The Unfrozen North was a game played across a number of dimensions. We wanted to examine how a northern element to China's Belt & Road Initiative (the BRI) could unfold. We wanted to examine the consequences of institutional weakness in the Arctic Council and a lack of cohesion amongst the NATO allies. More than that, we also wanted to examine to degree of potential co-operation there could be between Russia and China - with the acquiescence of Japan - in northern Asia. The study yielded some interesting conclusions that may be worth further consideration in the years to come.
The most obvious conclusion we reached is that, with the absence of a cohesive and unified approach from the NATO allies, the strategic initiative in the Arctic Ocean would pass to a Russia that is driven by China. This allowed both Russia and China to station fleets in the Arctic Ocean with no response from NATO. It allowed Russia to dominate the sea lanes for freight transit and to control the operation of the Arctic fisheries. This was conducted entirely to the benefit of western interests in the game, but it is not difficult to foresee a point in the future when that situation might change, with NATO having no answer to the question.
In 2020, much of the region is under-developed. The port facilities are sparse and the transportation corridors are few and far between. In the game, we assumed that the only nation with the desire and ability to change this situation would be China. We think that a reasonable assumption and the purpose of the game was to tease out some of the consequences of that assumption. The results were more or less what we could have expected them to be and we see this as a reasonably stable base line scenario for the Arctic.
The resulting development was not wholly beneficial to the environment of the Arctic. We had Canada and the European Commission advancing a green agenda, but with the lack of co-operation from Russia and the US, this was something of a forlorn hope. Canada was unable to limit the degree of poaching in the Arctic fisheries because there was a lack of naval assets to provide fishery protection. In many ways, this was an organisational matter that may have been better served by a clearer focus on whose mission fishery protection is, and the providing that agency with the tools to do the job.
Russia was very much the junior partner to China. In one sense, that is because we structured the game that way. We deliberately froze Russia out of the western capital markets and we deliberately placed the technical expertise in the hands of China. This facilitated a pivot of Russia away from Europe towards Asia. It was our intention to see how well the two actors would get on together. As it turned out, they got on rather well. They teamed up quite early in the game and the partnership provided a solid core for their achievements. A different, and more interesting, game would be to factor into the relationship more conflict than co-operation.
Japan managed to derive many of the benefits of the Polar Silk Road without incurring too many of the costs. Beneficial fishing rights were negotiated with Russia, as were beneficial transit fees along the Northern Sea Route. In the game, China was too busy building out the BRI to be bothered by Japan. An interesting extension might be to introduce a fuller spectrum of diplomatic relations by including, say, the Senkaku Islands as a point of conflict. However, that's a different game.
The structure of the game reflected our belief that the Arctic is more of a strategic priority for Canada than it is for the US. This came out in the game play and had an authentic feel to it. We could have given a bit more emphasis upon hydrocarbon extraction in Alaska just to tease out that point of conflict, In the end, there appeared to be an internal resolution of the conflict between hydrocarbon extraction and preserving the natural environment. This is an interesting way of interpreting the current situation in Alaska.
We inserted a fractured and disinterested Europe into the game. There were more pressing issues for the European Commission to deal with than the commercial development of the Arctic region. Europe has an interest in the region, but found it difficult to gain traction with events there. We found this to be reasonably accurate a portrayal of European politics. There are always more pressing matters than the Arctic, and any problem in the Arctic can be resolved through the use of liberal funding.
Looking back at the game, allowing for a period of reflection, we feel that the results were reasonably valid as a base line scenario. A Russian-Chinese caucus is likely be dominant. Japan is likely to free ride the commercial development. The US and Europe are distracted by far more pressing matters, and Canada alone is unable to move the needle. This scenario is not written in stone. Things can change if we act to effect those changes. Perhaps we might explore that in future games?
Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2020
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