At the end of a game that we have designed, nurtured, and umpired, it is useful to sit back and reflect on the lessons we have learned from the game. There are two dimensions to this. What lessons of game design stand out? And what lessons about the subject matter stand out? In this case, the former question is just as useful as the latter. Normally, we ask what a game has taught us from the perspective of the subject matter. However, in this case, because we were trying to do things that were new to us, it is also worth spending time on the structure of the game design.
The main difference between this game and those we normally play is the degree of concealment within 'The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe'. The five unconcealed players knew of each other, had a good idea of the resources they could command, and could see on the game map the contours of each other's interests. They knew very little about the Taliban. They knew little of the Taliban location and the resources at the command of the Taliban. Much of the game was based upon strategic assumptions, and as umpires we hinted in those cases where a reappraisal, in our view, ought to have been undertaken. Only one player attempted an intelligence assessment of the Taliban, with partial success. Of course, concealment for one player meant that we also had to offer the facility to the other players. Russia and the United States both undertook concealed moves, with varying degrees of success.
We feel that the concealment question was well addressed for the Taliban player through the use of secret maps and secret briefings, but it had a more limited impact for other players. Once the game play had taken on a collective dimension, the players had to demonstrate to their peers that they had undertaken what they had promised to do. This channelled the game play into a more open form. The Taliban eventually entered into this framework once they had achieved a degree of territoriality. Perhaps this tells us something about the design of games where one or more players are not territorial?
We found that the game developed more or less along the lines expected. It caught the dissonance between the Sunni and Shia worlds quite well. Initially, we felt that the game would highlight three combinations: China, Russia and Kazakhstan; China and Iran; and the US and the Taliban. In terms of conflict, the main competitors would be China and Iran against the US and the Taliban. A key co-operation axis would be between China, Russia, and Kazakhstan. Things didn't quite work out that way.
The US made common cause with Russia and Kazakhstan against the Taliban. China found common cause with the Taliban against the US, Russia, and Kazakhstan. Iran become a hermit republic. The game generated two axes of co-operation, one between China and Russia on the northern arm of the BRI and one with the Taliban on the southern arm of the BRI. We feel that Kazakhstan was left rather isolated by this development and it did beg the question in the Wash Up Session of whether or not Kazakhstan was ripe for partition in 2050 by China and Russia. That was a question we left hanging at the end of the game.
Did the game generate anything useful? In one sense it was useful in laying down a baseline scenario out to 2050. We aimed at examining what could happen if current policies were followed for the next thirty years. The result that China had the field to itself to roll out the BRI in Central Asia didn't contain too many surprises. It did beg the interesting question of what China's peer rival - the US - could do to counter this? Our view was that the US would need to 'out-China China' through something like an Asian equivalent of the Marshall Plan. This would also provide a useful counter to the expansion of Taliban influence.
Perhaps that could be the basis of a future game?
Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2020
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