The first turn in any game is always a little tentative as the players get to grips with what they are supposed to be doing and as the relationships between the players start to form. The structure of the game channels players along a number of lines. This game was no different. The aim of the game was for China to build a transport and hydrocarbon corridor across the map. To do so, they would need the active co-operation of Iran, Russia, and Turkey, three nations whose objectives may not be necessarily aligned. Ranged against this is a Saudi Arabia looking to contain Iran, and seeking the assistance from a disengaging United States to do so. Caught between these forces are Iraq, Syria, and Kurdistan. The initial moves in Turn 1 followed more or less those lines.
The Kurdish regional government in Iraq sought to develop the Khor
Mor gasfield and the Bina Bawi gasfield. These
two gasfields were to be linked by a pipeline. This was largely
achieved due to the provision of funding from the US. The
intention was to export the gas, but no developmental pipework was
undertaken to any of the export outlets in the region. The
anticipated economic windfall failed to materialise and the hoped for
gas revenues remain in the ground. In the process, Kurdish-US ties
were strengthened, but an export route for Kurdish gas remains
elusive. The Kurdish wealth and reputation has not been enhanced by
more than a very slight degree.
Elsewhere in Iraq, the government in Baghdad continued to work upon delivering broader economic prosperity within the country. This was based upon the relatively high price of oil and the relative lack of volatility in the global energy markets. Oil and gas exports continue to grow, underpinning a wider expansion of the non-oil private sector, which has allowed a shrinkage in public sector employment. The relative prosperity has allowed the government to propose a conference to discuss constitutional reform in the near future.
Iraq has seen little attention from Iran to date, despite the running down of US base facilities in the Iraq. This is largely because Iran has focussed on internal economic development. A network of de-salination plants have been constructed along the Persian Gulf, using electricity from Iranian oil fired power plants and capital derived from the proceeds of Chinese involvement in the economic development of Iran. Associated with the de-salination plants is the construction of a network of water delivery pipelines to large centres of population and areas of high demand for agricultural irrigation.
This process has been enhanced through the involvement of Chinese entities in Iran. The surveyed BRI route has been built out. An accompanying oil pipeline has also been built. The gas route from Bandar Abbas to Tehran, via Eshfahan, has been surveyed and will be ready to build out at a later date. In 2024, a naval presence was initiated by the visit of a Chinese carrier group to various Iranian naval installations. A Russian naval group had been planned to take part in the exercises, but these plans didn't materialise. There are rumours of Chinese naval surveyors taking particular interest in the port facilities at Basheri.
The economic stimulus created by the construction work in Iran, along with the provision of water for human consumption and irrigation in agriculture has led to a rise in prosperity in Iran. As the economic situation has started to improve, a happy face has been placed on Tehran to demonstrate the growing public approval of the regime.
Russia had hoped that a degree of accommodation between the US and Iran over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action could be accomplished. This didn't happen. It acts as an impediment for the Russian plan to establish a new co-operative multilateral framework for the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Iran have made expressions of support for this move, but these have remained vague expressions rather than having anything tangible attached. The regional framework proposed by Russia is in it's early days and hasn't really got off the ground just yet.
Russia - along with Iran - continues to support the Syrian government in military terms. The Syrian government took steps to assert control over it's core areas in Syria with some degree of success. Whilst attempting to keep a focus on purely military targets, some civilian collateral casualties were inevitable, given the nature of the conflict. There has been a tightening of security restrictions within the area, which have proven to be rather unpopular. Whilst remaining loyal to the government, the control over movement exercised by Russian and Iranian military elements, and the sheer corruption of Syrian governmental elements, is embittering the Aalawite population. The loyal population has become deeply unhappy with the regime, which is reflected by an unhappy face in Damascus.
The Syrian economy continues to deteriorate. The sale of oil continues to be inhibited through the imposition of western sanctions on the regime. This continues to limit the amount of public funds available. There are persistent rumours of significant arrears in army pay. This will limit the effectiveness of the Syrian military in the coming years.
The Russian naval facilities at Tartus are now fully operational, allowing the re-supply, refuelling and re-arming of Russian naval warships of all categories in the Mediterranean.
An agreement of sorts has been reached between Syria and Turkey concerning their common border and their policy towards the Kurdish population of their respective nations. This has led to a degree of stability to northern Syria, but the promised Turkish embassy in Damascus has yet to be opened.
The focus of Turkish policy is presently to enhance the standing of the Turkic culture. A cultural centre was opened at Erzurum. It is hoped that this centre would provide a cultural focus point for co-operation in the Caspian and Black Sea basins, and provide a bridge between the Asian nations and Europe.
Saudi Arabia pressed ahead with plans to develop the city of NEOM. Eventually, this is planned to become an economic and educational centre and a focus for diplomacy within the 'Arab Family'. Investments have been made in the new green economy and a variety of emerging technologies. This cultural and environmental research centre is intended to act as a focus for Arabic culture within the region that enhances the influence of the Kingdom.
Elsewhere in Iraq, the government in Baghdad continued to work upon delivering broader economic prosperity within the country. This was based upon the relatively high price of oil and the relative lack of volatility in the global energy markets. Oil and gas exports continue to grow, underpinning a wider expansion of the non-oil private sector, which has allowed a shrinkage in public sector employment. The relative prosperity has allowed the government to propose a conference to discuss constitutional reform in the near future.
Iraq has seen little attention from Iran to date, despite the running down of US base facilities in the Iraq. This is largely because Iran has focussed on internal economic development. A network of de-salination plants have been constructed along the Persian Gulf, using electricity from Iranian oil fired power plants and capital derived from the proceeds of Chinese involvement in the economic development of Iran. Associated with the de-salination plants is the construction of a network of water delivery pipelines to large centres of population and areas of high demand for agricultural irrigation.
This process has been enhanced through the involvement of Chinese entities in Iran. The surveyed BRI route has been built out. An accompanying oil pipeline has also been built. The gas route from Bandar Abbas to Tehran, via Eshfahan, has been surveyed and will be ready to build out at a later date. In 2024, a naval presence was initiated by the visit of a Chinese carrier group to various Iranian naval installations. A Russian naval group had been planned to take part in the exercises, but these plans didn't materialise. There are rumours of Chinese naval surveyors taking particular interest in the port facilities at Basheri.
The economic stimulus created by the construction work in Iran, along with the provision of water for human consumption and irrigation in agriculture has led to a rise in prosperity in Iran. As the economic situation has started to improve, a happy face has been placed on Tehran to demonstrate the growing public approval of the regime.
Russia had hoped that a degree of accommodation between the US and Iran over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action could be accomplished. This didn't happen. It acts as an impediment for the Russian plan to establish a new co-operative multilateral framework for the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Iran have made expressions of support for this move, but these have remained vague expressions rather than having anything tangible attached. The regional framework proposed by Russia is in it's early days and hasn't really got off the ground just yet.
Russia - along with Iran - continues to support the Syrian government in military terms. The Syrian government took steps to assert control over it's core areas in Syria with some degree of success. Whilst attempting to keep a focus on purely military targets, some civilian collateral casualties were inevitable, given the nature of the conflict. There has been a tightening of security restrictions within the area, which have proven to be rather unpopular. Whilst remaining loyal to the government, the control over movement exercised by Russian and Iranian military elements, and the sheer corruption of Syrian governmental elements, is embittering the Aalawite population. The loyal population has become deeply unhappy with the regime, which is reflected by an unhappy face in Damascus.
The Syrian economy continues to deteriorate. The sale of oil continues to be inhibited through the imposition of western sanctions on the regime. This continues to limit the amount of public funds available. There are persistent rumours of significant arrears in army pay. This will limit the effectiveness of the Syrian military in the coming years.
The Russian naval facilities at Tartus are now fully operational, allowing the re-supply, refuelling and re-arming of Russian naval warships of all categories in the Mediterranean.
An agreement of sorts has been reached between Syria and Turkey concerning their common border and their policy towards the Kurdish population of their respective nations. This has led to a degree of stability to northern Syria, but the promised Turkish embassy in Damascus has yet to be opened.
The focus of Turkish policy is presently to enhance the standing of the Turkic culture. A cultural centre was opened at Erzurum. It is hoped that this centre would provide a cultural focus point for co-operation in the Caspian and Black Sea basins, and provide a bridge between the Asian nations and Europe.
Saudi Arabia pressed ahead with plans to develop the city of NEOM. Eventually, this is planned to become an economic and educational centre and a focus for diplomacy within the 'Arab Family'. Investments have been made in the new green economy and a variety of emerging technologies. This cultural and environmental research centre is intended to act as a focus for Arabic culture within the region that enhances the influence of the Kingdom.
In the years 2026 to 2030, the price of oil rises from $70 a barrel to $75 a barrel.
Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2022
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