The Dragon, The Bear, And The Steppe - Turn 2 (2030)

Having made their opening moves, the players are now starting to focus on building their positions to achieve their objectives by the end of the game. The patterns of player relationships are starting to emerge as the actors start to reach for their goals. A few hidden moves still have an impact on the game, but the contours of gameplay are starting to become evident.

China, with the agreement of the US, builds out a series of LNG trans-shipment facilities on the West Coast of the US. These are fully operational by 2030. This helps to reduce Chinese dependence upon Central Asian gas supplies.

The Taliban engages in a campaign of area denial in the Karakum Desert. The campaign manages to reduce the flows of hydrocarbons across the desert by 90% to 95% of the 2025 levels. They can do this because of the degree of popular support they enjoy in the area and the relative ineffectiveness of the local Turkmen and Uzbek security forces.

Iran, using internally generated funding and knowledge of local operating conditions, embarks on a programme to develop a new pipeline material, based around the use of graphene. This will allow pipes to be laid that are tolerant of extreme weather conditions and which are flexible for use in extreme terrains. The technology is being researched at Shiraz and will be completed by 2035. The effort to produce this material has exhausted the supply of internal funding in Iran.

Kazakhstan is seeking to develop a tech sector to support the Kazakh economy. The Kazakh authorities sought to draw upon their previous investments in the transportation sector but were hampered by the relative lack of success in that endeavour. Transport in Kazakhstan remains primitive. The rail network, in 2030, is only 45% electrified. The improvements in this area were achieved by diverting power from the household sector to the rail sector. The bulk of electricity generated in the country - mainly from coal - is used to fuel the extractive industries. The road network, apart from a small number of vanity projects and BRI financed highways, retains the same pattern laid down by the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Little has been maintained effectively or upgraded.

Kazakhstan does receive a degree of technology transfer from Russia, China and the US, so the technology sector has started to be developed. In developmental terms, it has placed Kazakhstan to a similar situation enjoyed by the US in the early 1990s. Compared to the other C4 nations, Kazakhstan has a far higher degree of technological development, which improves the reputation of Kazakhstan amongst it's neighbours. However, there has been little improvement of the life conditions of the majority of the population.

The US has embarked upon a programme to support the agricultural diversification of the Central Asian region. This involved the US purchasing cereal crops from the Taliban at an extremely high intervention price that meant that many farmers have switched away from opium poppies to wheat. The US anti-narcotics programme was supported by Russia, China, and Kazakhstan, and approved by the Taliban. The roll out of the programme highlighted the results of the training missions in Mari and Bukhara. It transpired that 80% of the recruits refused to follow the established chain of command, 15% of the recruits were 'no shows', and only 5% of the recruits took their tasks seriously. Of this latter group, there is a high turnover owing to their relatively high mortality rate.

As a result of the US action, there was a decrease in the locally grown narcotic crop and an increase in the locally grown cereal crop. However, terrorist operations in the region were not significantly defunded. US relations with the Taliban, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan all improved.

Russia, with the acquiescence of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, establishes a border security programme. This involves establishing a training facility at Kulob and Bishket. Russia provides the necessary technology and security assistance through training and equipment upgrades. This results in a decreased drug flow into Russia involving increased security co-operation with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, but not Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 

Unknown to other players, this greatly assists the Taliban who control the town of Kulob and the associated hinterland. It means that the Taliban supply 80% of the recruits to the Russian training programme, who can now be considered as being trained in the latest Russian military doctrine using the latest Russian weapons. The troops are available for deployment anywhere in the region under Taliban control, either as Talban troops or as false flag troops pretending to be Russians.

Russia attempted to establish a new military camp in south Kyrgyzstan but was opposed by the Taliban. This did not go well for the Russians. There was intense fighting around the camp and along the access corridor, resulting with the Russians abandoning the plans to establish the camp. Russian survivors reported their opponents to be using quite modern weaponry and tactics of both US and Russian origin.

The years 2031 to 2035 will experience a prolonged heatwave with an associated lack of rainfall. These provide a hostile environment for the growth of cereals and other agricultural produce. A certain degree of water stress is experienced across the region.

In the years 2031 to 2035, the average price of oil rises from $45 per barrel to $50 per barrel.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

© The European Futures Observatory 2020