In 2017 we wrote about some thinking we had undertaken on the likely trajectory of Brexit over the next decade or so (see 'A Beginners Guide To Brexit'). Using the Three Horizons Model as a way of viewing the issue we suggested that it would be very optimistic to expect the question of Brexit to be resolved before the UK had left the European Union. With the benefit of hindsight over the past three years, and as the issue of Brexit has become one of international concern, now might be a good time to revisit that piece of work for an update.
In our original thinking, we felt that the period 2017-19 would be one in which the UK would attempt to negotiate a departure from the EU on beneficial terms. This would be unlikely to succeed because the UK had yet to determine exactly how it saw the relationship with the EU unfolding in the coming years. What we failed to appreciate was the degree to which the issue would polarise British society and the degree to which the British Establishment would hinder the process of leaving the European Union. Ultimately, this rearguard action failed. In December 2019, the British public voted decisively, by a large margin, for a government committed to leaving the European Union, as soon as possible, at any cost.
It was the decision to leave at any cost that is the cause for concern. After years of division and bitter recrimination, the British public has decisively decided what it doesn't want. What the United Kingdom has failed to do is to define what it does want. It is because of this fundamental mismatch between aspiration and capability that the UK government still appears vacillating. It also suggests that any attempt to determine a post-Brexit relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union is doomed to failure at this point. In contemporary language, we seem to be heading towards a 'Hard Brexit' unless either side is willing to compromise upon their core values and interests.
If we are right, our modelling suggests that we shall then go into a hostility phase. In our original thinking, we felt that this could last well into the mid-2020s. During this period, we shall see if the United Kingdom can be a viable independent nation off the coast of the European continent. We shall see if there is any merit to the aspiration of a 'Global Britain'. We shall see if 'Singapore-Upon-Thames' is just a dream (or nightmare, depending upon one's perspective). Of course, this isn't all one way. We shall also see if migration - especially of climate refugees - pulls apart the free movement of labour in Europe. We shall see if the unfinished monetary union is ever completed. And we shall see if the EU is really building a debt fuelled siege economy that is dependent upon the subsidies of state aid. By the mid-2020s, all of these uncertainties will have gone some way to being resolved.
The model then suggests that, from the mid-2020s onwards, we shall see a form of resolution starting to unfold. Where the new relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union starts to take shape. Each party will see aspects of each other that they like the look of. This will form the basis for reconciliation. It is at this point that issues such as finding a lasting trade deal will come into play. Our model suggests that this phase will not be a significant feature much before the end of this decade.
Where does that leave us? So far, the model seems to have stood up well to the test of reality. One factor not in the model is Scotland, and that is a feature that we might like to think about further. The core uncertainty here is whether or not Brexit has advanced the cause of Scottish Independence to the point where it actually occurs. It seems unlikely in the first half of the decade, simply because the Parliamentary arithmetic speaks against it. It could be a possibility for the second half of the decade, assuming that a General Election in 2023-24 changes the Parliamentary arithmetic dramatically, but a potential rapprochement between the UK and the EU in the second half of the decade would undermine the cause of Scottish Independence. This is certainly a factor to watch.
If we lay aside the question of Scotland, the model seems to be standing up to the test of time quite well. There are no real reasons why we would want to change the model at this point. Our expectation is that we shall see both the UK and the EU both becoming intransigent over the next four or five years. The question will be which can suffer the strain better? It is assumed that the United Kingdom, as the smaller party, will fare worse than the European Union. We feel that this assumption may not be correct because it under-estimates the determination of the United Kingdom to leave the EU, even at a very high price. It also does not take into account that the European Union may have a much lower pain threshold than the United Kingdom. That will be in the hands of politics and events, which the model can't fully anticipate.
Whatever happens, the United Kingdom will still be 12 miles away from continental Europe at the nearest point. Nothing will change that, which means that both sides will have an impact upon each other for some time to come.
Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2020
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