We recently asked if small nations matter? Recent events in Afghanistan have shown that at times they can. The speed with which events have developed in Afghanistan raise a number of important questions. Could this turn of events have been foreseen? What are the causes of such a rapid turn of events? What does this mean for Afghanistan? What does it mean for the region? And what does it mean from a wider perspective? Each of these questions deserves some form of answer.
Let's start with the degree to which we could have anticipated this turn of events. Last year we played a game that looked at the geopolitics of Central Asia, in which Afghanistan had a central role. This underlined the importance of the country as a geographical pivot for the region. The Taliban in the game concentrated upon building civil society, whilst the Americans in the game tended to prop up a variety of corrupt administrations. Poverty, hunger, and a lack of basic justice and fairness in the system - coupled by a dislike of foreigners determining the fate of Afghanistan - led to the collapse of the Afghan government and the expulsion of US forces. This was the template set by the game, much of which has been reflected in recent events.
News from Afghanistan is currently sketchy and partial, but it appears that the collapse of the Afghan National Army is more in the nature of a mutiny than anything else. The Afghan soldiers haven't been paid for some weeks, and there are allegations that their paymasters in government have squirrelled away the military payrolls into untraceable overseas bank accounts. This is a symptom of a wider corruption within the country. The Taliban haven't met with greater resistance because Afghan civil society isn't particularly loyal to the Afghan government.
In the west we tend to think of the Taliban as a monolithic and unified religious and political force. This is a mistake. The Taliban, like most factions and movements, contains internal differences of opinion. There are the traditionalists, who are currently receiving the most attention at the moment, who tend to represented amongst the military leaders on the ground right now. However, there are also the modernists, who tend to represent the political leadership, which has been exiled within the Middle East and are now returning to the country. We can expect the outcome of this difference of opinion to dominate the future course of Afghan affairs. At present, it is not certain which view will prevail.
This will have consequences within Central Asia. Although Afghanistan is the centre of Taliban support, they also have a presence in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. These countries have a structure of civil society similar to that of Afghanistan and must be seen as vulnerable to Taliban influence. There is also the complication of them being hydrocarbon exporters. In our game, the government of Turkmenistan was seized by the Taliban following a period of poverty alleviation and the elimination of corruption. As things stand today, we ought not to rule out this possibility in the years to come.
The Taliban also have a presence in the eastern part of Iran and links to the East Turkistan separatists in the Chinese province of XingJiang. This widens the possibilities to include Iran - and the struggle between the Shia and Sunni worlds - and the global ambitions of China. A key potential overland route on the BRI transits across the region, along with significant mineral potential in northern Afghanistan. It is unsurprising that China has sought an accord with the Taliban. With the Americans withdrawn from the region and with Russia cautious about renewed involvement within the Hindu Kush, China has been presented with an almost uncontested space for influence in the region. America appears to have lost a pawn in the great game of the twenty first century.
Appears to, but may not have done. The factors that led to the withdrawal of American forces are now a strength for the US and a weakness for the Taliban. The Taliban need to win over the local warlords across Afghanistan - especially in the north of the country, which presents an opportunity for the US. In the coming years, we may well see what covert operations, special forces operations, drone warfare, and high altitude airstrikes with precision munitions can achieve. We must not think that because American forces have left Kabul, the war is over. It may well be continued in a different way in the years to come. In which case, what we are witnessing is the opening of a new chapter in the saga rather than an end to it.
How it all unfolds depends upon a number of factors, but the key uncertainty revolves around the struggle within the Taliban. If the traditionalists gain the upper hand, the we can expect a future that is confrontational and violent. If the modernists gain the upper hand, then we can envisage a future in which Afghanistan could be coaxed into becoming a functioning nation by the standards of the region. That event would involve a process of engagement right now. It is interesting that this is exactly what China is doing. More 'Jaw Jaw' and less 'War War'.
Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2021
