Turn 6 started with a great deal of uncertainty - would the United States risk military action in the Persian Gulf to degrade the threat from a nuclear armed Iran? At this point the game started to become very interesting. The military option was on the table, but it would involve considerable risk. It was possible to engineer a confrontation indirectly through the use of Saudi Arabia as a proxy and within the confines of Syria as a common battleground. However, to do so would leave the arena open to China. Which adversary would America see as the greater?
As a result of the game play, the following events were recorded:
1. The United States has launched a global initiative - Silver and
Green - aimed at enhancing diplomatic, economic, and environmental
policies. Overtures have been made to a number of countries, but to
date only Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kurdistan have opted to join. The
membership of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria is under discussion. The
initiative has a security dimension to it and offers an alternative
to the BRI.
2. Russia seeks to maintain a degree of stability in the Middle East through the existing relationships, but it is unclear exactly what these are. There are numerous reports in the western press questioning the GSCO, the membership of which seems rather unclear. As part of this policy, and to deter any possible attacks, the missile defence screen at Basheri will be maintained and upgraded and Russia has engaged with China, Iran, and other partners in the Persian Gulf. On the diplomatic front, Russia has reached out to Saudi Arabia and other regional actors to assure them of the Iranian intentions to only use their nuclear weapons for defensive purposes.
3. China, being mindful of the recent reports from seismologists, has focussed on the strengthening and reinforcement of the BRI physical and digital infrastructure. This has involved the reinforcement of bridges, the shoring up of embankments, and the upgrading of digital systems. The focus of this upgrading work has been the route from Central Asia to Turkey.
4. Diplomatically, China has provided support to the GSCO and to enhance the Turkish Union proposed by Turkey. There have been some critics of the GSCO in the western press concerning that lack of transparency over membership and the terms by which nations have joined the GSCO. China has used its financial resources within the BRI framework in Central Asia to support the development of the Turkish Union in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
5. Chinese policy towards Syria has changed. Following on from potential Syrian overtures to the United States, China has significantly reduced the amount of oil purchased on the black market from Syria, leading to a significant fall in revenue for the Syrian government. At the same time, the operation of the rail link between Erzurum and Damascus, including the spur to Tartus, has been experiencing acute operational difficulties. Staff have been absent in large numbers, rolling stock has been unavailable due to use elsewhere on the BRI network, and essential maintenance has been delayed by a shortage of parts. This has significantly reduced the traffic on the Syrian rail network, has introduced supply problems to the Russian naval facility in Tartus, and has degraded the functioning of the transport network.
6. Iran has intensified its policy of distributing humanitarian aid through the Revolutionary Guard across the region. This has had an effect to tighten the grip of the Revolutionary Guard over local Shia populations within Syria, Iraq, and Kurdistan. Many Shia citizens in these countries now look to Tehran for leadership rather than towards their local regimes.
7. Turkey, with the help of China, has extended the reality of the Turkish Union and now exerts considerable influence over Azerbaijan (part of Trans Caucasus on the map) and Turkmenistan (part of Central Asia on the map). This allows Turkey to position itself as a bridge between China and Europe and to provide an exemplar of how a more secular form of Islam might take shape. This helps to enhance the relationship between Turkey and Iran.
8. Saudi Arabia continues to seek to lead the Arabic world through the provision of humanitarian aid across the Persian Gulf. Stability on the southern shore of the Persian Gulf is maintained through funding and material aid, although the local Shia majorities still feel oppressed by the local Sunni rulers. Saudi Arabia makes some headway in gaining influence in western Iraq and eastern Syria, where the local Sunni communities are suffering from the neglect of their respective governments.
9. Saudi Arabia has suggested a peace conference across the Arab world, involving Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Kurdistan, with the US as an observer, to find a common pathway to counter the growth of Iranian influence. To date, only the US and Jordan have shown an interest in the initiative.
10. Iraq starts to negotiate a trilateral treaty with Turkey and Syria for peace and the security of water rights. Turkey and Syria are sympathetic to such an arrangement but the fine details have yet to be announced. There is a question over whether or not this is part of the GSCO, which needs to be determined in the future.
11. The local Shia Imams in southern Iraq continue to preach against the government in Baghdad. The result of this has been a strike of all workers in southern Iraq in the hydrocarbon industries. Material assistance - food, water, and money - has been provided to the striking workers by local actors who are influenced by Iranian elements. The result of this strike is that Iraqi hydrocarbon exports through Um Qsr have largely ceased, depriving the Iraqi government of a significant source of income. An additional unhappy face has been added to Baghdad.
12. The government of Syria has sought to extend its influence across the country. This has largely been unsuccessful owing to the collapse in oil revenues originated from China, combined with having to pay the charter fees to the Russian tankers available to transport the oil to the Far East. Arrears in army pay have increased. Humanitarian assistance is now largely provided through the agency of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, whose control of the country has tightened. As a result of the deteriorating situation, unhappy faces have been placed on Damascus and Aleppo.
13. Kurdistan seeks to reaffirm it's status as an independent nation. An application to join the UN was vetoed by Russia. Kurdistan seeks to bolster its defences against a potential incursion from Iraq or Turkey. Unhappily, this hasn't quite gone to plan. In response to Kurdish overtures to the United States, China has persuaded Iran to diminish the material support given to the Kurdish government. The gas spur line remains open, but gas sales are much diminished and payment is erratic. Iran has imposed a degree of food and water rationing upon Kurdistan, which is enforced by the Revolutionary Guard, who are now a much stronger presence in the country. The result has been a sharp increase in unemployment, poverty and hunger, leading to an unhappy face being added to Mosul.
2. Russia seeks to maintain a degree of stability in the Middle East through the existing relationships, but it is unclear exactly what these are. There are numerous reports in the western press questioning the GSCO, the membership of which seems rather unclear. As part of this policy, and to deter any possible attacks, the missile defence screen at Basheri will be maintained and upgraded and Russia has engaged with China, Iran, and other partners in the Persian Gulf. On the diplomatic front, Russia has reached out to Saudi Arabia and other regional actors to assure them of the Iranian intentions to only use their nuclear weapons for defensive purposes.
3. China, being mindful of the recent reports from seismologists, has focussed on the strengthening and reinforcement of the BRI physical and digital infrastructure. This has involved the reinforcement of bridges, the shoring up of embankments, and the upgrading of digital systems. The focus of this upgrading work has been the route from Central Asia to Turkey.
4. Diplomatically, China has provided support to the GSCO and to enhance the Turkish Union proposed by Turkey. There have been some critics of the GSCO in the western press concerning that lack of transparency over membership and the terms by which nations have joined the GSCO. China has used its financial resources within the BRI framework in Central Asia to support the development of the Turkish Union in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
5. Chinese policy towards Syria has changed. Following on from potential Syrian overtures to the United States, China has significantly reduced the amount of oil purchased on the black market from Syria, leading to a significant fall in revenue for the Syrian government. At the same time, the operation of the rail link between Erzurum and Damascus, including the spur to Tartus, has been experiencing acute operational difficulties. Staff have been absent in large numbers, rolling stock has been unavailable due to use elsewhere on the BRI network, and essential maintenance has been delayed by a shortage of parts. This has significantly reduced the traffic on the Syrian rail network, has introduced supply problems to the Russian naval facility in Tartus, and has degraded the functioning of the transport network.
6. Iran has intensified its policy of distributing humanitarian aid through the Revolutionary Guard across the region. This has had an effect to tighten the grip of the Revolutionary Guard over local Shia populations within Syria, Iraq, and Kurdistan. Many Shia citizens in these countries now look to Tehran for leadership rather than towards their local regimes.
7. Turkey, with the help of China, has extended the reality of the Turkish Union and now exerts considerable influence over Azerbaijan (part of Trans Caucasus on the map) and Turkmenistan (part of Central Asia on the map). This allows Turkey to position itself as a bridge between China and Europe and to provide an exemplar of how a more secular form of Islam might take shape. This helps to enhance the relationship between Turkey and Iran.
8. Saudi Arabia continues to seek to lead the Arabic world through the provision of humanitarian aid across the Persian Gulf. Stability on the southern shore of the Persian Gulf is maintained through funding and material aid, although the local Shia majorities still feel oppressed by the local Sunni rulers. Saudi Arabia makes some headway in gaining influence in western Iraq and eastern Syria, where the local Sunni communities are suffering from the neglect of their respective governments.
9. Saudi Arabia has suggested a peace conference across the Arab world, involving Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Kurdistan, with the US as an observer, to find a common pathway to counter the growth of Iranian influence. To date, only the US and Jordan have shown an interest in the initiative.
10. Iraq starts to negotiate a trilateral treaty with Turkey and Syria for peace and the security of water rights. Turkey and Syria are sympathetic to such an arrangement but the fine details have yet to be announced. There is a question over whether or not this is part of the GSCO, which needs to be determined in the future.
11. The local Shia Imams in southern Iraq continue to preach against the government in Baghdad. The result of this has been a strike of all workers in southern Iraq in the hydrocarbon industries. Material assistance - food, water, and money - has been provided to the striking workers by local actors who are influenced by Iranian elements. The result of this strike is that Iraqi hydrocarbon exports through Um Qsr have largely ceased, depriving the Iraqi government of a significant source of income. An additional unhappy face has been added to Baghdad.
12. The government of Syria has sought to extend its influence across the country. This has largely been unsuccessful owing to the collapse in oil revenues originated from China, combined with having to pay the charter fees to the Russian tankers available to transport the oil to the Far East. Arrears in army pay have increased. Humanitarian assistance is now largely provided through the agency of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, whose control of the country has tightened. As a result of the deteriorating situation, unhappy faces have been placed on Damascus and Aleppo.
13. Kurdistan seeks to reaffirm it's status as an independent nation. An application to join the UN was vetoed by Russia. Kurdistan seeks to bolster its defences against a potential incursion from Iraq or Turkey. Unhappily, this hasn't quite gone to plan. In response to Kurdish overtures to the United States, China has persuaded Iran to diminish the material support given to the Kurdish government. The gas spur line remains open, but gas sales are much diminished and payment is erratic. Iran has imposed a degree of food and water rationing upon Kurdistan, which is enforced by the Revolutionary Guard, who are now a much stronger presence in the country. The result has been a sharp increase in unemployment, poverty and hunger, leading to an unhappy face being added to Mosul.
It is at this point that we leave the game. It paints an interesting picture for us, with the United States retreating to the southern shores of the Persian Gulf. American influence has declined in the three decades covered by the game, just as that of China and Iran has increased. Turkey and Russia are jostling to increase their influence in Central Asia, whilst Saudi Arabia has become quite withdrawn. The regime in Syria continues to survive, as does that in Iraq. Kurdistan has made an attempt at gaining independence, but that hasn't been wholly successful. This is the result of the gameplay, is it what the players intended?
Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2022
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