In the framework we followed during the game, we allowed a week to pass between each turn being declared. This gave the players ample time to work upon a collective approach to various issues, to hammer out agreements between themselves, and to reflect upon how they were progressing in relation to their objectives. At the end of Turn 6, we gave everyone a week of reflection before attending a final wash up session to consider the degree to which they achieved - or otherwise - their objectives. The umpires would also undertake this exercise separately, and the notes between the two groups would be compared at the meeting. Where they agreed, we would pass on. Where they differed, or where they threw out an interesting point, we would go back over the assessment as a research point.
The United States player had three objectives, which were to maintain the three US bases in the region and to expand the US
presence by a further three military bases; to check and counter Russian and
Chinese ambitions in the region; and to ensure that Iran and the Taliban fail
in the economic development of their respective territorial areas. In the assessment of both the umpires and the player concerned, all three objectives were not achieved. This was interesting in itself not because of the result but because of the manner in which it was achieved. At the request of the game designer, the American player adopted a 'War Hawk' stance to the game play. That it led to failure in achieving the core objectives was seen by the group as significant.
The objectives of the Russian player were to maintain the three Russian bases in the region and to expand the Russian
presence by a further three military bases; to achieve the removal of US
sanctions placed upon Russia; and to ensure that Russia remains the main
Chinese ally in the region. The assessment of the umpires was that the first and second objective had been achieved, and possibly also the third. The assessment of the player was a bit more restrained. They had mixed feelings over the first objectives whilst agreeing with the umpires over the second and third. Two research flags were placed upon this result. One concerning the degree to which Russian bases are truly Russian if they had been largely infiltrated by the Taliban forces. The second begged the question over what it meant to be the principal Chinese ally in the region. Especially as the Taliban could reasonably lay claim to that title.
The China player was aiming to secure the supply of hydrocarbons from within the region; to extend and
strengthen the BRI across the region; and to secure military and commercial
port facilities at Bandar Abbas. Both the umpires and the player agreed that the first and second objective had been achieved, whilst the third had not. However, a research flag was placed on the third objective because, in the course of the game, the Chinese game play had altered the strategic landscape. Instead of planning the BRI across Iran, access to Turkey - and subsequently Greece and Europe - was routed across Turkmenistan instead. Did that render the Iranian extension redundant?
The player of Kazakhstan sought to provide a freight and hydrocarbon transit route from Kazakhstan and
Russia to China; to impede the development of hydrocarbon transit routes
between the Persian Gulf and China; and to provide a mechanism whereby all
actors can evade western imposed sanctions. In the opinion of the umpires and the player, the first objective had been achieved whilst the third had not. There was a difference of emphasis over the second objective. The umpires felt that Kazakhstan might possibly have impeded the export of hydrocarbons from the Persian Gulf to China, but the player wasn't sure about that. It was felt that this difference was reasonably minor, so no research flag was placed over it.
During the game, Iran was seeking to fully circumvent western imposed sanctions on both goods and access to
capital markets; to sell hydrocarbons directly overland to China; and to have
developed fully functioning nuclear weapons. Both the umpires and the player agreed that the three objectives had not been achieved. In discussion, it was felt that a research point ought to be placed on the first objective. Within the game, the Iranian player developed a fully consistent siege economy, largely isolated from the global economy, except for the maritime export of hydrocarbons to China. In the light of this, it is reasonable to ask of western sanctions actually matter? The Iranian player felt that Iran was frustrated in the second objective because of the hostility of the Taliban in the game. In discussion, it was decided to place a research marker on this point because it captured the whole of the dissonance between the Shia and Sunni world. The game was designed to make this happen.
Which brings us to the Taliban player. Their objectives were to drive out the American presence from the region; to establish a form of
territoriality and a provisional government; and to ensure that the BRI
develops north of the Caspian Sea rather than the south of it. Both the umpires and the player agreed that the first two objectives had been achieved. The umpires felt that the Taliban had possibly achieved the third objective, whereas the player felt the result was more mixed. This was owing to China altering the proposals for the southern branch of the BRI. It was agreed to place a research on the second objective because although a degree of territoriality had been achieved, the new governments of Turkmenistan and Afghanistan were not universally recognised within the international community and a question arose over how much legitimacy could be conferred until that happened.
All in all the game was a mixed bag. Many of the objectives were zero sum, which meant that those who achieved their objectives would naturally prevent others from doing so. Looking at the outcome overall, a number of research points stand out:
1. We touched upon the issue of ownership and control within the game. Both the US and Russia established military training facilities deep in Taliban territory with the consequent result that they both trained and armed the Taliban military wing. This has an authentic air about it. However, what could the players have done to prevent it? This is definitely a point for further review.
2. At the start of the game, we would have predicted that Russia would end the game as the principal Chinese ally in the region. It was a surprise to find that the Taliban could challenge Russia to that title. Does this say something about the progress of Russian diplomacy? Or does it say more about the utilitarian nature of Chinese diplomacy? Perhaps the Taliban were playing more of a Chinese game than Russia managed to play?
3. The game play of Iran led to some interesting questions centred around the effectiveness of western sanctions. They are much used nowadays - over-used in our opinion - and run the risk of the sanctioned nation developing a siege economy. This was possible in the game owing to China continuing to buy Iranian hydrocarbons. However it does raise the question where a nation is comfortably disconnected from the world economy and doesn't see it as a priority to restore access. Could that mean that we have seen the use of sanctions pass their most effective point? In future, could they be no more than a gesture?
4. The rise of the Taliban as a territorial entity raised a number of tantalising questions. By starting as a non-state actor, the game allowed the Taliban to secure control of two countries - Turkmenistan and Afghanistan - and to become a dominant fact in three more - Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The model by which this happened - poverty alleviation, social assistance, and a relatively incorrupt justice system - is worth further study. Discussion at the end of the game was centred around how the Taliban could have been defeated within the game. The view of the umpires was that less corruption, less neglect of the population, and more public works would have undermined the case for the Taliban. The problem was how to achieve this is the existing governments are unwilling to reform?
These are some of the questions we were left with at the end of the game. The game itself didn't provide answers to these questions, but they are worthy of further study. In some respects, they have held to uncover the 'known unknowns'. We know what we don't know. Surely that has to be a step forward?
Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2020
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