Xi Turns West - Turn 4 (2040)

As we move into the second half of the game, the game play starts to become set. The key areas of concern are Syria, Iraq, and Kurdistan. Russia and Iran - with the backing of China - seem firmly in control of the area. Turkey is playing a slightly different game with the spread of influence across Central Asia. The key uncertainty is over what the United States and Saudi Arabia can do about it? Can they act to counter the spread of Iranian influence? Can they counter the security presence of Russia? Could they develop a commercial counter-measure for China? The scene is set for a move towards confrontation in Turn 4.

As a result of the game play, the following events were recorded:

1. The United States has invested heavily in rare earth mineral mining and processing capacity, drawing upon its own resources and those of European allies. The result is that the shortage of rare earth minerals has abated greatly, to the extent that the US is creating a strategic reserve of them to ensure a smooth running and fully functioning market. This has allowed the US and other OECD economies to recover from the downturn in economic activity previously experienced.

2. Russia is co-operating with China, Iran, and Turkey on the roll out of the BRI across the Trans Caucasus region. China has taken responsibility for the construction of of the surveyed routes in Turkey. There are rumours of Chinese technicians in Syria examining the feasibility of connecting Damascus and Tartus to the pan-Asian transportation network.

3. In the meantime, Russian engineers are surveying a BRI transportation route between Tehran, Eshfahan, and Basheri in Iran.

4. The Gulf Security and Cooperation Organisation continues to grow. It now includes the Trans Caucasus nations, Iran, Syria, and China as members, with Turkey achieving observer status.

5. China continues to build out oil, gas, and transportation infrastructure across the region. China is investigating ways to include Syria in the BRI. Initial scoping work has started. China has announced that it's maritime priority will be closer to home for the immediate future, but wishes to maintain it's footprint in the region with priority given to the Pakistan naval station.

6. Iran has announced a civil and military cooperation agreement with Pakistan. This builds upon previous trading relationships and introduces a more formal arrangement for counter-party trade.

7. An investigation by the BBC suggests that the Iran-Pakistan trade agreement involved Iranian food and water supplies being delivered to Pakistan in return for the delivery of Pakistani fissile material to Iran. The fissile material has a North Korean footprint to it and suggestions have been made of possible Chinese involvement in the supply. All parties deny these reports. The BBC goes on to suggest that Iran now has sufficient fissile material, in a number of locations, to be able to start the production of nuclear warheads to be used with the existing Iranian missile stock.

8. Turkey has launched the Turkic Union, based upon similar principles to the European Union. This is an extension of the Turkish cultural initiative achieved in 2025. The nations of the Trans Caucasus region and Central Asia are invited to join the TU, but it has been met with only a lukewarm response. These nations are currently waiting for a lead from Russia before committing one way or another.

9. Saudi Arabia has launched a 'Greener Future' initiative that involves the construction of desalination plants, water pipelines and irrigation initiatives across the nation. This has reduced the water scarcity experienced in the and has increased food production. The lower food costs has met with a degree of approval from the population in Saudi Arabia, allowing for the unhappy faces to be removed.

10. Sadly, this initiative is restricted to Saudi Arabia. The Gulf States were not included in the initiative, resulting in further water stress and food shortages. Additional unhappy faces have been added to the Gulf States. Sporadic rioting has broken out in the Gulf States, mainly amongst the Shia communities there. At present, the anger of the crowds is directed against the Sunni rulers of the Gulf States, but more recently the American bases have come to the attention of the protesters.

11. The Federal Government of Iraq has tried to distance itself from the US in an attempt to appease the local Shia Imams. This has not been successful at all and, if anything, has worsened the situation. Iraq is still heavily reliant upon the US security apparatus in country. The Federal Government took control of the desalination plant and water pipeline, but still faces acute problems in securing labour and materials to build them out. The Imams have increased the stakes by now organising a strike and boycott of the port of Um Qsr, with the result that oil and gas exports from Iraq have been severely disrupted.

12. The Syrian government continues to fund the operations of Russian railway engineers, who are now based in Iran. The distribution of humanitarian aid continues, but the extent to which the Syrian government controls the country has remained static. Internationally, Syria has joined the Gulf Security and Cooperation Organisation and has toyed with the idea of closing the Saudi Arabian embassy in Damascus.

13. The situation in Kurdistan is confused. The Regional Government of Iraqi Kurdistan has undertaken steps to assert it's authority in Kurdistan. However, there is evidence to suggest that the Iraqi forces have been operating inside Turkey. It is unclear whether or not Turkey authorised this incursion. There has been an influx of Kurds of Turkish origin into Iraq as climate refugees, seeking some of the assistance to Iraqi Kurds that has been provided by Iran. This has overwhelmed the local aid facilities in Iraqi Kurdistan, resulting in a number of violent clashes between Kurds of Turkish origin and Kurds of Iraqi origin. A campaign of car bombing has been experienced as the Turkish Kurds seek recognition of their plight from the Iraqi Kurds. To reflect this inter-community violence as Kurdistan drifts towards civil war, an unhappy face has been added to Iraqi Kurdistan.

14. Across the region, those nations with little or no poverty alleviation strategies have seen an additional unhappy face added to the existing unhappy faces. The governments of these areas will now start to become dysfunctional.

In the years 2041 to 2045, the price of oil rises from $79 a barrel to $84 a barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - Turn 3 (2035)

We are now moving towards the half way stage in the game. The various positions are starting to become formed with the alignments taking shape. China is managing to develop it's relationship with Iran, Russia, and Turkey to develop the infrastructure along the BRI. The United States struggles to gain traction north of the Persian Gulf, despite the desire of Iraq to engage America. The climate is starting to turn more hostile, with higher temperatures, greater water shortages, falling crop yields and the resultant popular discontentment. This doesn't bode well for the stability of the region in Turn 3.

As a result of the game play, the following events were recorded:

1. The United States has invested heavily in cyberwar assets, both for offensive operations and for defensive operations. The new base on the Persian Gulf has now been built out. The new cyberwar regional operations centre is located at that base. The roll out of the cyberwar capabilities has been hampered and slowed by the relative inaccessibility of key components owing to the Chinese ban on exports of rare earth products to entities of US origin.

2. Russia continues to increase it's footprint in the region. Russian technicians have been involved in surveying potential transportation routes between Damascus and Aleppo, with a spur to Tartus. The routes are planned to be of BRI quality. However, the surveying has been hampered by inadequate funding, gross inefficiencies, and the impacts of corruption in the procurement process.

3. In an agreement with Iran, the Russian navy has developed port facilities at Basheri, which will now be a more permanent home to the Russian Persian Gulf Fleet. At the request of Iran, Russia has installed an array of missile defences that have sufficient range to cover the whole of the Persian Gulf.

4. China continues to build out the BRI across Iran. This includes further oil and gas pipeline developments and the surveying of the BRI transportation route out as far as the Trans Caucasus. The routes have been surveyed, and are now ready for construction. The oil pipeline from the Iranian border to Yerevan has been surveyed and is awaiting political consent to be built out.

5. Elsewhere, China has laid down a further four aircraft carriers with a view to projecting power across the globe. She continues to research the green economy and seeks to establish an alternative to the capitalist-imperialist cultural narrative.

6. Iran has provided humanitarian assistance to Syria, Pakistan, and Iraqi Kurdistan. Food and water have been supplied to Pakistan and Iraqi Kurdistan, with the necessary water pipeline infrastructure being laid down. Food aid has been given to Syria, being distributed by local Shia militias and elements of the Revolutionary Guards.

7. A food distribution hub was established by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Dar az Zawi. When the local Syrian opposition officials objected to this, a fierce firefight resulted that left many of the Syrian opposition fighters either dead, incapacitated, or in the custody of the Revolutionary Guards. The local population, unhappy with the governance of the Syrian opposition, welcomed this change of governing body. The result is that control of Dar az Zawi has reverted back to the Syrian government, and the unhappy face has been removed.

8. Turkey has embarked upon a programme of infrastructure investment between Istanbul, Erzurum, and the Trans Caucasus border. It is early days as yet and the project will take some considerable time to complete if left entirely in Turkish hands. The hoped for economic spin offs have yet to materialise owing to the impact of corruption on public procurement.

9. Saudi Arabia has reopened its embassy in Damascus. This is combined with the opening of a cultural centre in a hope to provide a focus for the Arab family within Syria. New points of communication and collaboration are established, but with a mixed impact.

10. Iraq has commenced the construction of a desalination plant at Umm Qasr, along with a water pipeline network that runs north to Baghdad, Tikrit, and Erbil. Progress is very slow owing to the obstructions caused by local Iranian backed Shia militias. Several influential Shia Imams have preached against the water pipeline and this is slowing construction immensely.

11. Syria has engaged Russian engineers to survey a potential transportation route between Damascus and Aleppo, with a spur to Tartus. The routes are planned to be of BRI quality. However, the surveying has been hampered by inadequate funding, gross inefficiencies, and the impacts of corruption in the procurement process.

12. The continued anti-corruption campaign in Syria now has almost no effect at all, with the majority of the funding available being ghosted away to Nur-Sultan and Dubai. The payment of Syrian army arrears have helped to boost the approval of the government in the Syrian army.

13. The Iraqi Regional Government of Kurdistan has reached an agreement with Iran whereby Iran provides food and water to the region in return for the construction of a gas spur from Iraqi Kurdistan into the Iranian pan-Asian gas network in the vicinity of Tabriz. This has increased the approval of the population of the Iraqi Kurdish authorities, leading to the unhappy face being removed. The situation of the Turkish Kurds has not improved.

14. In a supreme irony, funding for the gas spur was provided by the US through the IMF, which means that American entities have funded Iranian entities - in collusion with the Iraqi Central Bank - in contravention of US sanctions on Iran.

15. The unhappy faces at Dar az Zawi and in Iraqi Kurdistan have been removed. An additional unhappy face has been added to all existing unhappy faces where no effective action has been undertaken to remove them. The unhappy faces in Turkish Kurdistan (the 'Mountain Kurds') relate to the disapproval of the Kurdish politicians by this population. If we reach three unhappy faces, the players will start to have their ability to act constrained a little.

15. Crop yields have been falling of late, leading to a further increase in food prices across the region, coupled with far wider shortages of water. For those areas whose governments have not taken mitigation steps, popular discontent has started to surface in the form of unhappy faces. The mumblings and grumblings have started to translate into action. There is a pronounced drift of the population from the countryside into the cities. Discontent is growing and there is an expectation on the part of the more general populace that action will be taken to improve their lot, especially if unemployment is added to high food prices and hunger.

In the years 2036 to 2040, the price of oil falls from $81 a barrel to $79 a barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - Turn 2 (2030)

Having made their initial deployments, the players have used this starting point as a base from which to stretch out their gameplay in search of their objectives. It is interesting that both Iran and Saudi Arabia concentrated upon social and economic development in Turn 1, whilst the three minor players in the region - Syria, Iraq, and Kurdistan - had a focus upon political control. There is an inherent clash here that could well come to a head in Turn 2.

As a result of the game play, the following events were recorded:

1. We are now seeing the limit of the Biden Doctrine being tested in the Persian Gulf. The United States has committed to increase it's military footprint on the Gulf by starting to construct a base along the southern shores of the Persian Gulf, within Saudi Arabia. The new base, along with the existing bases, will be constructed to resist the worst effects of disruptive climate change. The US has deepened its ties with the nations along the south coast of the Persian Gulf.

2. Elsewhere, the US has increased the sale of arms to the government in Baghdad. This will be accompanied by the attendant training in their use and the tactics surrounding the use of the US arms. It has help to strengthen the prowess of the Iraqi federal forces.

3. Constitutional discussions continue in Iraq, but are proceeding at a slow pace. The key parties to the negotiations are the Federal Government and the Regional Government of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Regional Government of Iraqi Kurdistan had hoped to access money from the IMF, but had yet to receive support from either the Iraqi Central Bank (which is under the control of the Federal Government) or the United States, which would be needed to approve and underwrite such finance.

4. The situation in Syria has stabilised. The crackdown within the areas under governmental control has diminished, to be replaced by a more modest programme to counter local corruption. The arrears of army pay have been addressed. Whilst some arrears remain, morale amongst the Syrian forces has noticeably improved. The government has embarked on a programme of humanitarian assistance through the provision of basic healthcare and, more importantly, through subsidies of food purchases. These changes do not extend to areas sympathetic to the Syrian opposition. They have resulted in the unhappy face being removed from Damascus.

5. There is a persistent rumour that Syrian oil, out of the port of Tartus, is being exported in contravention to UN sanctions. American satellite imagery suggests that the oil is being transported in tankers under Russian flags and communications intercepts by GCHQ suggest that the destination ports for these vessels are in China.

6. Relations between Turkey and Syria have been improved. The long awaited Turkish embassy in Damascus has finally opened with a great fanfare. A Turkish cultural centre has been established in the embassy and seeks to enhance Turkish influence within the country.

7. Saudi Arabia continues to invest in green technology and to use that technology to bind the 'Arab Family' nations. This has met with a modicum of success on the southern side of the Persian Gulf, but has gained no real traction elsewhere. Saudi prestige has risen south of the Persian Gulf.

8. Iran has started to manufacture, under licence from a South African biotech firm, genetically modified wheat, barley and rice seeds, that are heat resistant and drought resistant. Utilising the irrigation resources available, food production has risen considerably to reach a position where Iran now has a food surplus. The lowering of internal food prices, derived from the agricultural bonanza, has increased the approval ratings of the government, resulting in happy faces being placed on the major population areas.

9. China has continued to build out it's hydrocarbon assets in Iran. Bandar Abbas is now linked to the pan-Asian overland gas network and Tehran is now linked to the pan-Asian oil network. At the request of the government of Iran, China has installed a series of shore to ship defence missiles in Bandar Abbas. These have a range of about 600 km.

10. The UN allowed the JCPOA to lapse in 2025. This means that Iran is now no longer sanctioned under UN mandate, but still faces US imposed sanctions, which remain in place. Rather grudgingly, European entities have complied with the US sanctions. As a response to this, Russia has sought to put together a regional security framework. Most interested parties have been invited, but to date, only Russia, China, and Iran have shown an interest in mutual co-operation. It is intended that this new framework will be the main security guarantor in the Persian Gulf.

11. Within this framework of co-operation, joint naval exercises are now regularly undertaken by Russian and Chinese naval forces, of carrier group strength, within the Persian Gulf. These use Iranian naval port facilities for re-supply. As part of this framework, China has also added a carrier group that is based in Pakistan, just outside of the entrance to the Straits of Hormuz.

12. China has decided to focus on the greening of the global economy. There has been a great deal of investment in Green Tech, with varying results in a number of areas. In order to control these developments, China has decided to restrict the export of processed rare earth elements to those nations it considers to be inimical to Chinese interests. The main targets for these restrictions are Japan and the United States, but they also have an impact upon the Saudi plans for a greening of the Arab economy.

Crop yields have been wavering of late, leading to an increase in food prices across the region, coupled with more general shortages of water. For those areas whose governments have not taken mitigation steps, popular discontent has started to surface in the form of unhappy faces. At the moment, these are mumblings and grumblings that have yet to threaten any regime. However, discontent is growing and there is an expectation on the part of the more general populace that action will be taken to improve their lot.

In the years 2031 to 2035, the price of oil rises from $75 a barrel to $81 a barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - Turn 1 (2025)

The first turn in any game is always a little tentative as the players get to grips with what they are supposed to be doing and as the relationships between the players start to form. The structure of the game channels players along a number of lines. This game was no different. The aim of the game was for China to build a transport and hydrocarbon corridor across the map. To do so, they would need the active co-operation of Iran, Russia, and Turkey, three nations whose objectives may not be necessarily aligned. Ranged against this is a Saudi Arabia looking to contain Iran, and seeking the assistance from a disengaging United States to do so. Caught between these forces are Iraq, Syria, and Kurdistan. The initial moves in Turn 1 followed more or less those lines.

The Kurdish regional government in Iraq sought to develop the Khor Mor gasfield and the Bina Bawi gasfield. These two gasfields were to be linked by a pipeline. This was largely achieved due to the provision of funding from the US. The intention was to export the gas, but no developmental pipework was undertaken to any of the export outlets in the region. The anticipated economic windfall failed to materialise and the hoped for gas revenues remain in the ground. In the process, Kurdish-US ties were strengthened, but an export route for Kurdish gas remains elusive. The Kurdish wealth and reputation has not been enhanced by more than a very slight degree.

Elsewhere in Iraq, the government in Baghdad continued to work upon delivering broader economic prosperity within the country. This was based upon the relatively high price of oil and the relative lack of volatility in the global energy markets. Oil and gas exports continue to grow, underpinning a wider expansion of the non-oil private sector, which has allowed a shrinkage in public sector employment. The relative prosperity has allowed the government to propose a conference to discuss constitutional reform in the near future.

Iraq has seen little attention from Iran to date, despite the running down of US base facilities in the Iraq. This is largely because Iran has focussed on internal economic development. A network of de-salination plants have been constructed along the Persian Gulf, using electricity from Iranian oil fired power plants and capital derived from the proceeds of Chinese involvement in the economic development of Iran. Associated with the de-salination plants is the construction of a network of water delivery pipelines to large centres of population and areas of high demand for agricultural irrigation.

This process has been enhanced through the involvement of Chinese entities in Iran. The surveyed BRI route has been built out. An accompanying oil pipeline has also been built. The gas route from Bandar Abbas to Tehran, via Eshfahan, has been surveyed and will be ready to build out at a later date. In 2024, a naval presence was initiated by the visit of a Chinese carrier group to various Iranian naval installations. A Russian naval group had been planned to take part in the exercises, but these plans didn't materialise. There are rumours of Chinese naval surveyors taking particular interest in the port facilities at Basheri.

The economic stimulus created by the construction work in Iran, along with the provision of water for human consumption and irrigation in agriculture has led to a rise in prosperity in Iran. As the economic situation has started to improve, a happy face has been placed on Tehran to demonstrate the growing public approval of the regime.

Russia had hoped that a degree of accommodation between the US and Iran over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action could be accomplished. This didn't happen. It acts as an impediment for the Russian plan to establish a new co-operative multilateral framework for the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Iran have made expressions of support for this move, but these have remained vague expressions rather than having anything tangible attached. The regional framework proposed by Russia is in it's early days and hasn't really got off the ground just yet.

Russia - along with Iran - continues to support the Syrian government in military terms. The Syrian government took steps to assert control over it's core areas in Syria with some degree of success. Whilst attempting to keep a focus on purely military targets, some civilian collateral casualties were inevitable, given the nature of the conflict. There has been a tightening of security restrictions within the area, which have proven to be rather unpopular. Whilst remaining loyal to the government, the control over movement exercised by Russian and Iranian military elements, and the sheer corruption of Syrian governmental elements, is embittering the Aalawite population. The loyal population has become deeply unhappy with the regime, which is reflected by an unhappy face in Damascus.

The Syrian economy continues to deteriorate. The sale of oil continues to be inhibited through the imposition of western sanctions on the regime. This continues to limit the amount of public funds available. There are persistent rumours of significant arrears in army pay. This will limit the effectiveness of the Syrian military in the coming years.

The Russian naval facilities at Tartus are now fully operational, allowing the re-supply, refuelling and re-arming of Russian naval warships of all categories in the Mediterranean.

An agreement of sorts has been reached between Syria and Turkey concerning their common border and their policy towards the Kurdish population of their respective nations. This has led to a degree of stability to northern Syria, but the promised Turkish embassy in Damascus has yet to be opened.

The focus of Turkish policy is presently to enhance the standing of the Turkic culture. A cultural centre was opened at Erzurum. It is hoped that this centre would provide a cultural focus point for co-operation in the Caspian and Black Sea basins, and provide a bridge between the Asian nations and Europe.

Saudi Arabia pressed ahead with plans to develop the city of NEOM. Eventually, this is planned to become an economic and educational centre and a focus for diplomacy within the 'Arab Family'. Investments have been made in the new green economy and a variety of emerging technologies. This cultural and environmental research centre is intended to act as a focus for Arabic culture within the region that enhances the influence of the Kingdom.

In the years 2026 to 2030, the price of oil rises from $70 a barrel to $75 a barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - The Starting Point In 2020

From the outset, we felt that the more interesting game for this region would be the continuation scenario. What would the Middle East look like if current trends and policies were to play out? Of course, this means that we have to highlight those trends and policies, convert them into player objectives, and see how they play out. 

There are three large geopolitical trends that influence this game. All of them occur at the level of civilisational conflict. First, there is the emergence of the 'Biden Doctrine', which we take to mean that the United States will no longer act as the global policeman and will not be the guarantor of peace in the world. Second, we have the expansion of Chinese influence across Asia through the BRI programme. Third, there is a drive from Russia to escape from the strategic encirclement achieved during the Cold War. 

These trends are reflected in the objectives of the three actors. The US was tasked with maintaining a degree of influence in the region, whilst also countering the expansion of Russian and Chinese influence. China was tasked with the expansion and building out of the BRI across the region, and Russia was tasked with acquiring warm water ports in Syria and Iran whilst providing assistance to Russian client states in the region.

We wanted to include a degree of co-operation between Russia and Saudi Arabia over the price of oil, which allowed us to access the overlay of regional conflict. Saudi Arabia was tasked with keeping the United States engaged in the region, as a counter to Iran, and using Saudi financial assets to maintain a degree of internal stability on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf. The regional and religious conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran gave us an ability to introduce a bit of tension within the game. Iran was tasked with developing its sale of hydrocarbons, internal development despite western sanctions, and becoming a nuclear state.

The potential for regional tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia also gave rise to the possibility of regional tension between Russia and Turkey. Turkey is an interesting case in hand. Formally part of the NATO infrastructure, Turkey has been drifting away from European influence in recent years and starting to embrace being an Asiatic nation. We assumed that this trend would continue and tasked Turkey with ensuring that she remained the Asian destination point for the BRI - largely through collaboration with Iran - and to secure the stability of the southern border by encouraging stability in Syria - this time, through collaboration with Russia - and by thwarting the national aspirations of the Kurds.

This final objective introduces quite well the local themes within the game. We represented two different types of state - the unitary (Syria) and the federal (Iraq). We wanted to explore these themes within the game. We did this by including the Kurdish element in Iraq, but by not including the opposition in Syria. The Iraqi government were tasked with holding the country together. This was despite a drive from the Iraqi Kurds for independence and despite a high degree of Iranian influence in eastern Iraq. The Kurdish element was tasked with achieving national sovereignty, but across Iraqi Kurdistan, Iranian Kurdistan, and Turkish Kurdistan. Syria, on the other hand, was tasked with holding the country together by maintaining the support of the Russian elements and by restricting an expansion of Saudi influence.

By 2020, much of the core infrastructure in the region was in place. However, we felt that the impact of a changing climate ought to have a sharper focus in the game, so we highlighted the development of resources to mitigate the impact of a changing climate - mainly water and food resources. We felt that we had scope to make the changing climate more of a factor than in previous games. This would have an impact upon society throughout the region and become a consequential driver of politics. Everything was set up for a collision of interests within the region. What would the players make of it?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Introducing Xi Turns West

We naturally tend to focus on the expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia. This is an area that is contiguous with the external borders of China and it seems natural that this is to where our attention ought to be paid. In doing this, we naturally gravitate towards considering the relationship between China and Russia in Asia, to the neglect of other areas in which points of contact are made. This may be a mistake.

The BRI provides a grand geopolitical narrative for Chinese foreign policy out to the middle of this century. It is vast in its scope and ambition, which is nothing less than to bring the Eurasian landmass - the 'Heartland' of Mackinder - under Chinese dominion. In true Chinese diplomatic style, which goes back over three millennia, the aim is dominance rather than conquest. It is an expression through the soft power of commerce, trade, and diplomacy; rather than the hard power of military ambition and force. In this, it is distinctly Asian rather than European.

One neglected aspect of the declared plans for the BRI is the southern route - from Central Asia, south of the Caspian Sea, across the Middle East, and thence over the Mediterranean into Europe. The purpose of this game was to examine the challenges associated with achieving this ambition.

One of the more striking aspects of designing a game around this question is the degree to which a large number of layers of conflict can be found in a small space. That influenced our game design. We constructed a game that had four layers of conflict - the civilisational, the religious, the regional, and the local. Each layer had a dimension within the game, and each added a layer of complexity to the game.

At the civilisational level, the Middle East has the potential to see the approach of western civilisation - as championed by the United States - come into direct contact with the approach of the Chinese civilisation. We slotted into the game assumptions about the 'Biden Doctrine', which, admittedly, is in formation, that the United States will no longer act as the global policeman and that America no longer is willing to provide unconditional support to regimes that do not contain core US interests. This could create a power vacuum into which China could expand.

We decided to include Russia at the civilisational level. It could be argued that Russia is not quite a civilisational state in that it does not represent a way of life. However, we wanted to explore the relationship between China and Russia, and the Middle East provides a nice point of contact in which to do so. In previous games, Russia came out as the junior partner to China by 2050. We wanted to tease out the possibility that this may not be so and the game was designed to give Russia a more equal footing with China. It represents our view that if this happens anywhere, it will happen in the Middle East, which is a core territory for Russia, and which is vital to the plans for the BRI.

We placed China and Russia as broadly co-operative powers. On top of this lies the great religious struggle of the first half of the twenty-first century: that between Iran and Saudi Arabia. We added this dimension to the game, but we placed both powers as representing a more modern approach to Islam. History and geography allowed us to align Iran with China and Russia, and Saudi Arabia with the United States. These would provide the civilisational underpinnings to the religious conflict.

We also wanted to capture some of the regional rivalries. Within the dimension of the religious conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, we added the more regional actors of Turkey and Russia. These are potential rivals across the Black Sea. In order to roll out the BRI, China needs both Russia and Turkey to lay aside their regional differences. Turkey has been inclined more towards Europe and North America in the past, but this is now changing. Rebuffed by Europe and spurned by America, Turkey is now in the process of turning more towards Asia, with a little encouragement - and development funds without conditions - from China. We wanted to encourage this process and nudged the game into greater co-operation between Turkey, Russia, and Iran. This had the potential to act as something of a check to Saudi ambitions in the region.

These ambitions would have been felt at a local level. On this level, we wanted to examine a unitary Syria, largely backed by Russia and Iran, against a federal Iraq, largely backed by the United States and Saudi Arabia. We tested the federal nature of Iraq by giving voice - backed by Iran - to the aspirations of Kurdistan. That provided the final element in a very confused - and confusing - game.

The game was designed to represent the period 2020 to 2050, with six turns of five years duration each. The umpire team would represent a worsening climate, the energy markets, the bond markets, and all other countries not represented by players in the game. It was hard to decide who to leave out. We had a great deal of discussion about the exclusion of Israel in the game. However, the impact of Israel upon the BRI is fairly minimal, even if they are a large player in the Middle East, which we felt justified the exclusion. With nine players and three umpires, we felt that the game had the potential to become unmanageable, so we set the limit, for good and for ill, where it was.

Once we had the basic game structure, the next task was to design the opening positions for each of the nine actors. We shall turn to this in our next post.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

A buyer's guide to foresight.

"How do I know that it works?", is a common objection encountered by many foresight practitioners. In order to counter that objection, it would be helpful to be able to demonstrate to potential clients examples of where foresight has worked in the past and to explain how it could well work in the future. To do this, we need some form of framework that allows us to compare what was expected from a foresight project against what it actually delivered.

We can do this within three contexts. First, before a specific project is commissioned - almost as a feasibility project that explores the proof of concept. In this respect, the framework can act as a template for building a project at the conceptual stage. This is an ex ante foresight evaluation. Second, after project has been delivered, we can use the framework to explore how well the project performed against expectations, assess whether or not the project delivered value for money, and review how convincing we find the conclusions of the project. This is ex post foresight evaluation. Third, in between the start and the finish of a project, we can use the framework to evaluate the progress of a project. This is more of a management tool to either keep the project running to plan, or to change the plan because it is no longer appropriate. This is process foresight evaluation. 

While each of these contexts has a different purpose, the general use of the framework is broadly applicable to each of them. In this piece, I shall focus mainly on ex ante foresight evaluation. In following work, I will develop the theme a bit more to apply it to ex post foresight evaluation and to process foresight evaluation.

When constructing a foresight project, we need to be mindful of three things - the shape of the project (which is the larger decision frame), the depth of the project, and the staffing of the project. I should say at the outset that different practitioners have their own favourite frameworks that determine the shape of a project. No single framework is inherently better than another, they merely reflect the mode of thinking about strategic foresight by that particular practitioner. It reflects where they learned their trade, which elements they think are more important, and, to a certain degree, their attitude towards the future.

For my part, I prefer the framework set out in Andy Hines and Peter Bishop's 'Thinking About The Future'. As I said, there are other frameworks that are equally as useful, but we have been using this one for nearly two decades and it is as valid today as it was nearly 20 years ago. The framework breaks the process of foresight into six elements - Framing (working out what the foresight project is looking to achieve); Scanning (looking at what is happening within the decision frame); Forecasting (rolling forward the scanning into the future); Visioning (examining alternative futures within the decision frame); Planning (turning the abstractions of the visioning into things that could be done); and Acting (determining a course of action and then executing it). 

It should be said that the elements within the framework make no reference to the tools and techniques of foresight. These naturally help to gravitate the practitioner to one particular element. For example, the much used 2x2 matrix can be quite useful in the visioning process in teasing out alternative futures. It can also help in the planning stage, when competing alternatives are the focus of concern. Equally, the 3 Horizons model can serve in the framing process as it helps us to clarify what it is that we are looking at. It also serves well in the scanning and forecasting element, where we need to set a temporal dimension to the project.

It also has to be said that different projects might want to give differing emphases on different elements. For example, if the emphasis of the project is to explore possibilities for the future, then it might want to focus more upon the scanning and forecasting elements, even at the cost of not really coming to grips with the acting element. Alternatively, if the project is happy to have external visioning as an input in order to focus on planning and acting, then a consequence of that decision will be to accept the assumptions about the future that are baked into that external input. It is important to note that those undertaking the project do not have to undertake each element themselves. However, a well balanced project would contain each of the elements.

Once we have set out the foresight framework we are to be using, we then have to give some consideration to the depth of investigation we need to undertake. There is a model that we can use to help us here. The Foresight Maturity Model was developed to work in tandem with the Foresight Framework. It sets out five levels of depth to which a project can aspire. These are: Ad Hoc (this is a cursory review of the issue); Aware (where the review is more than superficial); Capable (where the a degree of consistency has been developed within the foresight capability); Mature (where a degree of advanced practice has been developed); and World Class (where the project might be considered a leader in the area). 

Needless to say, whilst we all might want to undertake world class work, this does have a budgetary implication. It is generally the case that the more depth that is given to a project, the more cost will be attached to it. It can be a delicate process of scaling back ambitions to fit the budget available. One way of squaring the circle could be to trim back the ambitions with regards to the framework to be used. This reflects a process of finding a compromise between competing alternatives. For example, if we trim back the trend analysis in our scanning, could we use that budget to push the result from capable to mature? Or if we used a set of external visions, could we use the budget saved to enhance the results from ad hoc to aware? These are the trade offs that the framework can inform. They set out the range of choices that are open to a project.

As most projects are labour intensive, the cost of staffing a project provides the third dimension to constructing a foresight project. Fortunately, there is a model that we can graft on top of the Foresight Framework and the Foresight Maturity Model - the Foresight Competency Model. This model establishes professional competence in three levels - Entry Level (someone starting to learn the craft); Associate Level (someone with a degree of technical competence); and Senior Level (someone technically competent and able to instruct others). 

Once again, there is a degree of trade off between seniority and cost. Whilst we may want a project to be undertaken by people at the senior level alone, we have to accept that as seniority rises, so does the daily fee rate which they can command. There has to be a certain degree of trade off between the staff cost of the project and the budget of the project. The preceding two steps can help to inform us in this area. If we are considering a part of the foresight framework that we don't find particularly compelling, and if we do not intend to go too deep into this area, then do we really need to hire someone especially senior on this aspect of the project? All foresight projects have to trim themselves to fit the resources available. This approach allows us to do this in a reasonably systematic way.

The three components are all designed to telescope into each other. The foresight framework is designed to answer questions such as what are we looking at? Over what time horizon? With what purpose? Using what tools and techniques? The foresight maturity model is designed to carry forward that discussion onto the depth of study we wish to undertake. It also starts to place a degree of resistance, normally in terms of a budgetary constraint, to our ambitions. Finally, the foresight competency model starts to address the question of who is to do what within the project. This will bring the question of cost to the front of the project planning exercise.

So far, we have discussed this in terms of ex ante foresight evaluation. The same structure, after the project has ended, can be turned around to consider the delivery of the project in terms of an ex post foresight evaluation. It also can be used to assess whether a project under way is still worth undertaking or needs some changes in an exercise of process foresight evaluation. The detail to all of this framework needs to be specified further, but is does provide the first steps towards a buyer's guide to foresight.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2021