Xi Turns West - Turn 6 (2050)

Turn 6 started with a great deal of uncertainty - would the United States risk military action in the Persian Gulf to degrade the threat from a nuclear armed Iran? At this point the game started to become very interesting. The military option was on the table, but it would involve considerable risk. It was possible to engineer a confrontation indirectly through the use of Saudi Arabia as a proxy and within the confines of Syria as a common battleground. However, to do so would leave the arena open to China. Which adversary would America see as the greater? 

As a result of the game play, the following events were recorded:

1. The United States has launched a global initiative - Silver and Green - aimed at enhancing diplomatic, economic, and environmental policies. Overtures have been made to a number of countries, but to date only Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kurdistan have opted to join. The membership of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria is under discussion. The initiative has a security dimension to it and offers an alternative to the BRI.

2. Russia seeks to maintain a degree of stability in the Middle East through the existing relationships, but it is unclear exactly what these are. There are numerous reports in the western press questioning the GSCO, the membership of which seems rather unclear. As part of this policy, and to deter any possible attacks, the missile defence screen at Basheri will be maintained and upgraded and Russia has engaged with China, Iran, and other partners in the Persian Gulf. On the diplomatic front, Russia has reached out to Saudi Arabia and other regional actors to assure them of the Iranian intentions to only use their nuclear weapons for defensive purposes.

3. China, being mindful of the recent reports from seismologists, has focussed on the strengthening and reinforcement of the BRI physical and digital infrastructure. This has involved the reinforcement of bridges, the shoring up of embankments, and the upgrading of digital systems. The focus of this upgrading work has been the route from Central Asia to Turkey.

4. Diplomatically, China has provided support to the GSCO and to enhance the Turkish Union proposed by Turkey. There have been some critics of the GSCO in the western press concerning that lack of transparency over membership and the terms by which nations have joined the GSCO. China has used its financial resources within the BRI framework in Central Asia to support the development of the Turkish Union in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

5. Chinese policy towards Syria has changed. Following on from potential Syrian overtures to the United States, China has significantly reduced the amount of oil purchased on the black market from Syria, leading to a significant fall in revenue for the Syrian government. At the same time, the operation of the rail link between Erzurum and Damascus, including the spur to Tartus, has been experiencing acute operational difficulties. Staff have been absent in large numbers, rolling stock has been unavailable due to use elsewhere on the BRI network, and essential maintenance has been delayed by a shortage of parts. This has significantly reduced the traffic on the Syrian rail network, has introduced supply problems to the Russian naval facility in Tartus, and has degraded the functioning of the transport network.

6. Iran has intensified its policy of distributing humanitarian aid through the Revolutionary Guard across the region. This has had an effect to tighten the grip of the Revolutionary Guard over local Shia populations within Syria, Iraq, and Kurdistan. Many Shia citizens in these countries now look to Tehran for leadership rather than towards their local regimes.

7. Turkey, with the help of China, has extended the reality of the Turkish Union and now exerts considerable influence over Azerbaijan (part of Trans Caucasus on the map) and Turkmenistan (part of Central Asia on the map). This allows Turkey to position itself as a bridge between China and Europe and to provide an exemplar of how a more secular form of Islam might take shape. This helps to enhance the relationship between Turkey and Iran.

8. Saudi Arabia continues to seek to lead the Arabic world through the provision of humanitarian aid across the Persian Gulf. Stability on the southern shore of the Persian Gulf is maintained through funding and material aid, although the local Shia majorities still feel oppressed by the local Sunni rulers. Saudi Arabia makes some headway in gaining influence in western Iraq and eastern Syria, where the local Sunni communities are suffering from the neglect of their respective governments.

9. Saudi Arabia has suggested a peace conference across the Arab world, involving Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Kurdistan, with the US as an observer, to find a common pathway to counter the growth of Iranian influence. To date, only the US and Jordan have shown an interest in the initiative.

10. Iraq starts to negotiate a trilateral treaty with Turkey and Syria for peace and the security of water rights. Turkey and Syria are sympathetic to such an arrangement but the fine details have yet to be announced. There is a question over whether or not this is part of the GSCO, which needs to be determined in the future.

11. The local Shia Imams in southern Iraq continue to preach against the government in Baghdad. The result of this has been a strike of all workers in southern Iraq in the hydrocarbon industries. Material assistance - food, water, and money - has been provided to the striking workers by local actors who are influenced by Iranian elements. The result of this strike is that Iraqi hydrocarbon exports through Um Qsr have largely ceased, depriving the Iraqi government of a significant source of income. An additional unhappy face has been added to Baghdad.

12. The government of Syria has sought to extend its influence across the country. This has largely been unsuccessful owing to the collapse in oil revenues originated from China, combined with having to pay the charter fees to the Russian tankers available to transport the oil to the Far East. Arrears in army pay have increased. Humanitarian assistance is now largely provided through the agency of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, whose control of the country has tightened. As a result of the deteriorating situation, unhappy faces have been placed on Damascus and Aleppo.

13. Kurdistan seeks to reaffirm it's status as an independent nation. An application to join the UN was vetoed by Russia. Kurdistan seeks to bolster its defences against a potential incursion from Iraq or Turkey. Unhappily, this hasn't quite gone to plan. In response to Kurdish overtures to the United States, China has persuaded Iran to diminish the material support given to the Kurdish government. The gas spur line remains open, but gas sales are much diminished and payment is erratic. Iran has imposed a degree of food and water rationing upon Kurdistan, which is enforced by the Revolutionary Guard, who are now a much stronger presence in the country. The result has been a sharp increase in unemployment, poverty and hunger, leading to an unhappy face being added to Mosul.

It is at this point that we leave the game. It paints an interesting picture for us, with the United States retreating to the southern shores of the Persian Gulf. American influence has declined in the three decades covered by the game, just as that of China and Iran has increased. Turkey and Russia are jostling to increase their influence in Central Asia, whilst Saudi Arabia has become quite withdrawn. The regime in Syria continues to survive, as does that in Iraq. Kurdistan has made an attempt at gaining independence, but that hasn't been wholly successful. This is the result of the gameplay, is it what the players intended?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - Iranian Security Briefing 2045

Control of Iraq 2045

In 2045, the United States, conducted an intelligence sweep of Iranian military forces using all of the available intelligence sources available. This sweep was prioritised and involved Israeli and European allies. It included enhanced cyber and satellite defence and offensive capabilities. It also included the deployment of further conventional forces into the bases situated along the Persian Gulf.

The contents of the security briefing were:

1. Iran has successfully tested a nuclear weapon - verified by the IAEA -  and has developed an unspecified number of mobile batteries within the Revolutionary Guard that are armed with medium range nuclear missiles of varying technical sophistication. The range of the missiles is not sufficient to threaten the mainland US directly, but they do have sufficient range to pose a threat to US allies in Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and Eastern Europe.

2. Production of the nuclear weapons is centred around Tehran, Eshfahan, Basheri, and Bandar Abbas. They have been deliberately located close to major centres of population in order to discourage military action owing to the prospect of significant loss of life from collateral civilian casualties.

3. As a further discouragement for military action, the centres of production now enjoy a significant defensive missile screen supplied by China. As an even further complication, the production facility at Basheri sits behind a Russian defensive missile screen. The Russian naval base at Basheri could become subject to collateral damage in the event of a wayward strike on the Iranian nuclear facility there. The missile defences of China and Russia are operated by their respective military personnel, and any losses to these caused by military action could be adopted as a causus belli.

4. In wider terms, the military balance in the Persian Gulf has tipped away from the United States. In pursuit of the Biden Doctrine, military forces in the region were drawn down in the 2020s and 2030s. Only recently has this been reversed to meet a renewed threat from Iran. However, as US forces were drawn down, there has been a significant build up of both Russian and Chinese forces. Both Russia and China maintain carrier groups within the Persian Gulf. These are supplied overland using the BRI transportation network. Against this, the US maintains a single carrier group within the Persian Gulf that is supplied primarily by sea.

5. The sea lanes for supply cannot be taken for granted. China maintains a carrier group in the western Indian Ocean, supplied overland from a facility in Pakistan. The recent construction of a naval base at Abu Musa, protected by a screen of missile defences, effectively has the potential to close the Persian Gulf to future military supply of US forces in the Gulf region. Supply could be undertaken by air, but not for bulk supply. Supply could be undertaken overland from the Red Sea, but the transportation infrastructure has not been sufficiently developed for this to be an effective option. The US forces in the Persian Gulf have been effectively bottled up and this should be a factor that weighs heavily on future decision making.

6. In recent years there has been an influx of climate refugees from Central Asia into Iran. These refugees have been welcomed in a booming Iranian economy and have facilitated a significant expansion of the Revolutionary Guard. This military build up has been facilitated by both China and Russia in terms of arms and training, and seems to be the result of participation in the Gulf Security and Cooperation Organisation.

7. This has allowed the Revolutionary Guard to expand their operations in both Iraq (see map attached, the Revolutionary Guard is shaded black here) and in Syria. Both Syria and Iraq are to become members of the GSCO, which ought to be of concern in determining US policy for the region.

8. Balanced against this, the United States operates a training facility in Iraq whose mission is to train the Federal Iraqi forces and has a covert facility in Syria whose mission is to counter radical Sunni militias, of whom ISIS is an example. Withdrawal from either of these facilities is likely to cause a power vacuum that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard are well suited to fill.

9. In recent years, China, Russia, and Iran have paced their cyber war capabilities to maintain their lead over the United States. The prospect of cyber action against Iran runs the risk of retaliatory action against the United States. Particularly vulnerable are US power networks, US governmental functions (including healthcare), and US financial institutions. In a recent exercise to map this possibility, the United States would suffer considerable economic and financial damage in the event of a retaliatory cyber action.

10. China has a lead over the United States in anti-satellite missile technology. This was established decades ago and maintained over the intervening years. It is believed that China has a first strike capability. In the event of a significant build up of US forces in the Persian Gulf, it would mean that China could remove US satellite overwatch before counter measures could be taken. The possibility of military action occurring blind is one that ought to enter into any future calculations.

Any potential military action against Iran contains a set of considerable risks. If China or Russia were to use such action as a causus belli, then the United States would be at a significant disadvantage. If the United States were to manage to isolate Iran from China and Russia, there is no guarantee of a decisive victory. A defeat to Iran would have repercussions across the globe that could influence the response of allied nations towards the United States for some considerable time to come.

This rather sobering report to the United States was intended to set the scene in which military action might, or might not, take place in Turn 6.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - Turn 5 (2045)

As we reach the penultimate turn of the game, much of the gameplay has been set by the previous moves. The tension is mounting, with Iran on the verge of acquiring a nuclear weapon, with Kurdistan on the verge of civil war, and with the climate fermenting popular unrest across the region. The question arises of what the Great Powers can do to contain the rising levels of violence. Could the United States become more engaged north of the Persian Gulf? Could China use it's commercial prowess to mitigate the worsening climate? Could the Russian sponsored regional structure provide the basis by which differences are settled? In this respect, it's still all to play for in Turn 5.

As a result of the game play, the following events were recorded:

1. The United States conducts an intelligence sweep of Iranian military forces, using all of the available intelligence sources available. This sweep is prioritised and involves Israeli and European allies. It includes beefing up cyber and satellite defences and offensive capabilities. It also includes deploying further conventional forces into the bases situated along the Persian Gulf.

2. Russia, in conjunction with China, continues to work to strengthen the BRI assets. The Russian contribution to the collective effort is somewhat limited owing to on-going western sanctions placed upon the regime. The Gulf Security and Cooperation Organisation continues to grow, and is starting to achieve a degree of traction within the region. There are now close partnerships between Russia, China, Iran, Syria, Iraq and Kurdistan.

3. China continues to bolster the defensive capabilities of the BRI partners. This includes the additional provision of the latest shore to ship missiles along the northern shores of the Persian Gulf, and, most importantly, the construction of a defensive naval base on Abu Musa.

4. Elsewhere, China has undertaken a series of defensive initiatives in East Asia, which includes preparations to evacuate Chinese citizens from the United States, preparations to freeze American assets in China, and the nationalisation of US companies engaged in technology manufacture within China. In a surprise move, China has removed the restrictions on the export of rare earth products to US entities, thus flooding the market and collapsing the price of rare earths.

5. Iran has announced the successful detonation of a nuclear warhead. This has been confirmed by the IAEA, who were invited to observe the tests. The warhead developed will be used in conjunction with existing Iranian medium range missile technology. The Revolutionary Guards now have a number of batteries of mobile medium range nuclear missiles.

6. Turkey has focussed on the completion of the obligations under the BRI agreement with China and now acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia. Actually, it's a tunnel, not a bridge, that goes underneath the Bosporus. It is hoped that this will enable Turkey to create a new forward looking relationship with regional actors, emphasising the important role of Turkic culture. The BRI induced stimulus has produced a degree of prosperity within Turkey that has allowed an unhappy face to be removed.

7. Saudi Arabia has undertaken a large programme of poverty alleviation in the Gulf States involving the provision of food and water. This has reduced the principal source of unhappiness in the Gulf States, reducing the number of unhappy faces from three to one (the local Shia underclass still feel oppressed by the Sunni minority ruling classes). Attempts to provide humanitarian aid to Western Iraq and Kurdistan have been hampered by the on-going civil unrest in Iraq, the closure of port facilities at Um Qsr, and the hostility of the local Shia Imams.

8. Iraq has sought and gained membership of the Gulf Security and Cooperation Organisation. This has yet to provide immediate relief to the Federal Government as the terms of the accession have yet to be fully worked out. There is the hope that Russia will provide security assets, in conjunction with Turkey and Syria, and that Iran will provide humanitarian aid across the wider Federal Iraq.

9. Syria has restricted the movement of Saudi Arabian diplomats in Damascus and has confined them to their embassy premises. The Saudi backed Arabic Cultural Centre has been placed under the supervision of the Syrian authorities to ensure that the activities of the centre remain religious in their provision and do not acquire a political tinge.

10. The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government has declared itself as an independent sovereign state. The independence of the newly formed Kurdistan has been recognised by Iran, China, and Russia. Kurdistan has sought and obtained membership of the Gulf Security and Cooperation Organisation, under which Russia has provided military assistance to the Kurdish Government.

11. Kurdish forces have seized the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, with the capital being located in Mosul. Under the terms of the humanitarian assistance provided by Iran, food, water, and medicines are now being provided to the residents of these cities. The enhanced Kurdish forces have closed the border between Turkey and Kurdistan in an attempt to stem the flow of refugees from Turkey. This has largely been successful and has allowed a degree of calm to enter into Kurdish civil society.

12. The Turkish Kurds are exceptionally unhappy at this treatment, with two further unhappy faces being placed upon their territory.

In the years 2046 to 2050, the price of oil rises from $84 a barrel to $93 a barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - Turn 4 (2040)

As we move into the second half of the game, the game play starts to become set. The key areas of concern are Syria, Iraq, and Kurdistan. Russia and Iran - with the backing of China - seem firmly in control of the area. Turkey is playing a slightly different game with the spread of influence across Central Asia. The key uncertainty is over what the United States and Saudi Arabia can do about it? Can they act to counter the spread of Iranian influence? Can they counter the security presence of Russia? Could they develop a commercial counter-measure for China? The scene is set for a move towards confrontation in Turn 4.

As a result of the game play, the following events were recorded:

1. The United States has invested heavily in rare earth mineral mining and processing capacity, drawing upon its own resources and those of European allies. The result is that the shortage of rare earth minerals has abated greatly, to the extent that the US is creating a strategic reserve of them to ensure a smooth running and fully functioning market. This has allowed the US and other OECD economies to recover from the downturn in economic activity previously experienced.

2. Russia is co-operating with China, Iran, and Turkey on the roll out of the BRI across the Trans Caucasus region. China has taken responsibility for the construction of of the surveyed routes in Turkey. There are rumours of Chinese technicians in Syria examining the feasibility of connecting Damascus and Tartus to the pan-Asian transportation network.

3. In the meantime, Russian engineers are surveying a BRI transportation route between Tehran, Eshfahan, and Basheri in Iran.

4. The Gulf Security and Cooperation Organisation continues to grow. It now includes the Trans Caucasus nations, Iran, Syria, and China as members, with Turkey achieving observer status.

5. China continues to build out oil, gas, and transportation infrastructure across the region. China is investigating ways to include Syria in the BRI. Initial scoping work has started. China has announced that it's maritime priority will be closer to home for the immediate future, but wishes to maintain it's footprint in the region with priority given to the Pakistan naval station.

6. Iran has announced a civil and military cooperation agreement with Pakistan. This builds upon previous trading relationships and introduces a more formal arrangement for counter-party trade.

7. An investigation by the BBC suggests that the Iran-Pakistan trade agreement involved Iranian food and water supplies being delivered to Pakistan in return for the delivery of Pakistani fissile material to Iran. The fissile material has a North Korean footprint to it and suggestions have been made of possible Chinese involvement in the supply. All parties deny these reports. The BBC goes on to suggest that Iran now has sufficient fissile material, in a number of locations, to be able to start the production of nuclear warheads to be used with the existing Iranian missile stock.

8. Turkey has launched the Turkic Union, based upon similar principles to the European Union. This is an extension of the Turkish cultural initiative achieved in 2025. The nations of the Trans Caucasus region and Central Asia are invited to join the TU, but it has been met with only a lukewarm response. These nations are currently waiting for a lead from Russia before committing one way or another.

9. Saudi Arabia has launched a 'Greener Future' initiative that involves the construction of desalination plants, water pipelines and irrigation initiatives across the nation. This has reduced the water scarcity experienced in the and has increased food production. The lower food costs has met with a degree of approval from the population in Saudi Arabia, allowing for the unhappy faces to be removed.

10. Sadly, this initiative is restricted to Saudi Arabia. The Gulf States were not included in the initiative, resulting in further water stress and food shortages. Additional unhappy faces have been added to the Gulf States. Sporadic rioting has broken out in the Gulf States, mainly amongst the Shia communities there. At present, the anger of the crowds is directed against the Sunni rulers of the Gulf States, but more recently the American bases have come to the attention of the protesters.

11. The Federal Government of Iraq has tried to distance itself from the US in an attempt to appease the local Shia Imams. This has not been successful at all and, if anything, has worsened the situation. Iraq is still heavily reliant upon the US security apparatus in country. The Federal Government took control of the desalination plant and water pipeline, but still faces acute problems in securing labour and materials to build them out. The Imams have increased the stakes by now organising a strike and boycott of the port of Um Qsr, with the result that oil and gas exports from Iraq have been severely disrupted.

12. The Syrian government continues to fund the operations of Russian railway engineers, who are now based in Iran. The distribution of humanitarian aid continues, but the extent to which the Syrian government controls the country has remained static. Internationally, Syria has joined the Gulf Security and Cooperation Organisation and has toyed with the idea of closing the Saudi Arabian embassy in Damascus.

13. The situation in Kurdistan is confused. The Regional Government of Iraqi Kurdistan has undertaken steps to assert it's authority in Kurdistan. However, there is evidence to suggest that the Iraqi forces have been operating inside Turkey. It is unclear whether or not Turkey authorised this incursion. There has been an influx of Kurds of Turkish origin into Iraq as climate refugees, seeking some of the assistance to Iraqi Kurds that has been provided by Iran. This has overwhelmed the local aid facilities in Iraqi Kurdistan, resulting in a number of violent clashes between Kurds of Turkish origin and Kurds of Iraqi origin. A campaign of car bombing has been experienced as the Turkish Kurds seek recognition of their plight from the Iraqi Kurds. To reflect this inter-community violence as Kurdistan drifts towards civil war, an unhappy face has been added to Iraqi Kurdistan.

14. Across the region, those nations with little or no poverty alleviation strategies have seen an additional unhappy face added to the existing unhappy faces. The governments of these areas will now start to become dysfunctional.

In the years 2041 to 2045, the price of oil rises from $79 a barrel to $84 a barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - Turn 3 (2035)

We are now moving towards the half way stage in the game. The various positions are starting to become formed with the alignments taking shape. China is managing to develop it's relationship with Iran, Russia, and Turkey to develop the infrastructure along the BRI. The United States struggles to gain traction north of the Persian Gulf, despite the desire of Iraq to engage America. The climate is starting to turn more hostile, with higher temperatures, greater water shortages, falling crop yields and the resultant popular discontentment. This doesn't bode well for the stability of the region in Turn 3.

As a result of the game play, the following events were recorded:

1. The United States has invested heavily in cyberwar assets, both for offensive operations and for defensive operations. The new base on the Persian Gulf has now been built out. The new cyberwar regional operations centre is located at that base. The roll out of the cyberwar capabilities has been hampered and slowed by the relative inaccessibility of key components owing to the Chinese ban on exports of rare earth products to entities of US origin.

2. Russia continues to increase it's footprint in the region. Russian technicians have been involved in surveying potential transportation routes between Damascus and Aleppo, with a spur to Tartus. The routes are planned to be of BRI quality. However, the surveying has been hampered by inadequate funding, gross inefficiencies, and the impacts of corruption in the procurement process.

3. In an agreement with Iran, the Russian navy has developed port facilities at Basheri, which will now be a more permanent home to the Russian Persian Gulf Fleet. At the request of Iran, Russia has installed an array of missile defences that have sufficient range to cover the whole of the Persian Gulf.

4. China continues to build out the BRI across Iran. This includes further oil and gas pipeline developments and the surveying of the BRI transportation route out as far as the Trans Caucasus. The routes have been surveyed, and are now ready for construction. The oil pipeline from the Iranian border to Yerevan has been surveyed and is awaiting political consent to be built out.

5. Elsewhere, China has laid down a further four aircraft carriers with a view to projecting power across the globe. She continues to research the green economy and seeks to establish an alternative to the capitalist-imperialist cultural narrative.

6. Iran has provided humanitarian assistance to Syria, Pakistan, and Iraqi Kurdistan. Food and water have been supplied to Pakistan and Iraqi Kurdistan, with the necessary water pipeline infrastructure being laid down. Food aid has been given to Syria, being distributed by local Shia militias and elements of the Revolutionary Guards.

7. A food distribution hub was established by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Dar az Zawi. When the local Syrian opposition officials objected to this, a fierce firefight resulted that left many of the Syrian opposition fighters either dead, incapacitated, or in the custody of the Revolutionary Guards. The local population, unhappy with the governance of the Syrian opposition, welcomed this change of governing body. The result is that control of Dar az Zawi has reverted back to the Syrian government, and the unhappy face has been removed.

8. Turkey has embarked upon a programme of infrastructure investment between Istanbul, Erzurum, and the Trans Caucasus border. It is early days as yet and the project will take some considerable time to complete if left entirely in Turkish hands. The hoped for economic spin offs have yet to materialise owing to the impact of corruption on public procurement.

9. Saudi Arabia has reopened its embassy in Damascus. This is combined with the opening of a cultural centre in a hope to provide a focus for the Arab family within Syria. New points of communication and collaboration are established, but with a mixed impact.

10. Iraq has commenced the construction of a desalination plant at Umm Qasr, along with a water pipeline network that runs north to Baghdad, Tikrit, and Erbil. Progress is very slow owing to the obstructions caused by local Iranian backed Shia militias. Several influential Shia Imams have preached against the water pipeline and this is slowing construction immensely.

11. Syria has engaged Russian engineers to survey a potential transportation route between Damascus and Aleppo, with a spur to Tartus. The routes are planned to be of BRI quality. However, the surveying has been hampered by inadequate funding, gross inefficiencies, and the impacts of corruption in the procurement process.

12. The continued anti-corruption campaign in Syria now has almost no effect at all, with the majority of the funding available being ghosted away to Nur-Sultan and Dubai. The payment of Syrian army arrears have helped to boost the approval of the government in the Syrian army.

13. The Iraqi Regional Government of Kurdistan has reached an agreement with Iran whereby Iran provides food and water to the region in return for the construction of a gas spur from Iraqi Kurdistan into the Iranian pan-Asian gas network in the vicinity of Tabriz. This has increased the approval of the population of the Iraqi Kurdish authorities, leading to the unhappy face being removed. The situation of the Turkish Kurds has not improved.

14. In a supreme irony, funding for the gas spur was provided by the US through the IMF, which means that American entities have funded Iranian entities - in collusion with the Iraqi Central Bank - in contravention of US sanctions on Iran.

15. The unhappy faces at Dar az Zawi and in Iraqi Kurdistan have been removed. An additional unhappy face has been added to all existing unhappy faces where no effective action has been undertaken to remove them. The unhappy faces in Turkish Kurdistan (the 'Mountain Kurds') relate to the disapproval of the Kurdish politicians by this population. If we reach three unhappy faces, the players will start to have their ability to act constrained a little.

15. Crop yields have been falling of late, leading to a further increase in food prices across the region, coupled with far wider shortages of water. For those areas whose governments have not taken mitigation steps, popular discontent has started to surface in the form of unhappy faces. The mumblings and grumblings have started to translate into action. There is a pronounced drift of the population from the countryside into the cities. Discontent is growing and there is an expectation on the part of the more general populace that action will be taken to improve their lot, especially if unemployment is added to high food prices and hunger.

In the years 2036 to 2040, the price of oil falls from $81 a barrel to $79 a barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - Turn 2 (2030)

Having made their initial deployments, the players have used this starting point as a base from which to stretch out their gameplay in search of their objectives. It is interesting that both Iran and Saudi Arabia concentrated upon social and economic development in Turn 1, whilst the three minor players in the region - Syria, Iraq, and Kurdistan - had a focus upon political control. There is an inherent clash here that could well come to a head in Turn 2.

As a result of the game play, the following events were recorded:

1. We are now seeing the limit of the Biden Doctrine being tested in the Persian Gulf. The United States has committed to increase it's military footprint on the Gulf by starting to construct a base along the southern shores of the Persian Gulf, within Saudi Arabia. The new base, along with the existing bases, will be constructed to resist the worst effects of disruptive climate change. The US has deepened its ties with the nations along the south coast of the Persian Gulf.

2. Elsewhere, the US has increased the sale of arms to the government in Baghdad. This will be accompanied by the attendant training in their use and the tactics surrounding the use of the US arms. It has help to strengthen the prowess of the Iraqi federal forces.

3. Constitutional discussions continue in Iraq, but are proceeding at a slow pace. The key parties to the negotiations are the Federal Government and the Regional Government of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Regional Government of Iraqi Kurdistan had hoped to access money from the IMF, but had yet to receive support from either the Iraqi Central Bank (which is under the control of the Federal Government) or the United States, which would be needed to approve and underwrite such finance.

4. The situation in Syria has stabilised. The crackdown within the areas under governmental control has diminished, to be replaced by a more modest programme to counter local corruption. The arrears of army pay have been addressed. Whilst some arrears remain, morale amongst the Syrian forces has noticeably improved. The government has embarked on a programme of humanitarian assistance through the provision of basic healthcare and, more importantly, through subsidies of food purchases. These changes do not extend to areas sympathetic to the Syrian opposition. They have resulted in the unhappy face being removed from Damascus.

5. There is a persistent rumour that Syrian oil, out of the port of Tartus, is being exported in contravention to UN sanctions. American satellite imagery suggests that the oil is being transported in tankers under Russian flags and communications intercepts by GCHQ suggest that the destination ports for these vessels are in China.

6. Relations between Turkey and Syria have been improved. The long awaited Turkish embassy in Damascus has finally opened with a great fanfare. A Turkish cultural centre has been established in the embassy and seeks to enhance Turkish influence within the country.

7. Saudi Arabia continues to invest in green technology and to use that technology to bind the 'Arab Family' nations. This has met with a modicum of success on the southern side of the Persian Gulf, but has gained no real traction elsewhere. Saudi prestige has risen south of the Persian Gulf.

8. Iran has started to manufacture, under licence from a South African biotech firm, genetically modified wheat, barley and rice seeds, that are heat resistant and drought resistant. Utilising the irrigation resources available, food production has risen considerably to reach a position where Iran now has a food surplus. The lowering of internal food prices, derived from the agricultural bonanza, has increased the approval ratings of the government, resulting in happy faces being placed on the major population areas.

9. China has continued to build out it's hydrocarbon assets in Iran. Bandar Abbas is now linked to the pan-Asian overland gas network and Tehran is now linked to the pan-Asian oil network. At the request of the government of Iran, China has installed a series of shore to ship defence missiles in Bandar Abbas. These have a range of about 600 km.

10. The UN allowed the JCPOA to lapse in 2025. This means that Iran is now no longer sanctioned under UN mandate, but still faces US imposed sanctions, which remain in place. Rather grudgingly, European entities have complied with the US sanctions. As a response to this, Russia has sought to put together a regional security framework. Most interested parties have been invited, but to date, only Russia, China, and Iran have shown an interest in mutual co-operation. It is intended that this new framework will be the main security guarantor in the Persian Gulf.

11. Within this framework of co-operation, joint naval exercises are now regularly undertaken by Russian and Chinese naval forces, of carrier group strength, within the Persian Gulf. These use Iranian naval port facilities for re-supply. As part of this framework, China has also added a carrier group that is based in Pakistan, just outside of the entrance to the Straits of Hormuz.

12. China has decided to focus on the greening of the global economy. There has been a great deal of investment in Green Tech, with varying results in a number of areas. In order to control these developments, China has decided to restrict the export of processed rare earth elements to those nations it considers to be inimical to Chinese interests. The main targets for these restrictions are Japan and the United States, but they also have an impact upon the Saudi plans for a greening of the Arab economy.

Crop yields have been wavering of late, leading to an increase in food prices across the region, coupled with more general shortages of water. For those areas whose governments have not taken mitigation steps, popular discontent has started to surface in the form of unhappy faces. At the moment, these are mumblings and grumblings that have yet to threaten any regime. However, discontent is growing and there is an expectation on the part of the more general populace that action will be taken to improve their lot.

In the years 2031 to 2035, the price of oil rises from $75 a barrel to $81 a barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - Turn 1 (2025)

The first turn in any game is always a little tentative as the players get to grips with what they are supposed to be doing and as the relationships between the players start to form. The structure of the game channels players along a number of lines. This game was no different. The aim of the game was for China to build a transport and hydrocarbon corridor across the map. To do so, they would need the active co-operation of Iran, Russia, and Turkey, three nations whose objectives may not be necessarily aligned. Ranged against this is a Saudi Arabia looking to contain Iran, and seeking the assistance from a disengaging United States to do so. Caught between these forces are Iraq, Syria, and Kurdistan. The initial moves in Turn 1 followed more or less those lines.

The Kurdish regional government in Iraq sought to develop the Khor Mor gasfield and the Bina Bawi gasfield. These two gasfields were to be linked by a pipeline. This was largely achieved due to the provision of funding from the US. The intention was to export the gas, but no developmental pipework was undertaken to any of the export outlets in the region. The anticipated economic windfall failed to materialise and the hoped for gas revenues remain in the ground. In the process, Kurdish-US ties were strengthened, but an export route for Kurdish gas remains elusive. The Kurdish wealth and reputation has not been enhanced by more than a very slight degree.

Elsewhere in Iraq, the government in Baghdad continued to work upon delivering broader economic prosperity within the country. This was based upon the relatively high price of oil and the relative lack of volatility in the global energy markets. Oil and gas exports continue to grow, underpinning a wider expansion of the non-oil private sector, which has allowed a shrinkage in public sector employment. The relative prosperity has allowed the government to propose a conference to discuss constitutional reform in the near future.

Iraq has seen little attention from Iran to date, despite the running down of US base facilities in the Iraq. This is largely because Iran has focussed on internal economic development. A network of de-salination plants have been constructed along the Persian Gulf, using electricity from Iranian oil fired power plants and capital derived from the proceeds of Chinese involvement in the economic development of Iran. Associated with the de-salination plants is the construction of a network of water delivery pipelines to large centres of population and areas of high demand for agricultural irrigation.

This process has been enhanced through the involvement of Chinese entities in Iran. The surveyed BRI route has been built out. An accompanying oil pipeline has also been built. The gas route from Bandar Abbas to Tehran, via Eshfahan, has been surveyed and will be ready to build out at a later date. In 2024, a naval presence was initiated by the visit of a Chinese carrier group to various Iranian naval installations. A Russian naval group had been planned to take part in the exercises, but these plans didn't materialise. There are rumours of Chinese naval surveyors taking particular interest in the port facilities at Basheri.

The economic stimulus created by the construction work in Iran, along with the provision of water for human consumption and irrigation in agriculture has led to a rise in prosperity in Iran. As the economic situation has started to improve, a happy face has been placed on Tehran to demonstrate the growing public approval of the regime.

Russia had hoped that a degree of accommodation between the US and Iran over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action could be accomplished. This didn't happen. It acts as an impediment for the Russian plan to establish a new co-operative multilateral framework for the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Iran have made expressions of support for this move, but these have remained vague expressions rather than having anything tangible attached. The regional framework proposed by Russia is in it's early days and hasn't really got off the ground just yet.

Russia - along with Iran - continues to support the Syrian government in military terms. The Syrian government took steps to assert control over it's core areas in Syria with some degree of success. Whilst attempting to keep a focus on purely military targets, some civilian collateral casualties were inevitable, given the nature of the conflict. There has been a tightening of security restrictions within the area, which have proven to be rather unpopular. Whilst remaining loyal to the government, the control over movement exercised by Russian and Iranian military elements, and the sheer corruption of Syrian governmental elements, is embittering the Aalawite population. The loyal population has become deeply unhappy with the regime, which is reflected by an unhappy face in Damascus.

The Syrian economy continues to deteriorate. The sale of oil continues to be inhibited through the imposition of western sanctions on the regime. This continues to limit the amount of public funds available. There are persistent rumours of significant arrears in army pay. This will limit the effectiveness of the Syrian military in the coming years.

The Russian naval facilities at Tartus are now fully operational, allowing the re-supply, refuelling and re-arming of Russian naval warships of all categories in the Mediterranean.

An agreement of sorts has been reached between Syria and Turkey concerning their common border and their policy towards the Kurdish population of their respective nations. This has led to a degree of stability to northern Syria, but the promised Turkish embassy in Damascus has yet to be opened.

The focus of Turkish policy is presently to enhance the standing of the Turkic culture. A cultural centre was opened at Erzurum. It is hoped that this centre would provide a cultural focus point for co-operation in the Caspian and Black Sea basins, and provide a bridge between the Asian nations and Europe.

Saudi Arabia pressed ahead with plans to develop the city of NEOM. Eventually, this is planned to become an economic and educational centre and a focus for diplomacy within the 'Arab Family'. Investments have been made in the new green economy and a variety of emerging technologies. This cultural and environmental research centre is intended to act as a focus for Arabic culture within the region that enhances the influence of the Kingdom.

In the years 2026 to 2030, the price of oil rises from $70 a barrel to $75 a barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - The Starting Point In 2020

From the outset, we felt that the more interesting game for this region would be the continuation scenario. What would the Middle East look like if current trends and policies were to play out? Of course, this means that we have to highlight those trends and policies, convert them into player objectives, and see how they play out. 

There are three large geopolitical trends that influence this game. All of them occur at the level of civilisational conflict. First, there is the emergence of the 'Biden Doctrine', which we take to mean that the United States will no longer act as the global policeman and will not be the guarantor of peace in the world. Second, we have the expansion of Chinese influence across Asia through the BRI programme. Third, there is a drive from Russia to escape from the strategic encirclement achieved during the Cold War. 

These trends are reflected in the objectives of the three actors. The US was tasked with maintaining a degree of influence in the region, whilst also countering the expansion of Russian and Chinese influence. China was tasked with the expansion and building out of the BRI across the region, and Russia was tasked with acquiring warm water ports in Syria and Iran whilst providing assistance to Russian client states in the region.

We wanted to include a degree of co-operation between Russia and Saudi Arabia over the price of oil, which allowed us to access the overlay of regional conflict. Saudi Arabia was tasked with keeping the United States engaged in the region, as a counter to Iran, and using Saudi financial assets to maintain a degree of internal stability on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf. The regional and religious conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran gave us an ability to introduce a bit of tension within the game. Iran was tasked with developing its sale of hydrocarbons, internal development despite western sanctions, and becoming a nuclear state.

The potential for regional tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia also gave rise to the possibility of regional tension between Russia and Turkey. Turkey is an interesting case in hand. Formally part of the NATO infrastructure, Turkey has been drifting away from European influence in recent years and starting to embrace being an Asiatic nation. We assumed that this trend would continue and tasked Turkey with ensuring that she remained the Asian destination point for the BRI - largely through collaboration with Iran - and to secure the stability of the southern border by encouraging stability in Syria - this time, through collaboration with Russia - and by thwarting the national aspirations of the Kurds.

This final objective introduces quite well the local themes within the game. We represented two different types of state - the unitary (Syria) and the federal (Iraq). We wanted to explore these themes within the game. We did this by including the Kurdish element in Iraq, but by not including the opposition in Syria. The Iraqi government were tasked with holding the country together. This was despite a drive from the Iraqi Kurds for independence and despite a high degree of Iranian influence in eastern Iraq. The Kurdish element was tasked with achieving national sovereignty, but across Iraqi Kurdistan, Iranian Kurdistan, and Turkish Kurdistan. Syria, on the other hand, was tasked with holding the country together by maintaining the support of the Russian elements and by restricting an expansion of Saudi influence.

By 2020, much of the core infrastructure in the region was in place. However, we felt that the impact of a changing climate ought to have a sharper focus in the game, so we highlighted the development of resources to mitigate the impact of a changing climate - mainly water and food resources. We felt that we had scope to make the changing climate more of a factor than in previous games. This would have an impact upon society throughout the region and become a consequential driver of politics. Everything was set up for a collision of interests within the region. What would the players make of it?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Introducing Xi Turns West

We naturally tend to focus on the expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia. This is an area that is contiguous with the external borders of China and it seems natural that this is to where our attention ought to be paid. In doing this, we naturally gravitate towards considering the relationship between China and Russia in Asia, to the neglect of other areas in which points of contact are made. This may be a mistake.

The BRI provides a grand geopolitical narrative for Chinese foreign policy out to the middle of this century. It is vast in its scope and ambition, which is nothing less than to bring the Eurasian landmass - the 'Heartland' of Mackinder - under Chinese dominion. In true Chinese diplomatic style, which goes back over three millennia, the aim is dominance rather than conquest. It is an expression through the soft power of commerce, trade, and diplomacy; rather than the hard power of military ambition and force. In this, it is distinctly Asian rather than European.

One neglected aspect of the declared plans for the BRI is the southern route - from Central Asia, south of the Caspian Sea, across the Middle East, and thence over the Mediterranean into Europe. The purpose of this game was to examine the challenges associated with achieving this ambition.

One of the more striking aspects of designing a game around this question is the degree to which a large number of layers of conflict can be found in a small space. That influenced our game design. We constructed a game that had four layers of conflict - the civilisational, the religious, the regional, and the local. Each layer had a dimension within the game, and each added a layer of complexity to the game.

At the civilisational level, the Middle East has the potential to see the approach of western civilisation - as championed by the United States - come into direct contact with the approach of the Chinese civilisation. We slotted into the game assumptions about the 'Biden Doctrine', which, admittedly, is in formation, that the United States will no longer act as the global policeman and that America no longer is willing to provide unconditional support to regimes that do not contain core US interests. This could create a power vacuum into which China could expand.

We decided to include Russia at the civilisational level. It could be argued that Russia is not quite a civilisational state in that it does not represent a way of life. However, we wanted to explore the relationship between China and Russia, and the Middle East provides a nice point of contact in which to do so. In previous games, Russia came out as the junior partner to China by 2050. We wanted to tease out the possibility that this may not be so and the game was designed to give Russia a more equal footing with China. It represents our view that if this happens anywhere, it will happen in the Middle East, which is a core territory for Russia, and which is vital to the plans for the BRI.

We placed China and Russia as broadly co-operative powers. On top of this lies the great religious struggle of the first half of the twenty-first century: that between Iran and Saudi Arabia. We added this dimension to the game, but we placed both powers as representing a more modern approach to Islam. History and geography allowed us to align Iran with China and Russia, and Saudi Arabia with the United States. These would provide the civilisational underpinnings to the religious conflict.

We also wanted to capture some of the regional rivalries. Within the dimension of the religious conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, we added the more regional actors of Turkey and Russia. These are potential rivals across the Black Sea. In order to roll out the BRI, China needs both Russia and Turkey to lay aside their regional differences. Turkey has been inclined more towards Europe and North America in the past, but this is now changing. Rebuffed by Europe and spurned by America, Turkey is now in the process of turning more towards Asia, with a little encouragement - and development funds without conditions - from China. We wanted to encourage this process and nudged the game into greater co-operation between Turkey, Russia, and Iran. This had the potential to act as something of a check to Saudi ambitions in the region.

These ambitions would have been felt at a local level. On this level, we wanted to examine a unitary Syria, largely backed by Russia and Iran, against a federal Iraq, largely backed by the United States and Saudi Arabia. We tested the federal nature of Iraq by giving voice - backed by Iran - to the aspirations of Kurdistan. That provided the final element in a very confused - and confusing - game.

The game was designed to represent the period 2020 to 2050, with six turns of five years duration each. The umpire team would represent a worsening climate, the energy markets, the bond markets, and all other countries not represented by players in the game. It was hard to decide who to leave out. We had a great deal of discussion about the exclusion of Israel in the game. However, the impact of Israel upon the BRI is fairly minimal, even if they are a large player in the Middle East, which we felt justified the exclusion. With nine players and three umpires, we felt that the game had the potential to become unmanageable, so we set the limit, for good and for ill, where it was.

Once we had the basic game structure, the next task was to design the opening positions for each of the nine actors. We shall turn to this in our next post.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022