface missiles fired from US bases in Afghanistan at targets further into Turkmenistan. Trajectory tracking software suggested that the intended targets would be close to the town of Mari and the capital Ashgabat. China considered these as important points on the BRI transit route and deployed a battery of anti-missile missiles to intercept the incoming American missiles. All five US missiles were successfully intercepted and detonated in the upper atmosphere.

The United States also scrambled a long range bombing mission against targets at Turkmenbashi. Originating from Incerlik airbase in Turkey, after a fierce debate between Turkey and the US, permission was granted by the Turkish authorities for the use of Turkish airspace for this purpose. Five planes were deployed on the bombing mission. As they entered Turkmen airspace, the Chinese anti-aircraft missile batteries opened fire on the incoming US bombers and shot down all five of them over the Caspian Sea. No crew were recovered.

At thins point, the Chinese commander in the region went onto the offensive. Sufficient anti-satellite missiles were deployed to severely degrade both the Russian and American satellite networks in the region, depriving both nations of the ability for reconnaissance, communications and missile guidance within the region. This dealt a severe blow to US plans to establish a radar site at Baikonur and an airbase at Almaty, both in Kazakhstan.

At this point, all sides were left wondering if World War III had started?

There are aspects of events within the game which were quite instructive and elements that were unsatisfying. The umpires took the view that both the US and the Russian players had underestimated the degree to which the balance of power had changed once the Taliban had allied to China. The missile protection offered along the BRI route, especially at key nodes, was a surprise. Admittedly, the dice rolls had favoured the Taliban. However, that left us with a sequence of really interesting 'what ifs?'. What if the Turkmen navy had been more successful at Tengiz? What if the Chinese missile salvo hadn't sunk most of the Russian Caspian Flotilla? What if the American missile strikes had been more successful? These imponderables have left us wanting to re-run the Battle of Turkmenbashi again in the future, only starting with the dice roll going the other way.

As it happens, World War III hadn't been started. In the following turn, all of the combatants took a step back from any further escalation. That was just as well because the umpires had previously resolved to frustrate any further escalation and to keep the game strictly within the region. It did leave me with a final question. Is this what World War III looks like? A short, nasty, and bloody exchange between the great powers in an obscure region of the globe? I can't say, but it is an interesting question to ponder.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020

The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe - Turn 5 (2045)

By 2045, the direction of the game had rather taken shape. The axes of co-operation and conflict had been set, and it was a case allowing these to run their course. It was inevitable that, with so much military hardware in the region, the latent conflict would run hot sooner or later. This was against a background of a more challenging climate. However, not all of the players were sucked into the conflict, although they all played their part. As it happens, 2045 started off quite peacefully.

Iran took steps to put to work the climate refugees that are coming into the country through a job creation programme that focuses on food production and a strengthening of the water network. 

Elections are held in Afghanistan - under US supervision - that result in the Taliban winning a landslide victory at the polls. As part of their winning manifesto, the Taliban ask the United States to vacate the bases held at Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Bagram. The United States refuses to leave. The Taliban cut off the water and power supplies to the bases and decide to continue the policy of denying the US access to Afghan airspace.

The US troops (16,000 at Bagram; 2,000 each at Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif) suffer from a lack of food and water; and from the absence of rotation and denial of access to their families and friends. By 2045, the US troops in Afghanistan are mutinous and increasingly do not follow the chain of command.

The new government in Kabul is recognised by Russia, China, and Iran; but is not recognised by the US and Kazakhstan.

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan join the BRI as full participating members. This results in the build out of the BRI railroad between Tashkent and Bukhara, and China being granted a 99 year lease on a port facility at Turkmenbashi. The port will have dual commercial and military usage. There will be joint naval operations at Turkmenbashi, where China will contribute A2/AD missile coverage.

Rent on the lease will be paid through Chinese financial institutions in Shanghai and Hong Kong to give Turkmen financial institutions access to the Far Eastern capital markets, along with those of other BRI member destinations.

Kazakhstan increases its efforts to develop the water infrastructure through additional desalinisation plants and the development of a main water pipeline that spans the country. The pipeline is surveyed, but remains to be built out. This is very popular and a happy face is added to Astana.

Russia enhances the naval and air support facilities at Aktau. The military footprint at Bishket is enhanced, but at the cost of deteriorating relations with the government of Kyrgyzstan. Russia seeks to enhance the military footprint at Dushanbe, but the government of Tajikistan refuses consent to this expansion.

Russia undertakes a naval blockade in the southern Caspian Sea to halt trade between Turkmenbashi and Baku. The Russian Caspian Flotilla is deployed, interdicts the Turkmen mercantile marine and escorts it to the home port of Astrakhan.

The Turkmen flotilla follows the retiring Russian flotilla and undertakes a retaliatory missile strike on the Kazakh desalinisation plants at Tengiz. Only slight damage is incurred, not enough to interrupt water production.

The Turkmen flotilla returns to base at Turkmenbashi, but is intercepted by the Russian flotilla in the Caspian Sea. In the exchange, two Turkmen missile boats are sunk and the remaining one damaged. There is a retaliatory exchange of missile fire from the Chinese batteries located in Turkmenbashi, resulting in the loss of one Russian Frigate and eight Russian Corvettes, nearly the entire Russian Caspian Sea flotilla.

The position of the Russian President internally remains precarious. On the one hand, the US sanctions on Russian citizens are lifted. They remain strictly imposed in European capital markets and there is a dramatic increase in the activity of organised criminal networks in North America. On the other hand, the Caspian Sea flotilla has been largely lost and the position of the President is being openly questioned. There are signs that the chain of command is not being adhered to.

The United States embarks on a concerted military campaign in the region. A salvo of 20 cruise missiles are fired from US naval ships in the Persian Gulf at targets in southern Turkmenistan. They fly through Iranian airspace. Iran intercepts 6 missiles, hacks into the guidance systems, and returns them to the point of origin. Six US naval warships are either crippled beyond repair or sunk. The remaining 14 missiles reach their targets in the Karakum Desert, destroying a variety of Taliban military units, but not seriously degrading the effectiveness of the Taliban forces as a whole.

Five long range surface to surface missiles are fired from sites in Afghanistan against targets in southern Turkmenistan. The Chinese anti-missile batteries in the area fire upon the incoming missiles and destroy all five. As a consequence of this, the Chinese anti-satellite batteries fire upon the US and Russian military satellites on overwatch across the region and destroy the capability completely. The US and Russia no longer has the ability for surveillance in the region, have missile guidance capabilities in the region, or can conduct drone operations in the region.

The people of Afghanistan are further alienated by the American actions. This results in further popular discontent focussed upon the US bases. An additional unhappy face is added to each US base in Afghanistan. The Taliban responds to the missile attacks by increasing the sale of heroin to the US bases in Afghanistan, further eroding US effectiveness and morale.

The US launches a high altitude bombing raid on Taliban positions in southern Turkmenistan from Incerlik airbase in Turkey. Turkey narrowly keeps open its airspace for US military operations against the Taliban. As the aircraft approach Turkmen airspace, the Chinese anti-aircraft batteries open fire against the aircraft and shoot down all five planes. There are no survivors.

The US and Russia fail to open a join military base at K2 in Uzbekistan. The US opens an airbase at Almaty in Kazakhstan, but the facilities need to be upgraded to accommodate military flights. Kazakhstan agrees to US opening a radar base at Baikonur, but logistical problems in moving equipment to the site mean that it is a long way from being operational. Plans to expand Bagram base in Afghanistan to accommodate and additional 100,000 ground troops are abandoned owing to logistical difficulties.

The United States now finds itself isolated diplomatically. NATO, the EU and Pacific Rim allies refuse to co-operate with the US. The UK is uncertain about co-operation, given its long and unfortunate history in the region. Internally, large segments of American public opinion are questioning the sanity of the President.

Russia has seen a serious loss of authority in the region. They are no longer feared by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan; all of whom no longer look to Russia for strategic direction. Increasingly, these nations look to China for strategic direction.

The hot, dry, weather continues and worsens a little.

There is a movement of populations from the larger population areas in the region northwards. Iran remains relatively water and food secure. Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Kazakhstan have programmes of social assistance and poverty relief. The urban populations are hungry, thirsty, poor, and angry. Unhappy faces will go on the capital cities of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. 

Climate refugees are now arriving in Russia and Iran in large numbers. In Russia they are causing a degree of friction with the local populations. An unhappy face will go on all Russian cities.

The adverse weather continues to affect construction activity across the region. 

The very dry state of the Siberian Forest has caused uncontrollable forest fires. The normal winter die back has not occurred because the rains and snows formerly experienced have not occurred. The oil pipeline and the BRI rail route between Kurgan and Omsk, and the oil pipeline and BRI rail route south of Novosibirsk are rendered inoperable. No Russian oil can reach China and all BRI freight is routed through Tashkent.

In the years 2046 to 2050 the average price of oil rises from $54 per barrel to $59 per barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020