We are now moving towards the half way stage in the game. The various positions are starting to become formed with the alignments taking shape. China is managing to develop it's relationship with Iran, Russia, and Turkey to develop the infrastructure along the BRI. The United States struggles to gain traction north of the Persian Gulf, despite the desire of Iraq to engage America. The climate is starting to turn more hostile, with higher temperatures, greater water shortages, falling crop yields and the resultant popular discontentment. This doesn't bode well for the stability of the region in Turn 3.
As a result of the game play, the following events were recorded:
1. The United States has invested heavily in cyberwar assets, both
for offensive operations and for defensive operations. The new base on the Persian Gulf has now been built out. The new cyberwar regional
operations centre is located at that base. The roll out of the
cyberwar capabilities has been hampered and slowed by the relative
inaccessibility of key components owing to the Chinese ban on
exports of rare earth products to entities of US origin.
2. Russia continues to increase it's footprint in the region. Russian technicians have been involved in surveying potential transportation routes between Damascus and Aleppo, with a spur to Tartus. The routes are planned to be of BRI quality. However, the surveying has been hampered by inadequate funding, gross inefficiencies, and the impacts of corruption in the procurement process.
3. In an agreement with Iran, the Russian navy has developed port facilities at Basheri, which will now be a more permanent home to the Russian Persian Gulf Fleet. At the request of Iran, Russia has installed an array of missile defences that have sufficient range to cover the whole of the Persian Gulf.
4. China continues to build out the BRI across Iran. This includes further oil and gas pipeline developments and the surveying of the BRI transportation route out as far as the Trans Caucasus. The routes have been surveyed, and are now ready for construction. The oil pipeline from the Iranian border to Yerevan has been surveyed and is awaiting political consent to be built out.
5. Elsewhere, China has laid down a further four aircraft carriers with a view to projecting power across the globe. She continues to research the green economy and seeks to establish an alternative to the capitalist-imperialist cultural narrative.
6. Iran has provided humanitarian assistance to Syria, Pakistan, and Iraqi Kurdistan. Food and water have been supplied to Pakistan and Iraqi Kurdistan, with the necessary water pipeline infrastructure being laid down. Food aid has been given to Syria, being distributed by local Shia militias and elements of the Revolutionary Guards.
7. A food distribution hub was established by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Dar az Zawi. When the local Syrian opposition officials objected to this, a fierce firefight resulted that left many of the Syrian opposition fighters either dead, incapacitated, or in the custody of the Revolutionary Guards. The local population, unhappy with the governance of the Syrian opposition, welcomed this change of governing body. The result is that control of Dar az Zawi has reverted back to the Syrian government, and the unhappy face has been removed.
8. Turkey has embarked upon a programme of infrastructure investment between Istanbul, Erzurum, and the Trans Caucasus border. It is early days as yet and the project will take some considerable time to complete if left entirely in Turkish hands. The hoped for economic spin offs have yet to materialise owing to the impact of corruption on public procurement.
9. Saudi Arabia has reopened its embassy in Damascus. This is combined with the opening of a cultural centre in a hope to provide a focus for the Arab family within Syria. New points of communication and collaboration are established, but with a mixed impact.
10. Iraq has commenced the construction of a desalination plant at Umm Qasr, along with a water pipeline network that runs north to Baghdad, Tikrit, and Erbil. Progress is very slow owing to the obstructions caused by local Iranian backed Shia militias. Several influential Shia Imams have preached against the water pipeline and this is slowing construction immensely.
11. Syria has engaged Russian engineers to survey a potential transportation route between Damascus and Aleppo, with a spur to Tartus. The routes are planned to be of BRI quality. However, the surveying has been hampered by inadequate funding, gross inefficiencies, and the impacts of corruption in the procurement process.
12. The continued anti-corruption campaign in Syria now has almost no effect at all, with the majority of the funding available being ghosted away to Nur-Sultan and Dubai. The payment of Syrian army arrears have helped to boost the approval of the government in the Syrian army.
13. The Iraqi Regional Government of Kurdistan has reached an agreement with Iran whereby Iran provides food and water to the region in return for the construction of a gas spur from Iraqi Kurdistan into the Iranian pan-Asian gas network in the vicinity of Tabriz. This has increased the approval of the population of the Iraqi Kurdish authorities, leading to the unhappy face being removed. The situation of the Turkish Kurds has not improved.
14. In a supreme irony, funding for the gas spur was provided by the US through the IMF, which means that American entities have funded Iranian entities - in collusion with the Iraqi Central Bank - in contravention of US sanctions on Iran.
15. The unhappy faces at Dar az Zawi and in Iraqi Kurdistan have been removed. An additional unhappy face has been added to all existing unhappy faces where no effective action has been undertaken to remove them. The unhappy faces in Turkish Kurdistan (the 'Mountain Kurds') relate to the disapproval of the Kurdish politicians by this population. If we reach three unhappy faces, the players will start to have their ability to act constrained a little.
15. Crop yields have been falling of late, leading to a further increase in food prices across the region, coupled with far wider shortages of water. For those areas whose governments have not taken mitigation steps, popular discontent has started to surface in the form of unhappy faces. The mumblings and grumblings have started to translate into action. There is a pronounced drift of the population from the countryside into the cities. Discontent is growing and there is an expectation on the part of the more general populace that action will be taken to improve their lot, especially if unemployment is added to high food prices and hunger.
2. Russia continues to increase it's footprint in the region. Russian technicians have been involved in surveying potential transportation routes between Damascus and Aleppo, with a spur to Tartus. The routes are planned to be of BRI quality. However, the surveying has been hampered by inadequate funding, gross inefficiencies, and the impacts of corruption in the procurement process.
3. In an agreement with Iran, the Russian navy has developed port facilities at Basheri, which will now be a more permanent home to the Russian Persian Gulf Fleet. At the request of Iran, Russia has installed an array of missile defences that have sufficient range to cover the whole of the Persian Gulf.
4. China continues to build out the BRI across Iran. This includes further oil and gas pipeline developments and the surveying of the BRI transportation route out as far as the Trans Caucasus. The routes have been surveyed, and are now ready for construction. The oil pipeline from the Iranian border to Yerevan has been surveyed and is awaiting political consent to be built out.
5. Elsewhere, China has laid down a further four aircraft carriers with a view to projecting power across the globe. She continues to research the green economy and seeks to establish an alternative to the capitalist-imperialist cultural narrative.
6. Iran has provided humanitarian assistance to Syria, Pakistan, and Iraqi Kurdistan. Food and water have been supplied to Pakistan and Iraqi Kurdistan, with the necessary water pipeline infrastructure being laid down. Food aid has been given to Syria, being distributed by local Shia militias and elements of the Revolutionary Guards.
7. A food distribution hub was established by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Dar az Zawi. When the local Syrian opposition officials objected to this, a fierce firefight resulted that left many of the Syrian opposition fighters either dead, incapacitated, or in the custody of the Revolutionary Guards. The local population, unhappy with the governance of the Syrian opposition, welcomed this change of governing body. The result is that control of Dar az Zawi has reverted back to the Syrian government, and the unhappy face has been removed.
8. Turkey has embarked upon a programme of infrastructure investment between Istanbul, Erzurum, and the Trans Caucasus border. It is early days as yet and the project will take some considerable time to complete if left entirely in Turkish hands. The hoped for economic spin offs have yet to materialise owing to the impact of corruption on public procurement.
9. Saudi Arabia has reopened its embassy in Damascus. This is combined with the opening of a cultural centre in a hope to provide a focus for the Arab family within Syria. New points of communication and collaboration are established, but with a mixed impact.
10. Iraq has commenced the construction of a desalination plant at Umm Qasr, along with a water pipeline network that runs north to Baghdad, Tikrit, and Erbil. Progress is very slow owing to the obstructions caused by local Iranian backed Shia militias. Several influential Shia Imams have preached against the water pipeline and this is slowing construction immensely.
11. Syria has engaged Russian engineers to survey a potential transportation route between Damascus and Aleppo, with a spur to Tartus. The routes are planned to be of BRI quality. However, the surveying has been hampered by inadequate funding, gross inefficiencies, and the impacts of corruption in the procurement process.
12. The continued anti-corruption campaign in Syria now has almost no effect at all, with the majority of the funding available being ghosted away to Nur-Sultan and Dubai. The payment of Syrian army arrears have helped to boost the approval of the government in the Syrian army.
13. The Iraqi Regional Government of Kurdistan has reached an agreement with Iran whereby Iran provides food and water to the region in return for the construction of a gas spur from Iraqi Kurdistan into the Iranian pan-Asian gas network in the vicinity of Tabriz. This has increased the approval of the population of the Iraqi Kurdish authorities, leading to the unhappy face being removed. The situation of the Turkish Kurds has not improved.
14. In a supreme irony, funding for the gas spur was provided by the US through the IMF, which means that American entities have funded Iranian entities - in collusion with the Iraqi Central Bank - in contravention of US sanctions on Iran.
15. The unhappy faces at Dar az Zawi and in Iraqi Kurdistan have been removed. An additional unhappy face has been added to all existing unhappy faces where no effective action has been undertaken to remove them. The unhappy faces in Turkish Kurdistan (the 'Mountain Kurds') relate to the disapproval of the Kurdish politicians by this population. If we reach three unhappy faces, the players will start to have their ability to act constrained a little.
15. Crop yields have been falling of late, leading to a further increase in food prices across the region, coupled with far wider shortages of water. For those areas whose governments have not taken mitigation steps, popular discontent has started to surface in the form of unhappy faces. The mumblings and grumblings have started to translate into action. There is a pronounced drift of the population from the countryside into the cities. Discontent is growing and there is an expectation on the part of the more general populace that action will be taken to improve their lot, especially if unemployment is added to high food prices and hunger.
In the years 2036 to 2040, the price of oil falls from $81 a barrel to $79 a barrel.
Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2022
Any developments from the hypersonic arms race? Has China begun to act out against the Musk umbrella in space? Which country will be the breadbasket of artificial (lab grown) food - one of these or the merchant Dutch?
ReplyDeleteWell Jim, everything comes to a head in 2045, which we will publish later this week. At that point, China has the lead in space, China and Russia have the lead in missile technology over the US, and Iran is the regional bread basket using South African and Chinese biotech.
ReplyDelete