 |
| Control of Iraq 2045 |
In 2045, the United States, conducted an intelligence sweep of Iranian military forces using all of the available intelligence sources available. This sweep was prioritised and involved Israeli and European allies. It included enhanced cyber and satellite defence and offensive capabilities. It also included the deployment of further conventional forces into the bases situated along the Persian Gulf.
The contents of the security briefing were:
1. Iran has successfully tested a nuclear weapon - verified by the
IAEA - and has developed an unspecified number of mobile batteries
within the Revolutionary Guard that are armed with medium range
nuclear missiles of varying technical sophistication. The range of
the missiles is not sufficient to threaten the mainland US directly,
but they do have sufficient range to pose a threat to US allies in
Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and Eastern Europe.
2. Production of the nuclear weapons is centred around Tehran, Eshfahan, Basheri, and Bandar Abbas. They have been deliberately located close to major centres of population in order to discourage military action owing to the prospect of significant loss of life from collateral civilian casualties.
3. As a further discouragement for military action, the centres of production now enjoy a significant defensive missile screen supplied by China. As an even further complication, the production facility at Basheri sits behind a Russian defensive missile screen. The Russian naval base at Basheri could become subject to collateral damage in the event of a wayward strike on the Iranian nuclear facility there. The missile defences of China and Russia are operated by their respective military personnel, and any losses to these caused by military action could be adopted as a causus belli.
4. In wider terms, the military balance in the Persian Gulf has tipped away from the United States. In pursuit of the Biden Doctrine, military forces in the region were drawn down in the 2020s and 2030s. Only recently has this been reversed to meet a renewed threat from Iran. However, as US forces were drawn down, there has been a significant build up of both Russian and Chinese forces. Both Russia and China maintain carrier groups within the Persian Gulf. These are supplied overland using the BRI transportation network. Against this, the US maintains a single carrier group within the Persian Gulf that is supplied primarily by sea.
5. The sea lanes for supply cannot be taken for granted. China maintains a carrier group in the western Indian Ocean, supplied overland from a facility in Pakistan. The recent construction of a naval base at Abu Musa, protected by a screen of missile defences, effectively has the potential to close the Persian Gulf to future military supply of US forces in the Gulf region. Supply could be undertaken by air, but not for bulk supply. Supply could be undertaken overland from the Red Sea, but the transportation infrastructure has not been sufficiently developed for this to be an effective option. The US forces in the Persian Gulf have been effectively bottled up and this should be a factor that weighs heavily on future decision making.
6. In recent years there has been an influx of climate refugees from Central Asia into Iran. These refugees have been welcomed in a booming Iranian economy and have facilitated a significant expansion of the Revolutionary Guard. This military build up has been facilitated by both China and Russia in terms of arms and training, and seems to be the result of participation in the Gulf Security and Cooperation Organisation.
7. This has allowed the Revolutionary Guard to expand their operations in both Iraq (see map attached, the Revolutionary Guard is shaded black here) and in Syria. Both Syria and Iraq are to become members of the GSCO, which ought to be of concern in determining US policy for the region.
8. Balanced against this, the United States operates a training facility in Iraq whose mission is to train the Federal Iraqi forces and has a covert facility in Syria whose mission is to counter radical Sunni militias, of whom ISIS is an example. Withdrawal from either of these facilities is likely to cause a power vacuum that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard are well suited to fill.
9. In recent years, China, Russia, and Iran have paced their cyber war capabilities to maintain their lead over the United States. The prospect of cyber action against Iran runs the risk of retaliatory action against the United States. Particularly vulnerable are US power networks, US governmental functions (including healthcare), and US financial institutions. In a recent exercise to map this possibility, the United States would suffer considerable economic and financial damage in the event of a retaliatory cyber action.
10. China has a lead over the United States in anti-satellite missile technology. This was established decades ago and maintained over the intervening years. It is believed that China has a first strike capability. In the event of a significant build up of US forces in the Persian Gulf, it would mean that China could remove US satellite overwatch before counter measures could be taken. The possibility of military action occurring blind is one that ought to enter into any future calculations.
Any potential military action against Iran contains a set of considerable risks. If China or Russia were to use such action as a causus belli, then the United States would be at a significant disadvantage. If the United States were to manage to isolate Iran from China and Russia, there is no guarantee of a decisive victory. A defeat to Iran would have repercussions across the globe that could influence the response of allied nations towards the United States for some considerable time to come.
2. Production of the nuclear weapons is centred around Tehran, Eshfahan, Basheri, and Bandar Abbas. They have been deliberately located close to major centres of population in order to discourage military action owing to the prospect of significant loss of life from collateral civilian casualties.
3. As a further discouragement for military action, the centres of production now enjoy a significant defensive missile screen supplied by China. As an even further complication, the production facility at Basheri sits behind a Russian defensive missile screen. The Russian naval base at Basheri could become subject to collateral damage in the event of a wayward strike on the Iranian nuclear facility there. The missile defences of China and Russia are operated by their respective military personnel, and any losses to these caused by military action could be adopted as a causus belli.
4. In wider terms, the military balance in the Persian Gulf has tipped away from the United States. In pursuit of the Biden Doctrine, military forces in the region were drawn down in the 2020s and 2030s. Only recently has this been reversed to meet a renewed threat from Iran. However, as US forces were drawn down, there has been a significant build up of both Russian and Chinese forces. Both Russia and China maintain carrier groups within the Persian Gulf. These are supplied overland using the BRI transportation network. Against this, the US maintains a single carrier group within the Persian Gulf that is supplied primarily by sea.
5. The sea lanes for supply cannot be taken for granted. China maintains a carrier group in the western Indian Ocean, supplied overland from a facility in Pakistan. The recent construction of a naval base at Abu Musa, protected by a screen of missile defences, effectively has the potential to close the Persian Gulf to future military supply of US forces in the Gulf region. Supply could be undertaken by air, but not for bulk supply. Supply could be undertaken overland from the Red Sea, but the transportation infrastructure has not been sufficiently developed for this to be an effective option. The US forces in the Persian Gulf have been effectively bottled up and this should be a factor that weighs heavily on future decision making.
6. In recent years there has been an influx of climate refugees from Central Asia into Iran. These refugees have been welcomed in a booming Iranian economy and have facilitated a significant expansion of the Revolutionary Guard. This military build up has been facilitated by both China and Russia in terms of arms and training, and seems to be the result of participation in the Gulf Security and Cooperation Organisation.
7. This has allowed the Revolutionary Guard to expand their operations in both Iraq (see map attached, the Revolutionary Guard is shaded black here) and in Syria. Both Syria and Iraq are to become members of the GSCO, which ought to be of concern in determining US policy for the region.
8. Balanced against this, the United States operates a training facility in Iraq whose mission is to train the Federal Iraqi forces and has a covert facility in Syria whose mission is to counter radical Sunni militias, of whom ISIS is an example. Withdrawal from either of these facilities is likely to cause a power vacuum that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard are well suited to fill.
9. In recent years, China, Russia, and Iran have paced their cyber war capabilities to maintain their lead over the United States. The prospect of cyber action against Iran runs the risk of retaliatory action against the United States. Particularly vulnerable are US power networks, US governmental functions (including healthcare), and US financial institutions. In a recent exercise to map this possibility, the United States would suffer considerable economic and financial damage in the event of a retaliatory cyber action.
10. China has a lead over the United States in anti-satellite missile technology. This was established decades ago and maintained over the intervening years. It is believed that China has a first strike capability. In the event of a significant build up of US forces in the Persian Gulf, it would mean that China could remove US satellite overwatch before counter measures could be taken. The possibility of military action occurring blind is one that ought to enter into any future calculations.
Any potential military action against Iran contains a set of considerable risks. If China or Russia were to use such action as a causus belli, then the United States would be at a significant disadvantage. If the United States were to manage to isolate Iran from China and Russia, there is no guarantee of a decisive victory. A defeat to Iran would have repercussions across the globe that could influence the response of allied nations towards the United States for some considerable time to come.
This rather sobering report to the United States was intended to set the scene in which military action might, or might not, take place in Turn 6.
Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2022
No comments:
Post a Comment