Monday 28 September 2020

The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe - Turn 4 (2040)

As we move into the second half of the game, the positions of the players are starting to become defined. The axes of co-operation and conflict are starting to show through as the players try to achieve their objectives. We are at the point where strategic assumptions need to be reviewed to work out what other players want and what they could be offered. As part of the background, the climate is becoming more of a factor within the region.

Iran revived its nuclear programme. This is dual purpose - to supply power within Iran and to secure a by-product that can be used in the creation of a nuclear weapon. Iran has sold some nuclear capability to North Korea. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Israel are unhappy in the region and pressures the US to take counter-measures. South Korea and Japan are unhappy about the North Korean involvement and pressure US to take counter-measures. They also make representations to China to limit North Korea. Internally in the US, the support for the President diminishes (his opponents denounce him).

It was established that Iran continues to supply China with oil, by sea from Bandar Abbas. It was also established that the Iranian diaspora was generally unsympathetic to the government of Iran, but too weak to become a factor within Iranian domestic politics.

The Taliban forms a provisional government in Turkmenistan. They receive official recognition from Iran, China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Contracts with China and Iran concerning the flow of hydrocarbons are honoured, and hydrocarbons flow again across the Karakum Desert. The border between Iran and Turkmenistan remains open.

The new government of Turkmenistan is not recognised by the US, Russia, and Kazakhstan. All US assets in Turkmenistan are nationalised with all contracts voided. The US business community is extremely upset with the President and support for the President diminishes even further (his supporters now denounce him). All Russian assets in Turkmenistan are nationalised with all contracts voided. The Siloviki are very unhappy with the Russian President and now openly question his competence. The border between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan remains open allowing trade to continue, but all contracts are voided owing to the lack of Kazakh recognition of the new government in Turkmenistan.

The government of Turkmenistan expresses a desire for the US training facility at Mari to remain open. The US decides to close the facility and the troops are withdrawn without incident.

The Taliban decides to close the US training facility at Bukhara in Uzbekistan. The US resists. In the resulting firefight, the US troops suffer 80% casualties, finding the Taliban troops well armed, well trained, and having the element of surprise. It is revealed that the US training facilities at Mari and Bukhara have been arming and training Taliban fighters since they were created in 2025.

A squadron of F35s are assigned to provide air support for the garrison at Bukhara. The first flight of four aircraft are shot down over the Karakum desert as soon as they enter Uzbek airspace, with two crews confirmed dead, one missing and presumed dead, and one captured. AWACs oversight reports that the F35s were shot down by Russian SA500 air defence missiles that appeared to be available in significant quantities. All military flights in the region are cancelled pending the outcome of a Congressional investigation.

The government of Afghanistan has become fearful of its position.

China acts to take control of the construction of the Urumqi to Orenburg gas pipeline. China will build out the pipeline with support from Kazakhstan and Russia, who will provide the project security. This increases and improves relations with Kazakhstan and will improve the flow of hydrocarbons into China when built. It increases China's role as an investor and consumer within the region. The pipeline will be complete in 2045.

As a result of the Chinese intervention in the Urumqi to Orenburg gas pipeline, ownership of the pipeline passes from Russian to Chinese entities. The Russian entities have to write off their investment. This causes even further discontent amongst the Siloviki with the current Russian leadership.

Russia seeks to develop GMO crop varieties to address the food crisis. The programme draws upon collaboration from the US and China and will make the new crop varieties available to Central Asian countries. The offer of seed is accepted by Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan for local food production.

Kazakhstan undertakes a scheme of public works with a focus on water security. Desalination plants are constructed in Tengiz and beside Lake Balkhash using a technology transfer from Russia, China, and the US. This improves the situation of many Kazakh people and creates partnerships with Russia, China, the US, and Iran. The Kazakh technological capability is raised marginally, despite the slight impact on the local water tables and the prevalence of corruption and waste.

The US seeks to reform and modernise the banking system in Central Asia. Attempts are hampered by a general lack of digital infrastructure in the region. An unsuccessful attempt is made to disrupt the traditional Hawala system of financial transactions. The US received support from Russia, but fails to gain support from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. China refuses to pressure Pakistan to join the initiative, but the US pressures Afghanistan to join the initiative.

The US can exert a degree of influence over the formal monetary structures within the region, but most of the transactions occur in the informal sector. The US loses further support from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

There is major popular discontent in Afghanistan. There are significant and peaceful demonstrations in Kabul, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif against continued US presence in the country.

The hot, dry, weather continues and worsens a little.

There is a movement of populations from the larger population areas in the region northwards. Iran remains relatively water and food secure. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have programmes of social assistance and poverty relief. The urban populations are hungry, thirsty, poor, and angry. Unhappy faces will go on the capital cities of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kabul. Climate refugees arriving in Russia and Iran are causing a degree of friction with the local populations.

The adverse weather continues to affect construction activity across the region.

In the years 2041 to 2045 the average price of oil rises from $51 per barrel to $54 per barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan
© The European Futures Observatory 2020

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