Xi Turns West - The Outcomes

Control of Syria 2050

In the framework we followed during the game, we allowed a week to pass between each turn being declared. This gave the players ample time to work upon a collective approach to various issues as they arose, to hammer out agreements between themselves, and to reflect upon how they were progressing in relation to their objectives. At the end of Turn 6, we gave everyone a period of reflection before bringing together a final wash up session to consider the degree to which they achieved - or otherwise - their objectives. The umpires would also undertake this exercise separately, and the notes between the two groups would be compared at that point. Where they agreed, we would pass on. Where they differed, or where they threw out an interesting point, we would go back over the assessment as a research point.

The United States was tasked with maintaining the US bases and extending the presence in the region, checking and countering Russian and Chinese ambitions, and ensuring that Iran remained isolated and failed in the economic development of its territorial area. There were mixed views over the US presence in the region. On the one hand, the number of bases increased. On the other hand, America was unable to counter China, Russia, and Iran in the region. One research point that did arise was the difference between presence - in the form of bases - and influence - the ability to direct and control events. This spoke to the 'Biden Doctrine' as it emerged in the early stages. It was felt that this might not lead to stable outcomes.

Russia had three objectives: to acquire port facilities on the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean Sea, to support Russian and Chinese commercial ambitions whilst increasing Russian military and diplomatic influence in the region, and to ensure that a good working relationship with Saudi Arabia is maintained to manage the price of oil. It was felt that the first two objectives had been achieved, but there was uncertainty over the relationship between Russia and Saudi Arabia. In the game, the price of oil didn't become a factor, so that issue wasn't really tested.

China was tasked with building out the BRI transport corridor across the region, securing port facilities at Bandar Abbas and Basheri and assisting Russia and Iran in evading western sanctions. It was felt that the transport corridors had been built out, the port facilities were largely acquired, but the evasion of western sanctions hadn't quite gone far enough. China had a fairly free run in the construction of the physical infrastructure, but the attendant financial and commercial infrastructure remained largely in western hands.

Saudi Arabia was challenged to contain Iran throughout the region, ensuring that the US maintained the present number of military bases on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf, and used Saudi financial and hydrocarbon assets to secure stability within the region. It was felt that Saudi Arabia hadn't managed to help to contain Iran, but had managed to keep the US engaged and had secured stability on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf. Beyond that, Saudi influence was very limited.

Iran, on the other hand, was asked to fully circumvent western imposed sanctions on both goods and access to capital markets, to sell hydrocarbons directly overland to China, and to have developed fully functioning nuclear weapons. Iran did acquire nuclear weapons and did sell hydrocarbons overland to China, but didn't fully circumvent western imposed sanctions. Two questions arose over the Iranian gameplay. The first was the degree to which the Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would trigger a response from the rest of the world. In the game, there was very little response. Second, to what extent would the gameplay be different if we included a Peak Oil scenario? These are interesting questions that warrant further thought.

Onto this complexity we need to add Turkey. Turkey was charged with developing a deeper relationship with Chinese commercial interests, ensuring that the BRI is fully built out in the region, ensuring that Kurdish national aspirations are thwarted, and securing the stability of the southern border with Syria. It was felt that Turkey had developed a deeper relationship with China, but hadn't managed to fully thwart Kurdish national aspirations and probably had helped to secure the border with Syria.

Syria itself was tasked with ensuring that the Russia remained engaged in Syria and continued to offer a security guarantee, ensuring that good relations are maintained with the regional powers of Turkey and Iran, whilst limiting the influence of Saudi Arabia, and ensuring that Kurdish aspirations for nationhood were frustrated. By and large, Syria did manage to maintain good relations with Russia, Turkey, and Iran, who together managed to maintain the unitary state in Syria. Kurdish national aspirations didn't gain a foothold in Syria, but weren't frustrated either.

Kurdish aspirations made the greatest progress in Iraq. The Iraqi Federal Government was asked to ensure that the US remained engaged in Iraq, to ensure that good relations were maintained with the regional powers, and that Kurdish aspirations for nationhood were frustrated with Kurdish gains in the federal constitution being rolled back. By and large, Iraq failed in these objectives. The United States remained engaged, but with much reduced support and influence. By 2050 Iran had become more bellicose towards Iraq and had a greater influence in Iraqi affairs than America. The regional powers were content to allow this to happen and the Iraqi Kurds had declared themselves an independent nation.

This was core to the Kurdistan game play. Kurdistan was tasked with ensuring that the wider Kurdistan achieves independent nationhood, that the newly formed Kurdistan receives a security guarantee from both the United States and Russia, and that Kurdistan is placed along the BRI and receives developmental support from China. Whilst some progress was made along these lines, the objectives had by no means been achieved by 2050. It did allow us to focus on what an independent Kurdistan might look like. It certainly gave us a feel for the difficulties that could arise from such a change and would merit further consideration in the future.

All in all the game was a mixed bag. Many of the objectives were zero sum, which meant that those who achieved their objectives would naturally prevent others from doing so. Looking at the outcome overall, a number of research points stand out:

1. The biggest question coming from the game was the extent to which the 'Biden Doctrine' - which we accept is emerging and not fully formed - could be a stable basis for long term policy. The US withdrawal from the northern side of the Persian Gulf rather leaves the region open to Russian and Chinese influence. Could that really happen?

2. The game assumed that Russia still covets warm water ports - on the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea. How realistic is that assumption? To what extent would that remain dependent upon Chinese largesse?

3. At the start of the game, we would have predicted that Iran would end the game as the principal Chinese ally in the region. It was no surprise to find this the case. However, there was little push back within the game to the growing relationship between the two, especially when China approved the Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. Would China really accept a nuclear Iran just to get the railroad built?

4. The game play touched upon western sanctions in a number of places. These weren't given a sharper focus within the game, but they did raise the question of effectiveness and the degree to which their use gives rise to an incentive to develop an alternative financial architecture. The game was ready for this - a Chinese, Russian, and Iranian financial infrastructure to challenge the present North American/ European one. The game missed this aspect, which is worth further consideration.

5. The issue of Kurdistan, especially in the context of Iraq, gave rise to a number of questions about nationhood and independence in the region. The game suggested that national aspirations could not be met within the confines of the present arrangements. If these are not stable, then we can expect to see further outbreaks of instability within the region. If the United States is not prepared to maintain the present world order, then might we see a new, possibly Chinese, one?

These are some of the questions we were left with at the end of the game. The game itself didn't provide answers to these questions, but they are worthy of further study. In some respects, they have helped to uncover the 'known unknowns'. We know what we don't know. Surely that has to be a step forward?

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2022