Thursday, 10 November 2022

The Green Arctic: Lessons Learned

On one level the game was quite inconclusive. The players didn't manage to achieve an accommodation. This showed how hard it is for sovereign nations to pool their sovereignty, to sacrifice their partial interest in exchange for a greater - if intangible - good. Reaching agreement in the Arctic would have been to the benefit of everyone, but that would have meant setting aside purely selfish concerns in order to do so. The inability to achieve this was, in many ways, the expected outcome. The tragedy of the commons hasn't been solved in human history, except in some very rare circumstances, and the inability to do so in a game is not an unusual outcome. However, the absence of an outcome different from our expectations does not mean that the game didn't throw out some interesting possibilities.

In the game play we saw emerging two possibilities that are worthy of further thought. One centred around the use of technology and the other centred around a coalition of like-minded parties. The game play centred on the use of farmed fishing technologies as a means to increase the catches of cod and salmon. This is worth further thought. It is unlikely that current fish farming technologies could be grafted into the Arctic Ocean, but they could form the basis for an eventual solution to the question of fishing quotas.

Equally, it must not be assumed that maritime technologies are static. The game play started to highlight the possibility of maritime technologies becoming much greener than they currently are, so that the environmental footprint per TEU, for example, is much reduced compared to current levels. This has already happened in the past decade, admittedly due to much tougher EU maritime emissions standards, but it shows that it could be done. It is also the case that there is scope to develop mineral and hydrocarbon extraction technologies that are far more sympathetic to the natural environment. Once again, we are already on this trajectory, and it could be the case that further impetus along this road might allow for greater exploitation of the Arctic region than we currently envisage.

This suggests an interesting pathway scenario game to explore this possibility. The pathway could examine the development of technologies that achieve a greater environmental efficiency in the use of the Arctic. It would have to run parallel with the development of an appropriate regulatory and enforcement structure to ensure that the newer technologies are rapidly adopted. The dramatic tension in the game would be provided by the questions of who would finance the development such technologies and who would enforce their use. This is game that would have some merit.

The second interesting possibility for further gaming centred around the issue of finding a coalition of like-minded parties. In the game play, Russia, China, and Japan started to converge on their views of how the Arctic Ocean should be used. This was at variance to the views expressed by Canada, the United States, and the European Commission. The game play started to head towards the creation of two blocs concerning Arctic usage. One with a distinct feel of NATO about it, and the other with a distinct Asiatic feel. I found that to be really interesting.

Much of this coalescence was driven by the construction of the game. However, the national objectives of the players reflected current policy intentions towards an unfrozen Arctic, so we don't feel that this was an unreasonable trajectory. The core issue is the way in which the players view the enclosure of the Arctic as distinct and separate national territorial units. 

It was correctly observed that we didn't provide the players with maps outlining the various national territorial claims in the Arctic. Whether or not this hampered the game play is a question still to be resolved, but the above map shows that there is ample scope for territorial disputes in the Arctic Ocean. Russia lays claim to most of the eastern half of the Arctic Ocean as sovereign territory. What if Russia, in conjunction with China and Japan, were to assert those claims and a user council to govern economic activity within the Arctic Ocean that it claims as territory?

This would provide an interesting end state game. The basic premise would be that the Arctic can no longer be governed within the purely voluntary framework offered by the Arctic Council. In this case a new Arctic Council (AC2) would be needed that recognised the needs of the Arctic states and allowed the greater participation in regulation and enforcement of the Arctic by a broader range of Arctic users. Such a game could focus on establishing generally agreed national boundaries, with the Lomonosov Ridge being a clear point of dispute, and a broader understanding within the coalition of how the usage would be divided. The dramatic tension would be provided by the question of who would join the AC2 and how the usage would be divided within it. The purpose of the game would be to explore future pathways for the development of the Arctic Council.

The two lines of thought originating in the game suggest that it was a worthwhile exercise in undertaking, even if it produced an inconclusive result. Rather than allowing us to drift into a future that might not be to our liking, it gives us the possibility to develop a vision for how the Arctic should emerge in the second half of this century. If we feel that the future of the Arctic should be one of conservation rather than exploitation, or vice-versa, then we now have a framework in which to position those considerations. If the default future outlined in the Blue Arctic scenario is not one of our choice, then we need to build an alternative future that better suits our views. This game is one step towards enabling that process.


Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Wednesday, 9 November 2022

The Green Arctic Game

The focus of the Green Arctic Game is to examine the possibility - or impossibility - of reaching an international consensus that the Arctic should remain a global commons that is held in trust on behalf of humanity. In this scenario, the pristine nature of the Arctic environment would be preserved for posterity and future generations. That would involve the parties to the Arctic exercising a degree of self-restraint and limiting its use as a commercial waterway, restricting the exploitation of the hydrocarbon and mineral deposits in the region, and acting to preserve the fish stocks found in the region. There are commercial incentives for the parties involved in the Arctic to exploit it to the full. Can they come together to overcome these temptations?

In designing the game, we decided to follow the template set out in our Blue Arctic pathway scenario. The Green Arctic Game was to be an end state game that examined the possibility of the Blue Arctic developing into the Green Arctic. We maintained the same players as before - Canada, the US, Russia, China, Japan, and the European Commission. It was correctly pointed out that this largely excludes the Global South. This is true, but it's hard to see what interest the Global South could exert in a game about the Arctic. This may have been a significant oversight, but that was a risk we were prepared to take.

As with the Blue Arctic, Canada favoured an enclosed Arctic and reaching consensus through the Arctic Council. Russia favoured an enclosed Arctic, to be policed through national action. The US was in favour of the Arctic as a global commons, but with a weak institutional base; whilst the European Commission was in favour of the Arctic as a global commons, with an enhanced institutional basis. China was indifferent about the tenure of the Arctic and the institutional structure as long as it was open for large scale commercial exploitation. Japan was of a similar view and tended to side with the US, whilst China was naturally drawn towards Russia.

We felt that the focus of the discussion should be a quota framework for the commercial use of the Arctic. Only three players were members of the Arctic Council (Canada, the US, and Russia). It was upon the non-members to influence the members as best they could. There were four focus points - the amount of freight passing through the Arctic (measured in TEUs), the amount of hydrocarbons and minerals extracted in the Arctic (expressed as bpd equivalents), and the amount of Cod and Salmon fished in the Arctic. We set a baseline of the current usage in 2050 in the Blue Arctic scenario and asked the players to set about reaching an agreement to limit the usage to sustainable levels. These were lower than current levels.

There were six rounds of negotiation using the structure of a committee game. The objectives of some players were to see usage lower than the 2050 baseline, whilst those of other players were to achieve a level that was higher than the 2050 baseline. We also included a range of sub-objectives for the players to use as negotiating points and it was interesting to see whether the players could find those other touch points and utilise them.

In the six rounds of negotiation, no consensus results emerged. The players were close to an agreement on fishing quotas at one point, but an eventual solution eluded them. This is something of an expected result, that has some important consequences. We will go into greater detail on this in our next post. For now, suffice it to say that we didn't solve the tragedy of the commons. However, as nobody else has in 2,000 years of trying, we ought not to feel too despondent just yet.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2022

Tuesday, 8 November 2022

The Green Arctic: Introducing The Game

For much of human history the Arctic has been a closed environment. Historically, the region has contained some of the more extreme conditions on the planet that had left it generally unsuitable for widespread human habitation. As a result of this, the Arctic is largely underdeveloped in economic terms. Key pieces of physical infrastructure - such as roads, ports and airports – are not to be found there in great abundance. This lack of economic development has left the region largely unspoiled from an environmental perspective. There is a general lack of human settlement and there are minimal amounts of economic activity. The warming planet is expected to change this situation. 

As a result of global warming, the Polar ice cap is melting. As the Polar ice cap retreats, the Arctic Ocean has started to assume a degree of importance as a potentially navigable waterway. The waterway could open a navigable route between East Asia and Europe on the one hand, and East Asia and the East Coast of North America on the other. This would reduce the maritime transit route for goods by a significant degree. Given the operation of wind and tides in the Arctic Ocean, the eastern coast (the Northern Sea Route, or Russian Passage) is likely to be open to commercial navigation before the western coast (the North West Passage, or Canadian Route).

The Arctic region contains significant mineral and hydrocarbon deposits. As the region warms, these deposits will become more accessible on a commercial basis. There is concern that the commercial development of these deposits could lead to a degree of environmental degradation within the region. The governance of the region has been led by the Arctic Council, which provides a framework whereby the region is used as a common asset by its members on a voluntary basis. One uncertainty about the future is concerned with the degree to which the Arctic nations would seek to enclose these commons once they assume significant commercial and financial value.

The Arctic Ocean also contains an important fishery. As the waters of lower latitudes start to warm, fish stocks may well migrate northwards into the Arctic region. Much commercial fishing is governed by international treaty, but these frameworks are largely absent for the Arctic region. A potential point of diplomatic disagreement could be the framework structure to regulate fishing in the Arctic region.

It is these factors that create the scope for a game. We tend to assume the shrinking of the polar ice cap and its potential for commercial exploitation as the most likely future. This is what we have dubbed as 'the Blue Arctic'. It could be that the residual winds, currents, and tides result in an Arctic that isn't fully navigable (which we dub the 'White Arctic'). However, we see the White Arctic as more in the nature of a wild card event. 

Should the Blue Arctic prevail, the Arctic nations could react in one of two ways. First, they could consider the Arctic to remain a global commons. In this case, they could co-operate to restrict the degree of commercial development of the fisheries, the exploitation of the hydrocarbons and minerals, and to limit the use of the navigable waterway, all on a voluntary basis. In this possible future - the 'Green Arctic' scenario - the Arctic is preserved for humanity as a common resource. The second possibility is that the Arctic nations seek to exploit the region by enclosing it, develop the fisheries, mine the hydrocarbons and minerals, and utilise the navigable waterway. This future would probably involve the militarisation of the Arctic, hence the label the 'Red Arctic'.

Of these possible futures, the most likely outcome, given the current policies and actions, would be the Red Arctic. The enclosure and exploitation of the Arctic is already underway. In a previous exercise, we undertook a pathway scenario game that examined the Blue Arctic as a baseline scenario. Details of that game can be found here: Introducing the Unfrozen North. Taking the outcome of that game as a starting point for this game, we looked to develop an end state scenario game that explored the possibility of achieving the Green Arctic. What sort of issues would arise in negotiating a settlement? Could we find a way to solve the tragedy of the commons? If so, what sort of investment do we need to make today to achieve that future outcome? 

In short, just how difficult would it be to achieve the Green Arctic scenario? That was the purpose of the game and the question it sought to answer.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2022