Ought Taiwan To Be Concerned By Events In Ukraine?

Taipei recently suffered a power outage. Such is the uncertain nature of the world at the moment that our first thoughts were around the possibility of a Chinese cyber-attack on Taiwanese critical infrastructure. Was this the prelude to an invasion? No, it was simply an outage in power supply. However, it does underline how events in Ukraine can have a knock on effect elsewhere in the world. What exactly are the repercussions for Taiwan after the Russian invasion of Ukraine? Why are we nervous at this particular time? And what are the prospects for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan?

From a Chinese perspective, the Russian invasion of Ukraine offers a number of points to consider. They fall along two lines - the prosecution of the military campaign by Russia and the reaction of the US and other western allies, especially of NATO. The military campaign has appeared to have stalled in the first two weeks. This could be deliberate on the part of the Russian forces - they may be waiting for better ground over which to advance their motorised vehicles. It could possibly be the result of limited Russian war aims, although this seems unlikely. Or it could be the result of poor military planning and issues around logistics and re-supply. In the weeks to come, we shall find out which is which. For now, the war has assumed a character of the medieval - slow paced, siege operations, and a high degree of brutality inflicted upon the civilian population.

What have been effective in Ukraine are portable, hand held, anti-armoured vehicle and anti-aircraft missiles. This is not too surprising. These weapons were effective in Afghanistan against first Russian and then against NATO and American targets. The nature of potential Chinese operations in Taiwan - sea-borne and air-borne assault - does suggest what is known as a 'target rich environment'. It is true that China would be able to access overwhelming force, but the ability to deploy it is entirely a different matter. The lesson in Ukraine suggests, so far, that the balance has shifted to the defence and away from the attack. This increases the potential price of initial military action and the costs of occupation.

One factor that must weigh heavily in Beijing is the political cost of failure. If China were to attack Taiwan and fail to achieve the military aims, would the current regime survive? Would the present leadership be replaced by a different set of leaders? Or would this be a signal to replace the Communist Party of China altogether? These are very high stakes indeed. Reflecting this point onto the war in Ukraine, could we be seeing the endgame for President Putin?

The response of the US and European allies has been to detach Russia from the global economy. We have yet to see how successful that will be. Russia has not been abandoned by its Asian allies - China, Iran, and India - but the sanctions have started to have an impact. Since 2014, President Putin has focussed on building a siege economy that is disconnected from the global economy to a larger extent. We shall now see how successful that policy will be. The freezing and seizure of Russian assets in Europe and America has changed the game somewhat. It is inconceivable the China isn't taking note here.

For decades China has recycled its trade surpluses into US Treasury bonds. If these can be frozen and seized at short notice, that suggests that America is an unreliable partner to financial counter-parties. For the last five years, we have seen China re-cycling the US Treasury holdings into US Dollar loans to emerging nations. That process is likely to accelerate in order for China to diversify the overseas portfolio away from the US. It will lessen Chinese vulnerability to the US seizure of Chinese financial assets in the US. However, it has a knock on effect that might ultimately act to the detriment of America. If the US gains a reputation for being an unreliable banker - limiting convertibility, refusing repayment, seizing assets in custody - then the US will lose it's appeal as an international financial safe haven. This will hasten the decline of the US Dollar as the global reserve currency.

China has seen this and has acted in two ways. The first is a policy of increasing self-reliance. Whilst not a fully fledged siege economy in the style of Russia, China has followed a policy of dual circulation, which draws a distinction between the economy at home and the economy abroad. The former has been developed, whilst the latter has taken on a more strategic dimension in recent years. Allied to this is the second core policy, that of restricting the convertibility of the Renminbi. China's financial system is not sufficiently robust for the Renminbi to develop into a fully fledged reserve currency. Whether it ever will is an interesting question. For now, China is content to allow the US Dollar to retain that status.

America, by following a policy of containment and disengagement, is supporting the process of dual circulation. By distancing itself from China, the US is facilitating the process whereby China - and the inner core of nations over which it has influence - become largely self-sufficient and only has contact with the world outside of its sphere of influence for trade. That trade is normally on its own terms. This is where Russia has aspired to be prior to the war in Ukraine. The downstream effectiveness of this policy is now unfolding before us. I would imagine that Beijing is watching very closely.

Turning back to Taiwan, if we have a China that is largely disengaged from the process of globalisation, either as the result of Chinese policy or American diplomacy, then Taipei ought to be concerned by events in Ukraine. However, there are two factors working against this. First, the policy of dual circulation may not be effective. It may be impossible for China to completely disentangle itself from the global economy. To that extent, there will remain sensitive points where sanctions against China could have some impact. Second, a military campaign against Taiwan might not be successful. Indeed, the failure of that campaign might herald more radical changes on the mainland.

In the past, the Chinese leadership have been aware of the risks involved over Taiwan. This has led them to be cautious, even in the face of a perceived weak and ineffective US President. Even if Ukraine proves to be an absolute disaster for the US and NATO, that still may not encourage China to become adventurous in Taiwan. When given the choice, China prefer to stick rather than twist.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Is A New Heartland Emerging?

The concept of the Heartland is usually associated with Halford Mackinder. Mackinder, an Edwardian geographer, suggested that the bulk of the Eurasian landmass could dominate world history and that the core of that landmass constitutes the 'Pivot of History'. He pointed to the development of technologies of integration - the railways, the telegraph, road transportation improvements - to support his thesis. His geopolitical contention was that if an integrated core could develop, it would dominate the world.

Subsequent events showed the thesis to be flawed. The maritime powers - first Great Britain and then the United States - came to dominate the twentieth century. The Heartland fell into relative backwardness as sea power came to dominate land power. The core proposition of the thesis - that the key to world dominance was to control Eastern Europe - proved to be flawed as the Austro-Hungarian, Nazi German, and Soviet Russian empires all collapsed despite controlling Eastern Europe. It was the maritime powers and the powers of the European 'Rimland' that dominated the twentieth century.

Events in the twenty-first century could run somewhat differently. The first quarter of the century has been dominated by the rise of China. Despite ambitions in the South China Sea, China has shown itself to be more of a land power than a maritime one. The expansion of Chinese influence through the keystone of the BRI programme has been directed towards growing her land power rather than sea power. Observers in the west have focussed upon the expansion of the Chinese navy, but this may prove to be something of a misdirection because the focus of Chinese investment has been upon developing land routes between the Far East and both Europe and Africa.

We consider these to be important developments, into which we have put some effort in gaming. There have been three areas of our gaming focus so far - the Arctic, Central Asia, and the Middle East. In Mackinder's day, the Arctic was written off as inaccessible. With the climate warming, the Arctic ice cover is melting, giving rise to the Arctic Ocean becoming a transit route between the Far East and both Europe and the North American seaboard. This is a possibility for the future. For the present, there are the tangible trade routes across Central Asia and the Middle East into Europe. This has been the focus of Chinese investment.

As a fact of geography, the Caspian Sea causes the rail and road corridors from China to pass first through Central Asia, and then either through Russia and on to Europe, or through Iran and Turkey into Europe. This would naturally suggest that relations between China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey are of relative importance. These commercial factors that pull the four together have been enhanced by the actions of the United States and the European nations.

A growing hostility towards China on the part of America and Europe could have left China rather isolated. Instead, a confrontational approach to Russia has forced both China and Russia to share a number of common interests. This confrontational approach has been extended to Iran over the use of nuclear technology, again acting as a stimulus for closer relations between China, Russia, and Iran. Turkey is a slightly different case. For over two decades Europe has held out to Turkey the prospect of joining the EU. This prospect has come to nothing and Turkey now realises this. In a national re-appraisal, Turkey has decided to become more of an Asian nation and less of a European one. This, accompanied by a degree of antipathy from the US, has guided Turkey into the orbit of China.

The prospect of stronger ties between China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey in the years ahead naturally leads us back to Mackinder's Heartland Theory. Could this grouping of powers come to dominate the world? If so, what could possibly prevent it? As things stand, both Russia, Iran, and Turkey are becoming more assertive about their interests. The response of the US and Europe is an ever growing array of sanctions. However, given the size of China in the global economy, sanctions need the co-operation of China to be fully effective. A point in time is coming where it would be advantageous for China, Russia, and Iran to develop an alternative financial framework using a currency other than the US Dollar. This would be a pivotal moment, and in the absence of a degree of renewal of the West, it would signify the growing dominance of the Heartland powers.

What could be the basis of western renewal? The single word answer is 'productivity'! The basis for the growth in Chinese power, which underwrites the BRI and the development of the Heartland, is economic development as a global power. Europe and North America does not have a large pool of unproductive labour on which to draw, but they could leverage such pools on the Indian Sub-Continent and Africa. Interestingly enough, China is doing exactly this in Pakistan and various African nations. In this world, if Europe and North America continue to be inward looking and self-absorbed, it will be at their cost in the longer term. It is certainly the trajectory on which they are currently travelling.

There is a strong argument that a new Heartland is emerging. Driven by China, with the active support of Russia, Iran, and Turkey, it is likely to be a feature of the twenty-first century. Exactly how Europe and North America responds to this will shape our common futures. At present, the new Heartland appears to be in the ascendant.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - The Lessons Learned

At the end of a game that has been designed, nurtured, and umpired, it is useful to sit back and reflect on the lessons we have learned from it. There are two dimensions to this. What lessons of game design stand out? And what lessons about the subject matter stand out? In this case, the former question is just as useful as the latter. Normally, we ask what a game has taught us from the perspective of the subject matter. However, in this case, because we were trying to do things that were new to us, it is also worth spending time on the structure of the game design.

The most significant observation made to us was that China rather had an easy time of it within the game. The United States was unable to leverage an effective degree of opposition to Chinese ambitions in the region. Part of this may be down to gameplay, but far more of it would be down to the case that a disengaged America has far fewer assets to play with in the region. The United States could have orchestrated Saudi resistance to Iran, especially in Syria, as a means to counteracting Russian influence, but there was very little incentive for Saudi Arabia to adopt that cause.

The Chinese objectives were fairly straightforward - build a railroad. To achieve this, as a matter of game design, China needed to orchestrate Iran, Russia, and Turkey. This happened in the game because the priorities of the players were reasonably aligned. However, what options to China were available if, say, Turkey decided to look west rather than east? A renewed Turkish commitment to NATO would certainly have altered the calculations of the BRI. Perhaps this could have been encouraged by exacerbating Turkish suspicions over Russian intentions in the region? That's an interesting possibility that could be explored in future runs of the game.

Within the game, Iran wasn't a particularly aggressive regional player. This was more gameplay than game structure because the Iranian player had the opportunity to be more aggressive in their approach, but decided not to be. Boosting the Iranian economy and strengthening Iranian civil society meant that Iran was fairly secure internally. By courting China and Russia, Iran achieved a degree of external security as well. As interesting point of uncertainty concerns what could have happened had Iran been more aggressive over, say, the partition of Iraq? By 2050, Iran controlled much of eastern Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. It is interesting to speculate on how relations with Turkey would have resulted had Iran been more expansionary within the region. Would Turkey have allowed this?

What we did see is the rise of Iran from being a local actor to being one with a far larger regional footprint. As the custodian of the Shia inheritance, Iran counter-balanced the Sunni guarantor - Saudi Arabia - quite well. We didn't write too much of this conflict into the game and it didn't reveal itself as part of the gameplay either. In this sense, this aspect of the game remained quite underdeveloped. In future run throughs, perhaps this aspect could be brought into stronger focus?

The game was designed to explore some aspects of unitary government - as opposed to federal government - within the region. Unsurprisingly, we found that unitary government in conjunction with strong backers gave a more stable result than a federal structure without any strong focussed backing. Syria, with the backing of Iran and Russia, fared a lot better than Iraq, which received the lukewarm support of a largely disengaged United States. The disengagement of America created a power vacuum into which China expanded her influence, Iran extended her control of the region, and the Kurds had a go at forming an independent Kurdistan. In this sense, the game achieved the result that had been baked into the design of the game. However, are we convinced by the outcome?

That raises the broader question of how satisfied we might be with the results of the game? We were quite pleased to see that a US withdrawal from the region created a power vacuum into which Chinese influence flowed. The main beneficiary of this was Iran. The way the BRI is structured, China plans to exert influence over a territory rather than occupying it, which means that China is always in need of local partners. The ascendancy of Iran fits this role very well. We found this aspect of the game to be quite convincing.

Hanging around that were the responses of Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. The protection of China helped the relationship between Russia and Iran. Chinese and Russian interests were reasonably well aligned as time wore on. We found this convincing. The game didn't expose the fragility of western sanctions in the face of Chinese support, which is something we would have liked to see develop. It would have provided an alternative financial and commercial structure into which Syria and Kurdistan could well have played. There is also sufficient scope to draw Turkey into such a framework.

To do so would have given Saudi Arabia an awkward choice. On the one hand, Saudi policy could remain wedded to the present structures - deeply engaged with the US and underwriting the Arabic world. On the other hand, with the US disengaging in the region, retreating into a core heartland south of the Persian Gulf and allowing Iran, more or less, a free hand north of it. Whilst not entirely convinced by this outcome, it does, at least, seem plausible.

The game generated an interesting vision of the region in 2050. The currents are incredibly complex and there are many moving parts, so we are uncertain that we generated a stable baseline for exploring the future of this region. It feels as if the same game played again would generate entirely different results. This is probably a good thing because it does speak to the complexity and instability of the region. However, of one thing we are certain, if the BRI is to extend south of the Caspian Sea, China will have to impose some sort of order to the region. That alone makes the game both interesting and important.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - The Outcomes

Control of Syria 2050

In the framework we followed during the game, we allowed a week to pass between each turn being declared. This gave the players ample time to work upon a collective approach to various issues as they arose, to hammer out agreements between themselves, and to reflect upon how they were progressing in relation to their objectives. At the end of Turn 6, we gave everyone a period of reflection before bringing together a final wash up session to consider the degree to which they achieved - or otherwise - their objectives. The umpires would also undertake this exercise separately, and the notes between the two groups would be compared at that point. Where they agreed, we would pass on. Where they differed, or where they threw out an interesting point, we would go back over the assessment as a research point.

The United States was tasked with maintaining the US bases and extending the presence in the region, checking and countering Russian and Chinese ambitions, and ensuring that Iran remained isolated and failed in the economic development of its territorial area. There were mixed views over the US presence in the region. On the one hand, the number of bases increased. On the other hand, America was unable to counter China, Russia, and Iran in the region. One research point that did arise was the difference between presence - in the form of bases - and influence - the ability to direct and control events. This spoke to the 'Biden Doctrine' as it emerged in the early stages. It was felt that this might not lead to stable outcomes.

Russia had three objectives: to acquire port facilities on the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean Sea, to support Russian and Chinese commercial ambitions whilst increasing Russian military and diplomatic influence in the region, and to ensure that a good working relationship with Saudi Arabia is maintained to manage the price of oil. It was felt that the first two objectives had been achieved, but there was uncertainty over the relationship between Russia and Saudi Arabia. In the game, the price of oil didn't become a factor, so that issue wasn't really tested.

China was tasked with building out the BRI transport corridor across the region, securing port facilities at Bandar Abbas and Basheri and assisting Russia and Iran in evading western sanctions. It was felt that the transport corridors had been built out, the port facilities were largely acquired, but the evasion of western sanctions hadn't quite gone far enough. China had a fairly free run in the construction of the physical infrastructure, but the attendant financial and commercial infrastructure remained largely in western hands.

Saudi Arabia was challenged to contain Iran throughout the region, ensuring that the US maintained the present number of military bases on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf, and used Saudi financial and hydrocarbon assets to secure stability within the region. It was felt that Saudi Arabia hadn't managed to help to contain Iran, but had managed to keep the US engaged and had secured stability on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf. Beyond that, Saudi influence was very limited.

Iran, on the other hand, was asked to fully circumvent western imposed sanctions on both goods and access to capital markets, to sell hydrocarbons directly overland to China, and to have developed fully functioning nuclear weapons. Iran did acquire nuclear weapons and did sell hydrocarbons overland to China, but didn't fully circumvent western imposed sanctions. Two questions arose over the Iranian gameplay. The first was the degree to which the Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would trigger a response from the rest of the world. In the game, there was very little response. Second, to what extent would the gameplay be different if we included a Peak Oil scenario? These are interesting questions that warrant further thought.

Onto this complexity we need to add Turkey. Turkey was charged with developing a deeper relationship with Chinese commercial interests, ensuring that the BRI is fully built out in the region, ensuring that Kurdish national aspirations are thwarted, and securing the stability of the southern border with Syria. It was felt that Turkey had developed a deeper relationship with China, but hadn't managed to fully thwart Kurdish national aspirations and probably had helped to secure the border with Syria.

Syria itself was tasked with ensuring that the Russia remained engaged in Syria and continued to offer a security guarantee, ensuring that good relations are maintained with the regional powers of Turkey and Iran, whilst limiting the influence of Saudi Arabia, and ensuring that Kurdish aspirations for nationhood were frustrated. By and large, Syria did manage to maintain good relations with Russia, Turkey, and Iran, who together managed to maintain the unitary state in Syria. Kurdish national aspirations didn't gain a foothold in Syria, but weren't frustrated either.

Kurdish aspirations made the greatest progress in Iraq. The Iraqi Federal Government was asked to ensure that the US remained engaged in Iraq, to ensure that good relations were maintained with the regional powers, and that Kurdish aspirations for nationhood were frustrated with Kurdish gains in the federal constitution being rolled back. By and large, Iraq failed in these objectives. The United States remained engaged, but with much reduced support and influence. By 2050 Iran had become more bellicose towards Iraq and had a greater influence in Iraqi affairs than America. The regional powers were content to allow this to happen and the Iraqi Kurds had declared themselves an independent nation.

This was core to the Kurdistan game play. Kurdistan was tasked with ensuring that the wider Kurdistan achieves independent nationhood, that the newly formed Kurdistan receives a security guarantee from both the United States and Russia, and that Kurdistan is placed along the BRI and receives developmental support from China. Whilst some progress was made along these lines, the objectives had by no means been achieved by 2050. It did allow us to focus on what an independent Kurdistan might look like. It certainly gave us a feel for the difficulties that could arise from such a change and would merit further consideration in the future.

All in all the game was a mixed bag. Many of the objectives were zero sum, which meant that those who achieved their objectives would naturally prevent others from doing so. Looking at the outcome overall, a number of research points stand out:

1. The biggest question coming from the game was the extent to which the 'Biden Doctrine' - which we accept is emerging and not fully formed - could be a stable basis for long term policy. The US withdrawal from the northern side of the Persian Gulf rather leaves the region open to Russian and Chinese influence. Could that really happen?

2. The game assumed that Russia still covets warm water ports - on the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea. How realistic is that assumption? To what extent would that remain dependent upon Chinese largesse?

3. At the start of the game, we would have predicted that Iran would end the game as the principal Chinese ally in the region. It was no surprise to find this the case. However, there was little push back within the game to the growing relationship between the two, especially when China approved the Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. Would China really accept a nuclear Iran just to get the railroad built?

4. The game play touched upon western sanctions in a number of places. These weren't given a sharper focus within the game, but they did raise the question of effectiveness and the degree to which their use gives rise to an incentive to develop an alternative financial architecture. The game was ready for this - a Chinese, Russian, and Iranian financial infrastructure to challenge the present North American/ European one. The game missed this aspect, which is worth further consideration.

5. The issue of Kurdistan, especially in the context of Iraq, gave rise to a number of questions about nationhood and independence in the region. The game suggested that national aspirations could not be met within the confines of the present arrangements. If these are not stable, then we can expect to see further outbreaks of instability within the region. If the United States is not prepared to maintain the present world order, then might we see a new, possibly Chinese, one?

These are some of the questions we were left with at the end of the game. The game itself didn't provide answers to these questions, but they are worthy of further study. In some respects, they have helped to uncover the 'known unknowns'. We know what we don't know. Surely that has to be a step forward?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - Turn 6 (2050)

Turn 6 started with a great deal of uncertainty - would the United States risk military action in the Persian Gulf to degrade the threat from a nuclear armed Iran? At this point the game started to become very interesting. The military option was on the table, but it would involve considerable risk. It was possible to engineer a confrontation indirectly through the use of Saudi Arabia as a proxy and within the confines of Syria as a common battleground. However, to do so would leave the arena open to China. Which adversary would America see as the greater? 

As a result of the game play, the following events were recorded:

1. The United States has launched a global initiative - Silver and Green - aimed at enhancing diplomatic, economic, and environmental policies. Overtures have been made to a number of countries, but to date only Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kurdistan have opted to join. The membership of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria is under discussion. The initiative has a security dimension to it and offers an alternative to the BRI.

2. Russia seeks to maintain a degree of stability in the Middle East through the existing relationships, but it is unclear exactly what these are. There are numerous reports in the western press questioning the GSCO, the membership of which seems rather unclear. As part of this policy, and to deter any possible attacks, the missile defence screen at Basheri will be maintained and upgraded and Russia has engaged with China, Iran, and other partners in the Persian Gulf. On the diplomatic front, Russia has reached out to Saudi Arabia and other regional actors to assure them of the Iranian intentions to only use their nuclear weapons for defensive purposes.

3. China, being mindful of the recent reports from seismologists, has focussed on the strengthening and reinforcement of the BRI physical and digital infrastructure. This has involved the reinforcement of bridges, the shoring up of embankments, and the upgrading of digital systems. The focus of this upgrading work has been the route from Central Asia to Turkey.

4. Diplomatically, China has provided support to the GSCO and to enhance the Turkish Union proposed by Turkey. There have been some critics of the GSCO in the western press concerning that lack of transparency over membership and the terms by which nations have joined the GSCO. China has used its financial resources within the BRI framework in Central Asia to support the development of the Turkish Union in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

5. Chinese policy towards Syria has changed. Following on from potential Syrian overtures to the United States, China has significantly reduced the amount of oil purchased on the black market from Syria, leading to a significant fall in revenue for the Syrian government. At the same time, the operation of the rail link between Erzurum and Damascus, including the spur to Tartus, has been experiencing acute operational difficulties. Staff have been absent in large numbers, rolling stock has been unavailable due to use elsewhere on the BRI network, and essential maintenance has been delayed by a shortage of parts. This has significantly reduced the traffic on the Syrian rail network, has introduced supply problems to the Russian naval facility in Tartus, and has degraded the functioning of the transport network.

6. Iran has intensified its policy of distributing humanitarian aid through the Revolutionary Guard across the region. This has had an effect to tighten the grip of the Revolutionary Guard over local Shia populations within Syria, Iraq, and Kurdistan. Many Shia citizens in these countries now look to Tehran for leadership rather than towards their local regimes.

7. Turkey, with the help of China, has extended the reality of the Turkish Union and now exerts considerable influence over Azerbaijan (part of Trans Caucasus on the map) and Turkmenistan (part of Central Asia on the map). This allows Turkey to position itself as a bridge between China and Europe and to provide an exemplar of how a more secular form of Islam might take shape. This helps to enhance the relationship between Turkey and Iran.

8. Saudi Arabia continues to seek to lead the Arabic world through the provision of humanitarian aid across the Persian Gulf. Stability on the southern shore of the Persian Gulf is maintained through funding and material aid, although the local Shia majorities still feel oppressed by the local Sunni rulers. Saudi Arabia makes some headway in gaining influence in western Iraq and eastern Syria, where the local Sunni communities are suffering from the neglect of their respective governments.

9. Saudi Arabia has suggested a peace conference across the Arab world, involving Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Kurdistan, with the US as an observer, to find a common pathway to counter the growth of Iranian influence. To date, only the US and Jordan have shown an interest in the initiative.

10. Iraq starts to negotiate a trilateral treaty with Turkey and Syria for peace and the security of water rights. Turkey and Syria are sympathetic to such an arrangement but the fine details have yet to be announced. There is a question over whether or not this is part of the GSCO, which needs to be determined in the future.

11. The local Shia Imams in southern Iraq continue to preach against the government in Baghdad. The result of this has been a strike of all workers in southern Iraq in the hydrocarbon industries. Material assistance - food, water, and money - has been provided to the striking workers by local actors who are influenced by Iranian elements. The result of this strike is that Iraqi hydrocarbon exports through Um Qsr have largely ceased, depriving the Iraqi government of a significant source of income. An additional unhappy face has been added to Baghdad.

12. The government of Syria has sought to extend its influence across the country. This has largely been unsuccessful owing to the collapse in oil revenues originated from China, combined with having to pay the charter fees to the Russian tankers available to transport the oil to the Far East. Arrears in army pay have increased. Humanitarian assistance is now largely provided through the agency of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, whose control of the country has tightened. As a result of the deteriorating situation, unhappy faces have been placed on Damascus and Aleppo.

13. Kurdistan seeks to reaffirm it's status as an independent nation. An application to join the UN was vetoed by Russia. Kurdistan seeks to bolster its defences against a potential incursion from Iraq or Turkey. Unhappily, this hasn't quite gone to plan. In response to Kurdish overtures to the United States, China has persuaded Iran to diminish the material support given to the Kurdish government. The gas spur line remains open, but gas sales are much diminished and payment is erratic. Iran has imposed a degree of food and water rationing upon Kurdistan, which is enforced by the Revolutionary Guard, who are now a much stronger presence in the country. The result has been a sharp increase in unemployment, poverty and hunger, leading to an unhappy face being added to Mosul.

It is at this point that we leave the game. It paints an interesting picture for us, with the United States retreating to the southern shores of the Persian Gulf. American influence has declined in the three decades covered by the game, just as that of China and Iran has increased. Turkey and Russia are jostling to increase their influence in Central Asia, whilst Saudi Arabia has become quite withdrawn. The regime in Syria continues to survive, as does that in Iraq. Kurdistan has made an attempt at gaining independence, but that hasn't been wholly successful. This is the result of the gameplay, is it what the players intended?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - Iranian Security Briefing 2045

Control of Iraq 2045

In 2045, the United States, conducted an intelligence sweep of Iranian military forces using all of the available intelligence sources available. This sweep was prioritised and involved Israeli and European allies. It included enhanced cyber and satellite defence and offensive capabilities. It also included the deployment of further conventional forces into the bases situated along the Persian Gulf.

The contents of the security briefing were:

1. Iran has successfully tested a nuclear weapon - verified by the IAEA -  and has developed an unspecified number of mobile batteries within the Revolutionary Guard that are armed with medium range nuclear missiles of varying technical sophistication. The range of the missiles is not sufficient to threaten the mainland US directly, but they do have sufficient range to pose a threat to US allies in Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and Eastern Europe.

2. Production of the nuclear weapons is centred around Tehran, Eshfahan, Basheri, and Bandar Abbas. They have been deliberately located close to major centres of population in order to discourage military action owing to the prospect of significant loss of life from collateral civilian casualties.

3. As a further discouragement for military action, the centres of production now enjoy a significant defensive missile screen supplied by China. As an even further complication, the production facility at Basheri sits behind a Russian defensive missile screen. The Russian naval base at Basheri could become subject to collateral damage in the event of a wayward strike on the Iranian nuclear facility there. The missile defences of China and Russia are operated by their respective military personnel, and any losses to these caused by military action could be adopted as a causus belli.

4. In wider terms, the military balance in the Persian Gulf has tipped away from the United States. In pursuit of the Biden Doctrine, military forces in the region were drawn down in the 2020s and 2030s. Only recently has this been reversed to meet a renewed threat from Iran. However, as US forces were drawn down, there has been a significant build up of both Russian and Chinese forces. Both Russia and China maintain carrier groups within the Persian Gulf. These are supplied overland using the BRI transportation network. Against this, the US maintains a single carrier group within the Persian Gulf that is supplied primarily by sea.

5. The sea lanes for supply cannot be taken for granted. China maintains a carrier group in the western Indian Ocean, supplied overland from a facility in Pakistan. The recent construction of a naval base at Abu Musa, protected by a screen of missile defences, effectively has the potential to close the Persian Gulf to future military supply of US forces in the Gulf region. Supply could be undertaken by air, but not for bulk supply. Supply could be undertaken overland from the Red Sea, but the transportation infrastructure has not been sufficiently developed for this to be an effective option. The US forces in the Persian Gulf have been effectively bottled up and this should be a factor that weighs heavily on future decision making.

6. In recent years there has been an influx of climate refugees from Central Asia into Iran. These refugees have been welcomed in a booming Iranian economy and have facilitated a significant expansion of the Revolutionary Guard. This military build up has been facilitated by both China and Russia in terms of arms and training, and seems to be the result of participation in the Gulf Security and Cooperation Organisation.

7. This has allowed the Revolutionary Guard to expand their operations in both Iraq (see map attached, the Revolutionary Guard is shaded black here) and in Syria. Both Syria and Iraq are to become members of the GSCO, which ought to be of concern in determining US policy for the region.

8. Balanced against this, the United States operates a training facility in Iraq whose mission is to train the Federal Iraqi forces and has a covert facility in Syria whose mission is to counter radical Sunni militias, of whom ISIS is an example. Withdrawal from either of these facilities is likely to cause a power vacuum that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard are well suited to fill.

9. In recent years, China, Russia, and Iran have paced their cyber war capabilities to maintain their lead over the United States. The prospect of cyber action against Iran runs the risk of retaliatory action against the United States. Particularly vulnerable are US power networks, US governmental functions (including healthcare), and US financial institutions. In a recent exercise to map this possibility, the United States would suffer considerable economic and financial damage in the event of a retaliatory cyber action.

10. China has a lead over the United States in anti-satellite missile technology. This was established decades ago and maintained over the intervening years. It is believed that China has a first strike capability. In the event of a significant build up of US forces in the Persian Gulf, it would mean that China could remove US satellite overwatch before counter measures could be taken. The possibility of military action occurring blind is one that ought to enter into any future calculations.

Any potential military action against Iran contains a set of considerable risks. If China or Russia were to use such action as a causus belli, then the United States would be at a significant disadvantage. If the United States were to manage to isolate Iran from China and Russia, there is no guarantee of a decisive victory. A defeat to Iran would have repercussions across the globe that could influence the response of allied nations towards the United States for some considerable time to come.

This rather sobering report to the United States was intended to set the scene in which military action might, or might not, take place in Turn 6.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Xi Turns West - Turn 5 (2045)

As we reach the penultimate turn of the game, much of the gameplay has been set by the previous moves. The tension is mounting, with Iran on the verge of acquiring a nuclear weapon, with Kurdistan on the verge of civil war, and with the climate fermenting popular unrest across the region. The question arises of what the Great Powers can do to contain the rising levels of violence. Could the United States become more engaged north of the Persian Gulf? Could China use it's commercial prowess to mitigate the worsening climate? Could the Russian sponsored regional structure provide the basis by which differences are settled? In this respect, it's still all to play for in Turn 5.

As a result of the game play, the following events were recorded:

1. The United States conducts an intelligence sweep of Iranian military forces, using all of the available intelligence sources available. This sweep is prioritised and involves Israeli and European allies. It includes beefing up cyber and satellite defences and offensive capabilities. It also includes deploying further conventional forces into the bases situated along the Persian Gulf.

2. Russia, in conjunction with China, continues to work to strengthen the BRI assets. The Russian contribution to the collective effort is somewhat limited owing to on-going western sanctions placed upon the regime. The Gulf Security and Cooperation Organisation continues to grow, and is starting to achieve a degree of traction within the region. There are now close partnerships between Russia, China, Iran, Syria, Iraq and Kurdistan.

3. China continues to bolster the defensive capabilities of the BRI partners. This includes the additional provision of the latest shore to ship missiles along the northern shores of the Persian Gulf, and, most importantly, the construction of a defensive naval base on Abu Musa.

4. Elsewhere, China has undertaken a series of defensive initiatives in East Asia, which includes preparations to evacuate Chinese citizens from the United States, preparations to freeze American assets in China, and the nationalisation of US companies engaged in technology manufacture within China. In a surprise move, China has removed the restrictions on the export of rare earth products to US entities, thus flooding the market and collapsing the price of rare earths.

5. Iran has announced the successful detonation of a nuclear warhead. This has been confirmed by the IAEA, who were invited to observe the tests. The warhead developed will be used in conjunction with existing Iranian medium range missile technology. The Revolutionary Guards now have a number of batteries of mobile medium range nuclear missiles.

6. Turkey has focussed on the completion of the obligations under the BRI agreement with China and now acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia. Actually, it's a tunnel, not a bridge, that goes underneath the Bosporus. It is hoped that this will enable Turkey to create a new forward looking relationship with regional actors, emphasising the important role of Turkic culture. The BRI induced stimulus has produced a degree of prosperity within Turkey that has allowed an unhappy face to be removed.

7. Saudi Arabia has undertaken a large programme of poverty alleviation in the Gulf States involving the provision of food and water. This has reduced the principal source of unhappiness in the Gulf States, reducing the number of unhappy faces from three to one (the local Shia underclass still feel oppressed by the Sunni minority ruling classes). Attempts to provide humanitarian aid to Western Iraq and Kurdistan have been hampered by the on-going civil unrest in Iraq, the closure of port facilities at Um Qsr, and the hostility of the local Shia Imams.

8. Iraq has sought and gained membership of the Gulf Security and Cooperation Organisation. This has yet to provide immediate relief to the Federal Government as the terms of the accession have yet to be fully worked out. There is the hope that Russia will provide security assets, in conjunction with Turkey and Syria, and that Iran will provide humanitarian aid across the wider Federal Iraq.

9. Syria has restricted the movement of Saudi Arabian diplomats in Damascus and has confined them to their embassy premises. The Saudi backed Arabic Cultural Centre has been placed under the supervision of the Syrian authorities to ensure that the activities of the centre remain religious in their provision and do not acquire a political tinge.

10. The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government has declared itself as an independent sovereign state. The independence of the newly formed Kurdistan has been recognised by Iran, China, and Russia. Kurdistan has sought and obtained membership of the Gulf Security and Cooperation Organisation, under which Russia has provided military assistance to the Kurdish Government.

11. Kurdish forces have seized the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, with the capital being located in Mosul. Under the terms of the humanitarian assistance provided by Iran, food, water, and medicines are now being provided to the residents of these cities. The enhanced Kurdish forces have closed the border between Turkey and Kurdistan in an attempt to stem the flow of refugees from Turkey. This has largely been successful and has allowed a degree of calm to enter into Kurdish civil society.

12. The Turkish Kurds are exceptionally unhappy at this treatment, with two further unhappy faces being placed upon their territory.

In the years 2046 to 2050, the price of oil rises from $84 a barrel to $93 a barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022